

KERALA UNDER HAIDAR ALI AND TIPU SULTAN

The author acknowledges the financial assistance given by the Indian Council of Historical Research for publication of this book. The responsibility for the facts stated, opinions expressed, or conclusions reached, however, is entirely that of the author.

Dr. C. K. KAREEM

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Dr. C. K. KAREEM

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History – This study on the medieval period of Kerala History has been accepted by the Aligarh Muslim University for the award of Ph.D.

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Trivandrum-10,
July 31, 1973.

Dr. C. K. Kareem
State Editor
Kerala Gazetteers.

PREFACE

It is acknowledged everywhere that truth is the criterion by which the worth of historical writings is to be tested. Yet truth is the very quality that is found lacking in many works that pass for history. This is especially so in the case of the history of a country which has been subjected to prolonged foreign rule. When historians of the conquering race attempt a history of the conquered country, principles of historiography are ignored and facts are subjected to a great deal of distortion, misrepresentation and misinterpretation. Indian history remains as an unrivalled example of this phenomenon. This history of India was written by the English, for the English, with the specific view that the sun may never set on the British Empire. Adherence to truth, therefore, is not a salient feature of Indian History that English historians have bequeathed to the world. In the interest of truth it behoves us to be critical while going through these writings and to have reservations regarding the conclusions, to which these authors would lead us. Much more is demanded from the Indian students concerned with the history of our country; they have to explore the past patiently and make the light of truth and scientific spirit fall on its distorted passages darkened by malicious misrepresentation. Facts that have been concealed have to be brought into the open and made to speak for themselves. This is, no doubt, an arduous task but at the same time one that is greatly rewarding.

While instances of the English historians' bias can be cited practically from any period of Indian History, it is seen at its worst in the record of the fierce rivalry of the English with the Nawabs of Mysore and the consequent wars fought between them. English historians, who deserve praise for

being the first to undertake the strenuous task of writing a comprehensive history of India were unfortunately committed to the imperialist policy of "Divide and Rule" and did not scruple to adopt any means that would further this policy. Naturally a great deal of falsehood has crept into their writings. Their ingenuity found innumerable ways to accomplish their purpose which was to nurture the empire and preserve and foster its interests here in India as elsewhere. To manage the writing of history in such a way as to stir up communalism was but a corollary of the British policy in India. All evils which taint Indian History in general are no where so evident as in the picture of the Mysorean period drawn by the prejudiced English.

This is not surprising, as the Mysore rulers were uncompromising enemies of the English. Moreover Tipu Sultan, in whom the English found an enemy of formidable stature who could measure up to them in every way, inspired in them an envious alarm. It became a compelling urge therefore not merely to destroy this source of threat to their security but also to blacken him for all ages. This they have done effectively. To the people of India they have bequeathed the idea that Tipu Sultan was a fanatic, who did not stop at anything in order to humiliate his enemies or to effect conversions to Islam. An elaborate network of lies and careful propaganda implanted in the popular mind the 'atrocities' of Tipu Sultan and his 'savage bigotry.' This calculated step taken by the English was intended not merely to win for themselves the favour of the non-Muslim rulers of India, but also to justify their deeds to the people of England who tended to be critical of the Company's activities in India. Many men of integrity were raising their voice in protest against the policy of the East India Company. Burke, for instance described the rule of the Company as "one of the most corrupt and disruptive tyrannies that probably ever existed in the world."¹ Elaborating

1. *Parliamentary History*, Vol. 23, Burke's Speech, Nov. 18, 1783.

on the corrupt and unethical conduct of the English in India Burke continued, "there is not a single prince, state or potentate, small or great in India with whom they have come into contact—whom they have not sold There is not a single treaty they have ever made which they have not broken There is not a single prince or state who ever put any trust in the Company who is not utterly ruined."² It thus became a necessity for the Company to paint their inveterate enemies like Tipu Sultan in the blackest colour possible so that it might be absolved of blame. Stories of forced conversions, of the circumcision of thousands of Hindu subjects and of other manifold brutalities were invented and spread carefully. Historical writings by unidentified authors appeared in large numbers. Carefully compiled "memoirs" and "autobiographies" of the dreadful person—Tipu Sultan—were made available to the people. Edicts in the name of the Sultan were brought forward which lent credibility to the stories of his religious bigotry and cruelty. In short every possible attempt was made to besmirch this Mysorean ruler and to make his name live for ever as the synonym of wickedness. The entire Mysorean period is dismissed as a savage episode in Indian history and the coming of the Mysoreans into Malabar is described as a devastating raid made by barbarians who looted and killed without any mercy, who consigned everything to the fire and left in every place they passed through, a picture of desolation.

This opinion prevails even today. No serious and detailed study of this period has been attempted so far that could, by bringing to light well-concealed facts, alter the entire aspect of the history of the period. Kerala under the Mysoreans witnessed great social, political and economic developments that had far reaching effects. From the point of view of the administrative measures and socio-economic reforms that were implemented during the rule of Haidar Ali

and Tipu Sultan, the period deserves systematic study and careful appraisal. Yet these two figures who played a major role in emancipating Kerala from Medieval ways have not been done justice to. True, there is an abundance of materials concerning this period of Kerala history. But these are mostly one-sided, and of a derogatory nature. Even Indian historians writing about this period have been content to follow the foot-steps of their English predecessors and to let themselves be guided entirely by the fabricated documents they had ready access to. The damage done is incalculable. Truth has been sacrificed and a very important and in many respects a glorious period of our history remains buried under falsehood. Hence, any attempt to unearth the facts and to bring to light the real nature of the period will be of great value.

The present work has been undertaken with the purpose of reconstructing the history of the Mysorean rule in Kerala. On the strength of the original documents available a probe has been made into the political, social and economic conditions in Malabar before and after the Mysorean occupation. The contention that both Haidar Ali and his son Tipu Sultan have been wronged by English historians is supported by evidence. The notorious Malabar edicts that have been the corner-stone of all charges of bigotry and monstrocities, are subjected to a dispassionate scrutiny as a result of which the undeniable conclusion emerges that both edicts were fabricated or invented. The political set up of Kerala under the Mysorean administration, the unprecedented reforms that the country witnessed in the economic and agrarian spheres and the impact of these novel steps on the social set-up of the country are given the importance they deserve. In evaluating the political scene on the eve of the Mysorean conquest of Kerala, it has been necessary to deal, briefly however, with the rise of the many principalities of this part of the country so that the relation of each of these to the Mysoreans may be made clear. The advent of the foreign

powers, their steady growth, their constant political manoeuvres and their relation with the chieftains of Malabar are also discussed. Some important aspects of the relation of the Mysoreans with the princely states of Travancore and Cochin have been discussed with the help of hitherto unpublished documents. The major problem in the execution of a work of this nature has been the dearth of indigenous source material. What has been sedulously propagated as original sources have been proved unreliable. Most of the contemporary writings, and many later works based on them, have been found to call for much sifting, so as to separate facts from fiction.

No other period in the Indian History has produced such an overwhelming abundance of source-materials as the period of the Mysorean rule. Yet the paradox remains that this period is most misunderstood and misrepresented. This is explained by the very nature of these sources and their spurious origin. Myths, legends and rumours form a large part of these sources. The writings that have been handed down to posterity as authoritative were all written by the English and we have already seen to what extent they are trustworthy. The Mysorean rulers could never enjoy the good-will of the English chroniclers, since the former were committed to an anti-English policy. Tipu Sultan especially with his persistent and unwavering hostility to the fast-rising power of the East India Company, drew upon himself the unmitigated hatred of the English. It is not surprising therefore, that all the contemporary writings in which he figures, have depicted him as a monster of cruelty and a symbol of bigotry. The English taxed their ingenuity heavily in an attempt to create records that could ensure for their bitter enemy the kind of reputation they wanted him to have. Edicts and proclamations that lent themselves conveniently to the purpose of the English, appeared. Biographical writings allegedly by sympathetic authors were published anonymously. To depend on these sources, as almost al

historians have done would be to perpetuate falsehood and bias.

The sources used for the present work are memoirs, diaries, letters, diplomatic reports, news-letters and original narratives of contemporaries and eye-witnesses. To corroborate and supplement these sources, secondary works of well-known authors have been referred to. The National Archives of India have proved to be a veritable mine of information for this period under study. The proceedings, consultations and secret letters to the Court of Directors as well as those written by them that are arranged in the Foreign, Home, Miscellaneous and Military Departments etc., are of inestimable worth in writing the history of the period along scientific lines.

Among these sources pride of place is claimed by '*The Malabar Joint Commissioner's Report*', with connected papers and a Supplementary Report of 1792-94. This Report holds a mirror to the state of Malabar when the country came into the hands of the English on the conclusion of peace with Tipu in 1792 A.D. Since these reports were to be a correct assessment of the actual condition of the country and of the history of its people, the Commissioners were compelled to be objective. Hence these Reports that are in the Foreign Miscellaneous Series give the lie to the innumerable charges against the Mysoreans that the English recorded elsewhere for the sake of popular consumption. *The Joint Commissioner's Report*, in fact, is an illuminating source of information regarding the history of the various dynasties of Malabar and the relation of the Rajahs and other potentates with one another and with the Mysorean rulers. It may well be accepted as the basis of Kerala History covering ancient and medieval periods. The study of this Report can be supplemented usefully with the '*Minutes of Sir John Shore on the Report of the Joint Commissioners of Malabar*.' This volume contains the decision taken by the Company's

government on the recommendations of the Commissioners and is to be studied carefully along with the *Report* itself. Another source of reliable information is the *Procedure volumes* of the Joint Commissioners that recorded the proceedings, vouchers, letters and other valuable documents the usefulness of which can hardly be over-estimated. This invaluable source may be rated as being more important than even the *Joint Commissioner's Report*.

The archival materials housed in the Tamil Nadu Archives and in the State Archives and in its regional offices of Kozhikode, Ernakulam and Trivandrum have yielded compelling evidence in favour of a reassessment of the period under survey. *The Tellicherry and Anjengo Factory Diaries and Consultations, Military Consultations and Military Country Books* preserved in the Tamil Nadu Archives have shed much light on the subject. These original sources give rise to a sense of regret that these precious storehouses of information have been taxed so very little in the writing of Kerala History. The present work owes much to a number of obscure Malayalam documents found in the manuscript libraries of Trivandrum and Tripunithura. It is perhaps for the first time in Kerala that indigenous sources are exploited for historical writing.

The published documents of the record offices of Kerala, Hyderabad, Bombay, Tamil Nadu and Delhi have also been highly useful. The Newsletters, Diplomatic correspondence and Poona Akbharas, published by the Hyderabad Record office are very important for this purpose. *The Dutch Records and Memoirs* of the Dutch Governors of the Malabar Coast, *Baramahal Records* and other publications of Tamil Nadu Archives are also worth mentioning. Another fertile source of information has been the *Poona Residence Correspondence*, particularly the third volume that supplies the diplomatic correspondence of the Governor-General and the other three principal parties of the Third Anglo-Mysore war.

This volume has been used to supplement and corroborate the information found in other sources. *The Minutes, Correspondence etc. of the Marquis of Wellesly and Indian Series, The Old Vestiges of Madras* are also helpful for the study. The Inam Registers of Kozhikode Archives, Manuscript Grandhams of Tripunitura and the Dutch Correspondence of this period in the Ernakulam Archives have also been referred. A number of *Revenue Reports* by the Collectors of Malabar, prepared under the instructions of the Company in the early years of its reign in Malabar are relevant to the study of this period. These *Reports* are : (1) *A Report of the Southern Division of Malabar, February 4, 1801* by John W. Wye, Collector, (2) *Report On The Condition Of The Paulghat, Congad, Mannar, Eddaterra, Kowilpara And Narnottum Divisions Of The Districts Of Malabar*, dated March 19, 1801 by Thomas Warden — Collector, (3) *The Jamabundi Reports* by Major Macleod, June 18, 1802, (4) *Report On The Revenue Affairs Of Malabar And Canara*, September 1807, W. Thackeray, (5) *Report On The Survey and Settlement Of South Malabar*, J. Smee, Collector, 1809 (6) *Report On The Revenue System in Malabar*, June 16, 1813 by Thomas Warden, Collector, (7) *Report On The Land Assessment in Malabar*, April 20, 1815 by Thomas Warden, Collector, (8) *Mr. Graeme's Glossary of Words And Phrases Relating To The Land Tenures and Land Assessment Of Malabar With Notes And Etymological Headings*, 1818-1822, (9) *Report On The Province Of Malabar And Canara*, January 29, 1841, (10) *File Of Correspondence Regarding The Relation Of Landlord And Tenant in Malabar*, 1852-1856 by T. Strange, (11) *Report Of The Malabar Special Commission*, 1881-82 by W. Logan, Collector.

In addition to these original materials, the writings of contemporary historians and travellers have also been consulted, the most important among these being Col. Wilk's *History of Mysore* written in 1810-1814. This book traces

the history of Mysore and describes her wars with the native and foreign powers. The book written with great literary flair is eminently readable. Yet, as a work of history it evinces innumerable defects of a very grave nature. That Wilks ignores the wealth of original sources which could have supplied him with all the details necessary for a specialised study is the prime defect of the book. Another is that the book remains a good monument of the English Historian's bias. One cannot find any trace of objectivity or scientific enquiry in the work of Col. Wilks. Yet this very book has been treated as the bible of later historians writing about this period. The harm done by the *History of Mysore* with its highly prejudiced rendering of facts was perpetuated by later writers like Bowring and W. Logan who depended solely on this. Bowring's *Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan* and Logan's *The Malabar Manual* show that they blindly accepted the views of Wilks. In the eagerness with which historians borrowed passage after passage from Wilks and their readiness to claim him as an authority, the caution given by J. Mill that "for opinions his (Col. Wilks) partiality deserves to be watched,"³ went unnoticed. Two other English writers who contributed to the calumny of Tipu Sultan were Beaston and Kirk Patrick. The latter's '*The Select Letters of Tippoo Sultan*' shows instances of dexterous manipulation of facts and tampering with the correspondence. The translation of the letters is also faulty and one cannot subscribe to the view that the mistakes are unintentional. In addition to all these Kirk Patrick lets himself into the work too much to guide highly subjective interpretation of passages quoted from the so called biography of Tipu Sultan, a work evidently forged.

Dirom's Narrative published in 1794 professes to be a study of the very last phase of the Third Anglo-Mysore War from June 1791 to February 1792. It ignores the diplomatic aspects that had their bearing on the military issue. The

3. J. Mill—*History of British India*, Vol. V, p. 297.

author however admits that his *Narrative* is imperfect and that all the innumerable details and complicated circumstances relating to the operations of several armies could not have come within his knowledge. Another work of a similar nature is Edward Moore's '*Narrative of Operations of Captain Little's Detachment*' published in 1794. It does not attempt to give a comprehensive picture of the Third Anglo-Mysore War but limits its scope to the depiction of a mere side-show—the work of the small British Detachment that accompanied Parasuram Bahu Patwardhan. But even in this the book cannot claim to be fully informative, for the author confesses that a lot of valuable materials which he expected his friends in India to pass on to him never reached him.

Contemporary writings that directly deal with Malabar and its affairs include "*A Journey From Madras, Through The Countries of Mysore, Canara And Malabar*" by Dr. Francis Buchanan and '*A View Of The English Interest In India*' by W. Fullerton. Buchanan was deputed to assess the actual position of the ceded territory of Malabar. Specific instructions were given to him by the Governor General: "Your enquiries are to extend throughout the dominions of the present Raja of Mysore and the country acquired by the Company, in the late war, from the Sultan, as well as to that part of Malabar which the Company annexed to their own territories in the former war under Marquis Cornwallis." This order was dated February 24, 1800. Buchanan set to work at once and the Report that he submitted was published from London in three volumes in 1807. Buchanan's work has several merits. One of the most commendable thing about it is the author's thoroughness with which he has gathered material for his work by travelling all over the territory. Eager to take in everything Buchanan travelled extensively, always displaying keen curiosity and a capacity for intelligent observation. Giving an allowance for the Englishman's bias that even Buchanan could not quite shake

off and for his avowed hatred of Mysore Sultans, economic and commercial conditions of Kerala are well described in his work. Modern historians can reconstruct the history of Kerala from the copious materials that Buchanan presents. In many instances Buchanan supplements the *Reports Of The Joint Commissioners Of Malabar*. At the same time he deviates from factual statements to indulge in false allegations against the Mysoreans which on a later occasion he inadvertently contradicts. He frequently abandons objectivity and succumbs to impassioned condemnation of the Mysorean rule. Despite these blemishes the book is valuable and the discerning reader stands to gain much from a perusal of this work.

Fullerton, in writing his book, '*A View Of The English Interest In India*', drew lavishly upon his own prejudices and his own sentiments. He fought in the Second Anglo-Mysore War and participated in the capture of the Palghat fort. It was this colonel who continued his army operations in Malabar even after the Treaty of Mangalore, in defiance of orders from his superiors. The same arrogance he shows in his writings too. He is the originator of the story that when the Mysore force arrived, the Zamorin to whom he had entrusted the fort evacuated it only because the Mysoreans beheaded a number of Brahmins and terrorized the Zamorin by holding before him the heads of these unfortunate victims and thus forced him out of the fort. All native historians of Kerala adhere to this version of the event.

Not satisfied with their own unmerited criticism of Tipu Sultan, English historians brought out a number of anonymous works like *Memoirs of Tipu Sultan*. Even more scandalous is '*The History of Hyder Shah and of His Son Tippoo Sultan*' published in 1801 from London with the gratuitous information from the publisher that "the author was an impartial writer who never gave his name to the public though it is evident that he was a Frenchman who

served as a general in the army of the Mughals.”⁴ This alleged authorship was a very subtle and convenient idea as the English, who really wrote the book could lent greater sharpness and impression of veracity to the charges against Tipu if they were made to proceed from a Frenchman. Since the French were the allies of Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan it was felt that the book written by a Frenchman would be accepted uncritically whereas anything that the English wrote against their enemies would naturally be held suspicious. This book by the unnamed French author has been used by W. Logan as a source book in writing his *Malabar Manual* in the year 1885. Logan however attributes the authorship of the book to a general in the Mughal army and says that he “was a confidant of Prince Ghulam Mohammed, the only surviving son of Tipu Sultan.”⁵ About the nationality or religion of the author Logan does not say anything definite. Logan’s *Manual* with its heavy reliance on this fabricated work has been accepted as the first book that deals with the history of Kerala in general and Malabar in particular. Since he was intimately connected with the affairs of Malabar as Collector of the district and as he enjoys great reputation for his scholarship, his writings have been accorded undisputed validity and they have become the basis of all subsequent writings on Kerala History. K. M. Panikkar who published his book in 1957 is guided by Logan’s judgement regarding the book “*History of Hyder Shah etc.*” Having accepted Logan’s testimony, the author of the book, K. M. Panikkar makes the mistake of qualifying him as a “Pro-Haidar Muslim historian” whereas the publisher of the book clearly says that he was a Frenchman probably a general in the army of the Mughals. It is unthinkable that all Mughal officers were Muslims. This book by the mysterious author is in reality the product of English ingenuity. This book is no isolated instance. Several

4. *Malabar Manual*, W. Logan.

5. *Ibid.*,

works by unknown authors appear in the historical literature of India but those pertaining to the period under review are most abundant. A sensible explanation that we can offer for this phenomenon is that most of the English historians were generals who were either defeated by the Mysore Nawabs or forced to retreat in their campaigns against them. Hence they sought to alleviate the misery of the humiliation and wounded pride by writing damaging things about their enemies, as if trusting their pens to do what their sword could not achieve for them.

Preposterous falsehood of the edicts of Haidar Ali was originated from the author of *'The History of Hyder Shah and of His Son Tippoo Sultan'*. As for Tipu's edicts they are first mentioned by Wilks in his *History of Mysore*. It must be noted that while the time of the issue of the edicts is said to have been between 1788 and 1789, neither the *Malabar Joint Commissioner's Report* nor any of the numerous other Reports cited earlier mentions these edicts. Buchanan is also silent on this score, and not even the most diligent student can trace a mention of them in the procedure volumes referred to earlier. In short no reference of these edicts had been made by anyone till these were mentioned by Wilks after 1810.

Tipu Sultan has suffered not merely at the hands of the enemy historians but even at the hands of his own historians who in their attempts to glorify him have done more than any others to tarnish his image. Contemporary Muslim historians following the fashion of the time, expended hyperbolic terms and highly figurative language in portraying the Sultan as the champion of Islam and as a slayer of infidels, Hindu and English. Every deed of the Sultan was interpreted as an act of faith. This pernicious tendency quite characteristic of all Muslim chroniclers attached to royal courts has done inestimable harm to the very person whom they sought to invest with a permanent halo. What they extolled

as a religious zeal and laudable missionary enthusiasm became the most convincing evidence for proving Tipu's inhumanity and his blind bigotry. English historians who could not have been unaware of the peculiar nature of the literary style and hyperbolic epithets invariably used in such writings, however chose to attribute credibility to all these. They pounced on the writings of these chroniclers and used them literally to buttress the charges of fanaticism and savagery that they themselves raised against Tipu. It must also be borne in mind that some of the Muslim historians who lived under the protection of the Company after the fall of Tipu also obliged their new masters by giving them such pen portraits of Tipu as would delight them. Kirmani serves as the best example of this category of Muslim historians whose writings have contributed not a little to falsify the picture of the period and its prominent figure.

Far greater is the harm done to history by the apparently impartial historians whose half truths are more false than the direct falsehood of the English historians or the Muslim chroniclers. For instance E. M. S. Namboothiripad in his book, doubts the idea of forced conversion and yet maintains "but they were a few." His testimony does more harm than that of Logan, Innes and Panikkar who insist that 40,000 Coorg people or 2,000 Nairs of Kuttipuram etc., were circumcised and made Musalmans. The same is the result when Dr. Surendranath Sen in his "*Studies in Indian History*" justifies the religious policy of Tipu Sultan with the remark that the conversions made by Tipu were on political ground and not on religious.

Historians of Kerala, in tracing the history of their land have relied entirely on English sources viz., the Manuals and the Gazetteers. To them also Tipu has been a target of venomous attack. The stories of bigotry and dire cruelty are almost naively propogated by them. This is explained by the peculiar circumstances that the men of Kerala who have

ABBREVIATIONS


Fgn.	...	Foreign
Misc.	...	Miscellaneous
Pro.	...	Proceedings
Pol.	...	Political
Mly.	...	Military
Cons.	...	Consultations
Dept.	...	Department
Sec.	...	Secret
L.	...	List
S.	...	Serial
No.	...	Number
P. R. C.	...	Poona Residency Correspondence
D. R.	...	Dutch Records
Vol.	...	Volume
P.	...	Page


ILLUSTRATIONS

1. Map of Kerala before Haidar Ali's conquest in 1766.
2. Palghat Fort built by Haidar Ali—1766.
3. Map of Kerala in 1774.
4. Pallipuram Fort (Ayyicottah) purchased by the Raja of Travancore from the Dutch in 1789.
5. Map of Kerala in 1800.

KERALA UNDER HAIDAR ALI AND TIPU SULTAN

MAP OF KERALA BEFORE 1766

- ☐ Kolattunad (Kingdom of Chirakkal)
- ☐ Zamorin of Kozhikode
- ☐ Kingdom of Cochín
- ☐ Kingdom of Travancore
-  Lakes & Rivers



ILLUSTRATIONS

1. Map of Kerala before Haidar Ali's conquest in 1766.
2. Palghat Fort built by Haidar Ali—1766.
3. Map of Kerala in 1774.
4. Pallipuram Fort (Ayyicottah) purchased by the Raja of Travancore from the Dutch in 1789.
5. Map of Kerala in 1800.

CAUSES FOR THE INVASION

It was only after Haidar Ali had assumed control of the Mysore kingdom that he undertook the invasion of Malabar in the year 1766¹. The following reasons were ostensibly assigned to this action by the new ruler of Mysore. Firstly to collect the war indemnity from the Zamorin of Kozhikode², secondly to realise the debt due from the Raja of Chirakkal³ to the Raja of Neelaswaram which Haidar Ali claimed by virtue of the conquest of that country⁴, thirdly to punish the Raja of Travancore⁵ for evading payment of compensation for the military preparations Haidar Ali had made on his behalf and lastly in response to an invitation sent to him jointly by the Aly Raja of Cannanore⁶ and Capu Thampan, one of the scions of the Kolathiri family, urging the Mysorean ruler to conquer Malabar. But the actual cause was that Haidar Ali wanted to enlarge his domain and to establish his sway over this resourceful country with many natural harbours that were centres of world contact.

Haidar Ali, who was waiting for an opportunity to interfere in Kerala politics⁷, got it through the agency of the

1. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 56, Part I, Voucher No. 4, p. 69.
2. See Appendix I, for the History of the Zamorin of Kozhikode.
3. See Appendix ii for the History of the Rajas of Chirakkal under Kolathiris.
4. T. F. R. March 10, 1766, Consultations April 2, 1766.
5. See Appendix iii for the History of Travancore dynasty.
6. See Appendix iv for the History of the Aly Rajas of Cannanore.
7. See Appendix v—Foreign powers and their relations with the Rajas of Kerala.

Raja of Palghat⁸ whose territory was conquered by the Zamorin of Kozhikode⁹. Komi Achan, the Palghat Raja, in his extremity appealed to Haidar Ali, then Faujdar of Dindigal, for military aid when the Zamorin was marching against him. Haidar Ali, accordingly sent a force of 2000 horses and 5000 infantry under his brother-in-law Makhdum Saheb. This force aided by Palghat Nairs¹⁰ carried their arms as far the gates of the Zamorin's Capital.¹¹ The Zamorin's forces fell back and he bought off his opponents by agreeing to restore his Palghat conquests and by promising to pay a war indemnity of 12 lakhs of rupees.¹² But the Zamorin taking advantage of the dissensions in the Mysore capital opened negotiations with Dev Raj, one of the Ministers of the Mysore Raja with the request that he would directly pay the amount to the Mysore Government instead of paying to Haidar Ali. Dev Raj who was jealous of the rising fortune of Haidar Ali, agreed that the Zamorin would pay the promised amount to him through his agents and he would cause the recall of Haidar Ali's army from his Kingdom.¹³ Accordingly, Dev Raj required his Rajput Chief, Hari Singh to proceed to Calicut for the realisation of the amount from the Zamorin. Haidar Ali withdrew his army, respecting the command from Dev Raj.

But Hari Singh, before he could realise the amount from the Zamorin, had to return hurriedly to Seringapatam on hearing of the death of his patron Dev Raj on June 19, 1758.¹⁴

8. See Appendix vi—for the History of the Rajas of Palghat.

9. *Joint Commissioners' Report*, Para 18.

10. See Appendix vii regarding Nairs.

11. *Joint Commissioners' Report*, Para, 18.

12. *Ibid.*

13. Logan: *Malabar Manual*, Vol. I, P. 407.

14. *Ibid.*

Even this incident has given rise to difference of opinion among our historians. K. M. Panikkar is of opinion that Haidar Ali's army returned from Calicut after receiving the first instalment of the promised amount from the Zamorin and that Haidar Ali connived to cause the murder of Hari Singh on his way back to Seringapatam.¹⁵ This is not correct. The fact that the Zamorin did not pay a single pie to Haidar Ali is sufficiently substantiated with evidence by W. Logan, in his '*Malabar Manual*' and Prof. N. K. Sinha, in his '*Haidar Ali*'.¹⁶ To say that Hari Singh was treacherously murdered by Makhdum Saheb under the orders of Haidar Ali is also a partial truth. That Hari Singh met with his death at the hands of Makhdum is true, but the circumstances under which it happened are quite different. One of the contemporary writers, Mir Hussain Ali Khan Kirmani, narrates this event in detail in his '*Nishan-i-Haidari*.' He says that Hari Singh took the Delwai Nundi Raj captive and treated him so badly that it is said that he even stopped the supply of drinking water to his kitchen. On witnessing these occurrences Haidar with the permission of the Delwai defeated Hari Singh.¹⁷ The author continues that the Delwai was so pleased that with the exception of the money and articles belonging to himself, he presented the whole of the plunder to Haidar Ali "whose prudence in this action acquired for him great renown".¹⁸

The Zamorin calculated that since the internal conditions of Mysore were unstable he could avoid paying the stipulated amount. But the claim to this war subsidy was never relinquished by Haidar Ali and recovering the same was one of his objects in invading Malabar.

15. K. M. Panikkar : *A History of Kerala*, 1498-1801, (1960) P. 326.

16. W. Logan : Op. Cit., p. 402; Dr. N. K. Sinha, *Haidar Ali*, Vol. I, P. 257.

17. Kirmani : *Nishan-i-Haidari* (Miles), p. 41.

18. Ibid.

When Canara¹⁹ became a part of his Kingdom by conquest, Haidar Ali espoused the claim of the vanquished ruler of the place over the Kolathiri Raja who had to pay

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19. The conquest of the Kolathiri Kingdom by the Canarese and the war indemnity promised by Udaya Varma the Kolathiri are entered in the Proceedings of the Board of Revenue in June 1801 as follows: "... ..in the Malabar Year 907 the Canarese or Equerians of Beddannore took an opportunity to come with a large army and invaded the Chirracal country by which they compelled every Rajah to fly from the country and seek refuge in the European settlements. At this time there was a very skilful prince of the House of Cherrical by the name Oodeawarma, who by the aid and support of the English maintained the war till the year 911, when the army of Equerians under the command of Hopallayan was camped at Dharmapatam with the design of entering into the Cotiote districts. "Every hope of reconquering the Cherikkal country by force of army, being lost the above said Oodeah Warma of the House of Chirakal called the rest of the Rajahs but finding them all unwilling to subscribe a sum of money, he alone entered into a negotiation with the Equerians and bound himself to pay them, 1,22,000 Pagodas in instalments for which they were instantly to quit the country. This they accordingly complied with on account of a family compact took place and the same was afterwards corroborated and in the fort of Madday before the God Parradivada, Kolastry Raja, all the princes of the family, four swaroopams, two Eddavangas and 3,50,000 Nairs. The substance of the agreement was that each Raja according to his seniority in years, should have his title in the five Koorvaicha, but the management of the country and the administration of justice should always continue in the house of Chirakkal alone. This agreement was written on a plate of copper 7485 and solemnly given to the above mentioned Oodeah Warma of the house of the Chirakkal by the Kolastry Raja. From that period ever Rajas of the house of Cherikal managed the country, maintained the rest of the Rajas and administered justice, without any interruption or opposition" (Board of Revenue, B. N. 67-69, V. 288, June 29, 1801, Fort St. George, pp. 7483-84). The Kolathiris failed to fulfil the stipulated condition of the above agreement. The tribute accumulated to nearly 2 lakhs of pagodas when [Haidar Ali conquered Bednore, the capital and the Presidency town of Canara in the year 1763. As the ruler of Canara Haidar Ali now legitimately claimed the tribute long over due from the Kolathiris.

two lakhs of pagodas to the late ruler of Canara²⁰. When the English Company's agents met him at Bednore and requested him to desist from attacking the Company's ally, the Raja of Kolathiri,²¹ Haider promised to do so if the Raja were to pay two lakhs of pagodas due from him to the Bednore Government²². As this claim was overlooked by the Kolathiri Raja, Haider Ali determined to nullify it by force and made it one of his ostensible reasons to invade the country.

But Haider Ali's grievance against the Raja of Travancore was a long-standing one. His attention was drawn to this part of the country when he was only an officer in the Mysore army in 1751, when Marthanda Varma of Travancore requested his assistance for the suppression of his 'refractory Nair nobles'²³. Haider Ali promised to send a powerful army and made necessary military preparations for the purpose. The news of Haider Ali's military support alarmed the nobles and frightened them into submission to the Raja²⁴. The immediate submission of the Nair nobility of Travancore freed the Raja from the threatened internal disorder and danger and he therefore declined to accept the assistance of Haider Ali and animated him of this change in his attitude. But Haider Ali claimed the expenses he had incurred in this respect and the Raja was held responsible for the loss of money

20. T. F. R.: March 10, 1766: Cons. April 2, 1766.

21. The Tellicherry Settlement entered into a treaty of friendship with the Raja of Chirakkal on April 24, 1757. By this treaty the Rajah had been promised help in case of external aggression or internal dissension (Tellicherry Factory Record, August 24, 1763, Ibid Consultations, Sept. 24, 1763). There were more or less similar agreements with other scions of the Kolathiri family—Kottayam, Nileswaram, Kadathanad etc. (Logan, *Treaties* etc. lxxxj). But when Haider Ali descended from Mysore the Factors failed to accord any direct help to them. Consultations, April 4, 1756.

22. Ibid.

23. N. K. Sinha: *Haider Ali*, Vol I, p. 262.

24. P. Shankunoy Menon, *The History of Travancore*, p. 281.

resulting from this²⁵. When this demand was not met, Haidar Ali decided to bide his time till a favourable course of events would afford him an opportunity to take revenge.

To facilitate matters easy for him the Aly Raja of Cannanore and Kappu Thampan of Kolathiri family both of whom had a score to settle with the Kolathiris now eagerly invited Haidar Ali to invade the country²⁶. The Aly Raja who was the only Muslim ruler in Kerala might have thought that it would better his prospects if Haidar Ali conquered the country²⁷. The relation of the Aly Raja with the other rulers of Malabar was also not friendly. This Mappilla²⁸ royal family of Cannanore was respected by the rest of the Muslim community of Malabar who looked up to them for protection. This prominence of the Aly Raja was resented and envied by the local chieftains, the result of which was continuous skirmishes and open fights between them²⁹. The Malabar Joint Commissioners in their *Report* give a number of instances that led to bloody massacres and open riots³⁰. The story of this development is described by the author of '*The History of Hyder Shah and of his son Tippoo Sultan*'³¹. He says that the Mappillas who grew rich by the monopoly of trade and commerce were envied by the Nairs who often found it impossible to repay the money advanced to them and that due to organised conspiracies more than 600 Mappillas were massacred by them on an appointed day³². He continues to say, "the Mopilahs in their distress, hastened

25. Moens: *Memorandum* etc., p. 154.²

26. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 55, p. 21 para 20

27. Ibid.

28. See Appedlx viii regarding Mappillas.

29. M. M. D. L. T: *History of Hyder Shah* etc., pp. 64-66.

30. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 55, p. 242, para 263; pp. 260-61, para 281.

31. M. M. D. L. T.: *Op. Cit.*, pp. 62-68.

32. Ibid. p. 65.

to send deputies to Hyder, to inform him of the catastrophe and implore his protection.....”³³.

Haidar Ali might have made a show of espousing the cause of the Muslims of Malabar. As any other prudent invader he was bound to consider it advantageous for him to come to the rescue of a large section of the people of the country that he intended to conquer, as it would make his path smooth by minimising the opposition ³⁴. Therefore he gladly accepted the invitation of the Aly Raja and Cappu Thampan to conquer the country for which he himself was awaiting a favourable opportunity. Cappu Thampan was one of the junior members of the Kolathiri family who was irreconcilable with the ruling prince – the Prince Regent of Chirakkal. He wanted assistance from outside and sided with the Aly Raja to fulfil his ambition of becoming the ruler of Kolathiri Kingdom. This was also a favourable situation for Haidar Ali.

These were the apparent reasons offered by Haidar Ali to justify his conquest of Malabar. But by far the most acceptable explanation is that Malabar had become particularly important for him when he became ruler of Mysore. For the existence of his military Government, he

33. Ibid. p.66.

34. To say that Haidar Ali conquered Malabar due to the only reason of getting the grievances of Muslims redressed as the Author of '*the History of Hyder Shah etc.*' claims, is not correct. The unidentified author of this book falls in line with the other English authors who try to create a sound background to support their allegations of religious bigotry of the Mysore Nawabs. Many a literature has come down to us, the authenticity of which is subjected to scrutiny by Prof. Mohibbul Hasan Khan in his work *History of Tipu Sultan* (Appendix E, Bibliography, pp. 396-401). If one can establish that Haidar Ali conquered Kerala only because he felt grieved by the plight of the Mussalman Community of Malabar, then as a corollary one should be convinced easily that Haidar Ali and his son Tipu Sultan might have committed religious atrocities.

had to procure equipments, horses and fire-arms, from outside India for which easy access to the sea with ports and harbours was imperative. The political development and the prevailing balance of power made him believe that he could not safely depend on the friendship of the English. Therefore, Haidar Ali desired to have intimate contact with the French power in India. Thus it was an absolute necessity for him to have an independent and unhampered access to the ports of the West Coast. Since Pondicherry was far away from Mysore and since the territory of the Nawab of Carnatic, Mohamed Ali, Haidar's enemy, lay between Mysore and Pondicherry, preventing communication between the two countries, Haidar turned to the West Coast. He would be in a position to have constant contact with Mahe, the French pocket in the Malabar Coast for all practical purposes in his relations with the French. The most important cause for undertaking the invasion of Malabar by Haidar Ali was to ensure the control of the means of communication and the land leading to Mahe, the French possession in Kerala. Thus Haidar Ali in all respects was motivated solely by political considerations and not at all by religious regards in conquering Kerala. To insist on the contrary view would be unhistorical.

CHAPTER 2

CONQUEST

Haidar Ali conquered Canara in 1763 and thus became a neighbour of the Malabar Coast.¹ The Aly Raja of Cannanore, whose principality formed the southern boundary of Canara, met him on a deputation and invited him to conquer Malabar.² Haidar Ali who was very keen on forming a fleet took advantage of the invitation of the Aly Raja who had a number of well-equipped vessels at sea. Haidar Ali therefore appointed the Aly Raja his High Admiral and his brother Sheik Aly, Intendent of the marine.³ Thus preparing himself a ground for substantial support he sent a Brahmin envoy—Anand Raw—to Malabar to acquaint him with the political developments of the place and to intimate the English, the French and the Dutch with his desire to conquer Malabar.⁴ He requested the English to help him with four or five hundred soldiers and sufficient arms.⁵ When the Tellicherry Factors declined, Haidar Ali required them at least not to object to his subjugation of the Malabar princes, to which request also the Factors could not agree.⁶

The Tellicherry Settlement was in alliance with a number of Malabar Princes. They entered into a treaty of friendship

1. M. M. D. L. T. *History of Hyder Shah* etc., p. 62.

2. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 55, p. 21.

3. M. M. D. L. T., Op. Cit., p. 62.

4. T. F. R., dated October 26, 1764—Tellicherry to Bombay—Cons. Nov. 15, 1764.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., November 17, 1764, Tellicherry to Bombay—Cons. November 28, 1764.

with the Raja of Chirakkal on April 21, 1757. By this treaty, the Raja had been promised help if he was attacked.⁷ But the English found it very difficult to extend their open support when the Raja required it, as it would lead to an open war with Haidar Ali, for which they were not prepared at that time.⁸ Therefore the English decided to help the Raja only secretly.⁹ At the same time the Company's representatives when they heard in December 1765, about Haidar Ali's preparations to conquer Malabar met him at Bedanore with the demand that all the trade privileges granted to the Company by the several Malabar Rajas should be confirmed. Haidar Ali issued a firman on February 23, 1766 granting them all the trade privileges enjoyed by them.¹⁰ Thus the Tellicherry Factors were fully alive to the fact that Haidar Ali's invasion of Malabar was only a question of time.¹¹

During the month of February 1766, Haidar Ali reached Mangalore with an army of 12000 of his best troops¹² of

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7. Ibid., August 24, 1763: Ibid., Cons., Sept., 24, 1763.
 8. Fgn. and Home Department—1756-80, Secret Cons. No. 1.
 9. Board's Minute—Cons. April 4, 1766.
 10. C. C. Aitchison: *Treaties etc.*, Vol. IX, No. XXXVI, pp. 195-6.
 11. W. Logan: *Malabar Manual*, Vol. I, p. 403.
 12. There are different versions about the strength of Haidar Ali's army. K. M. Panikkar calculates "over 40,000 soldiers among whom were 10,000 cavalry and the rest infantry" (*A History of Kerala*, p. 333). He bases his authority on the Dutch Records. Moens, the then Dutch Governor who is expected to speak more authoritatively about the Dutch Documents does not mention the number of Haidar Ali's army. Nor does K. M. Panikkar point out his authority on any particular Dutch record which he claims to have consulted. It can be reasonably pointed out that in 1756, Makhdum Saheb, defeated the Zamorin who was the most powerful ruler of Malabar with an army of only 5,000 men of which 2,000 were cavalry. Reiterating the strength of Haidar Ali's army to 12,000, the Author of *The History of Hyder Shah etc.* writes ".....since the Nabob had.....brought no more than twelve thousand men with him, it was to be presumed, that he was certain that the number he had brought was sufficient to defeat his enemies." (M. M. D. L. T. Op. Cit. p. 68).

which 4,000 were cavalry and the rest infantry and began his march to the Coast of Malabar through Mangalore and Cannanore.¹³ On reaching Cannanore, Haidar Ali was received by the Aly Raja with not less than 12,000 soldiers whom the Author of *the History of Hyder Shah etc.* describes as "ill-armed.....but superior in courage to Nairs".¹⁴ Haidar Ali was very much pleased with his conduct and "by presents and kindness gained his confidence and because the Chief was known to be well-acquainted with secrets of the country, he associated him in his plans".¹⁵

The combined army marched against the Kolathiri family in the month of February 1766.¹⁶ The opposition was not serious. The Raja of Chirakkal was soon defeated and slain. His son who was only seven years old was adopted by Haidar Ali,¹⁷ and was named Iyas Khan.¹⁸ The Aly Raja and his men seized the palace at Chirakkal. Some members of the royal family with their attendants took refuge in the Brass Pagoda within Tellicherry limits.¹⁹ This was reported by the Raja of Travancore to the Governor of Bombay.²⁰ He gave expression to the fear "Haidar Ali may attack my kingdom also and my reliance is entirely on the ancient friendship with the Company to whom I will transfer 3,000 candies of pepper.....on condition that the English Company will supply me with money and warlike stores and that the Company will defend my kingdom at my expense".²¹

The Mysore army moved towards Kottayam from where the ruling prince and his nobles had already fled. After the

13. Ibid., p. 66.

14. Ibid., p. 66.

15. Kirmani: *Nishan-i-Haidari*, p. 184.

16. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 55, pp. 18-9.

17. For a fuller treatment see '*History of Tipu Sultan*' by Mohibbul Hasan Khan, Foot note of Page 32.

18. Kirmani: Op. Cit., p. 184.

19. Joint Commissioners' Report, Para 20.

20. Anjengo Diaries, Factory, 1764-66, Vol. 1269, p. 237.

21. Ibid., p. 238.

occupation of Chirakkal and Kottayam the triumphant army marched southward to the principality of Kadathnad, where for the first time Haidar Ali met an organised and serious opposition.²² To enter into the territory, the Mysorean army had to cross the Mahe river. But on the southern bank of the river, the Malayalee princes strongly posted their Nair militia. Haidar Ali appraised the situation and found it a difficult one. Here he employed one of the rare tactics of warfare in surprising his enemy by crossing the river with his cavalry.²³ He left his infantry in the northern bank of the river and required them to pretend to enter into the fleet kept ready for crossing the river. At the same time, Haidar Ali with his cavalry traversed the river at a distance. "Sometimes swimming and sometimes wading, he came to the other side where the Nairs were busied in attempting to oppose the infantry, who pretend to be on the point of passing over".²⁴

The Nairs were frightened at the sudden appearance of the cavalry²⁵ and fled with the "utmost precipitation and disorder"²⁶. Haidar Ali ordered his men to pursue the fugitives who had escaped into the jungles and hills. They were combed out. Many of them were killed and

22. Fgn and Pol. 1756-1780, Select Committee, 1768, Vol. XIV, pp. 283-84, Vol. XV, pp. 483-84.

23. M. M. D. L. T., Op. Cit., p. 69.

24. Ibid.

25. The cause for this complete rout of Nair Militia is assigned by our historians in different ways. K. M. Panikkar is of opinion that cavalry was totally unknown to the Nairs and that they were panic-stricken at its sight and that this was the cause for their rout. (*A History of Kerala* p. 334) To say that cavalry was unknown to the rulers of Kerala is not correct. K. M. Panikkar himself writes in his book '*Malabar and the Dutch*' that Marthanda Varma of Travancore employed cavalry even before 1750. We have seen in 1756-'57, when Haidar Ali sent his brother-in-law to help the Raja of Palghat, his force included 2,000 cavalry

26. Wilks: Vol. I, p. 290.

many more were taken prisoners²⁷. Thus the Nairs who were no match for the disciplined troops in open fight were defeated on the only occasion when they offered armed resistance to Haidar Ali. Evaluating the military triumphs of Haidar Ali over the Nair princes of Kerala Prof. N. K. Sinha, observes, "the conquest of Malabar was perhaps Haidar Ali's most arduous feat of arms"²⁸.

This was the first and the last opposition Haidar Ali had to encounter in his conquest of Malabar. From Kadathnad, Haidar Ali sent his deputies with the offer of peace to the Zamorin and other princes²⁹. The Zamorin at first sent away the envoys of Haidar Ali "with utmost contempt"³⁰. But the situation changed very much after the flight of the combined forces that opposed Haidar Ali near the banks of the Mahe river. The Zamorin prepared himself to submit before the conqueror and informed him accordingly³¹. Haidar Ali, it is reported, received him cordially and promised to restore his dominions on condition of his paying an annual tribute as soon as his subjects had laid down their arms³². This is corroborated by Kirmani who says, "the Nawab from convenience and policy... ..honoured the Chief with a Kawlnama..... gave him his life and property and forgave his offences"³³. Thus an agreement was reached between Haidar Ali and the Zamorin to the effect that the former would not conquer Calicut on payment of the arrears and the war indemnity. The Zamorin agreed to pay the stipulated amount³⁴.

27. Ibid., p. 291.

28. N. K. Sinha: *Haidar Ali*, Vol. I, p. 250.

29. Moens: *Memorandum* etc., p. 132.

30. Ibid., p. 133.

31. M. M. D. T.; p. 70,

32. Ibid., p. 71

33. Kirmani: *Nishan-i-Haidari*, p. 184.

34. M. M. D. L. T., p. 71.

But the Zamorin returning to his palace committed suicide³⁵. He set his palace on fire and was burnt to death³⁶. The Raja of Travancore reported this: "he (Haider Ali) had attacked the Zamorin and imprisoned him in a pagoda. The Zamorin promised him to pay 27 lakhs of Rupees and Haidar Ali refused to accept it. Fearing ill-treatment the Zamorin set fire to the pagoda and perished in the flames"³⁷. The cause for this tragic end of a ruling prince of the renowned dynasty of Malabar was that Haidar Ali demanded payment of a crore of gold Mohrs in cash³⁸. In spite of the entreaties of the Zamorin and his plea that he had no money available for the full settlement, the conqueror was unrelenting. Driven to despair the Zamorin sought escape from his dilemma through death.

The position was such that no one can blame either the Zamorin or Haidar Ali for creating a situation leading to such a crisis. Both of them had their own justifications. Haidar Ali might have been adamant in his demand refusing to believe the Zamorin, because of his past experience of breach of contract from the predecessor of this prince who had evaded paying the promised amount twelve lakhs of rupees in the year 1756, as war indemnity. At the same time the Zamorin might not have been in a position to pay off his arrears, tribute money and war expenses. The rulers of Kozhikode were always in financial difficulties³⁹. Thus the Zamorin might not have been in a position to clear off his financial commitments with the conqueror.

35. Kirmani: P. 133. Joint Commissioners' Report, para. 18.

36. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 55, p. 19.

37. Anjengo Diary, 1, Factory, Vol. 1269, pp. 292-94.

38. Jonathan Duncan: *Asiatic Researches*. V, p. 30.

39. As early as 1723, the negotiations of peace with the Dutch, fell through for the time being over the question of the amount of indemnity, "the Zamorin asserting that he had no cash...." As we know it that the Zamorin could not pay the war indemnity of 12 lakhs of Rupees to Haidar Ali, as was agreed

Several reasons were brought out by different writers about this tragic event. The popular version accepted by most of our historians is the opinion of Jonathan Duncan, who was President of the 'First Malabar Commission' in 1792 and afterwards the Governor of Bombay. He writes that the Zamorin was sent under a guard of 500 horses and 2,000 infantry to the Fort of Calicut, and that the Raja was confined in his own house without food and was strictly prohibited from performing the ceremonies of his religion. He continues to say that as the Zamorin thought that Haidar might inflict some further disgrace upon him, either by having him hanged, or blown from a gun, he set fire to the house with his own hand and was consumed in it⁴⁰. Moens says that the prince in fear of his life set his palace on fire and was burnt to death⁴¹. Modern writers have brought forward several conjectures to explain the unfortunate incident⁴². But another contemporary writer asserts that the Zamorin ended his life on account of some letters he received from his nephews and the Rajas of Travancore and Cochin. He writes, "these letters contained the bitterest reproaches and execrations, treating him as the betrayer of his country

upon between himself and Makhdum Ali, the realisation of which was one of the ostensible causes of Haidar Ali's invasion. Again when the Zamorin was re-instated in 1768, on a definite condition of annual tribute, he fell in arrears and consequent to this, he was removed from the office in the year 1773. Same was repeated when the English experimented with the Zamorin by restoring his kingdom under his management after the Treaty of Seringapatam.

40. *Asiatic Researches*, V, pp. 30-31.

41. Moens: '*Memorandum etc.*' p. 133.

42. Prof. K. V. Krishna Iyer in his '*The Zamorins of Calicut*' says "As his position became more and more desperate, he grew more and more stubborn in his refusal to surrender. At last he resolved to put an end to his life and with it to the fort which no enemy had entered as a conqueror since the zamorin laid its foundation. On the 27th of April corresponding to the 14th of Medom 941 M. E. on Chitra or the 14th lunar asterism, he set fire to the powder magazine with his own hand and

and apostate to his religion, which he had abandoned to the Muhammedans. The Brahmin who had conveyed these letters to him, avowed to him at the same time that he was degraded and excluded from his caste and that all the Brahmins and the Nayars had sworn never to have any communication with him"⁴³. This statement also does not fully explain the case. The Raja of Travancore was a tributary to Mohamed Ali, the Nawab of Carnatic,⁴⁴

was blown up along with the fortress from which his ancestors had marched out to conquer and annex." (*The Zamorins of Calicut*, p. 240) K. M. Panikkar finds one more reason that the Zamorin might have reasonably apprehended that he might be converted to Islam and that he did a heroic deed of committing suicide that was quite appropriate to the time. (*A History of Kerala*, p. 335). But the contemporary authors say otherwise. The author of the '*History of Hyder Shah etc.*' a French officer who claims that he was present with the army of Haidar Ali says "he (Haidar Ali) met the prince (the Zamorin) who came forth and threw himself at his feet, Hyder hastened to raise and the Zamorin offered him presents consisting of two small basins of gold, one filled with precious stones and the other with pieces of gold and two small cannons of gold with carriages of same metal. The two princes having entered the palace, Hyder testified his respect for the Zamorin and promised to restore his dominions on condition of his paying a small annual tribute as soon as his subjects have laid down their arms." (M. M. D. L. T. pp 70-71). This statement is corroborated by the author of *Naisha-in-Haidari*. He writes "in short when the Nawab appeared to conduct the siege of Calicut, the Chief of Nairmars seeing that his affairs were going to them.... being therefore resourceless despatched vakeels with presents and provision for the army and asked for his forgiveness. The Nawab from convenience and policy called the envoys to the presence, he sent the chief with Kawlnama for security to set his mind on ease and sent for him and after they had met, Haidar gave him his life and property and forgave his offences. (Kirmani: Op. Cit., p. 184). Thus by all evidence it is seen that an agreement was reached between Haidar Ali and the Zamorin to the effect that the former would not conquer Calicut on payment of arrears of tribute and war indemnity and the latter agreed to pay the stipulated amount. (Moens: *Memorandum etc.*, 1781, p. 132).

43. M. M. D. L. T.: *History of Hyder Shah. etc.*, p. 71.

44. Anjago Diaries dated, Factory 1764-66, Vol.1217, pp. 86-90.

and the Raja of Palghat sought assistance from Haidar Ali to repel the Zamorin from his territory and the Raja of Cochin was negotiating through the Dutch Governor Moens for becoming a tributary to Haidar Ali to save himself from the impending invasion⁴⁵. All these facts make it highly improbable that the Zamorin committed suicide because of any fear of excommunication.

With the death of the ruling prince of Calicut under these tragic circumstances the country lay before the conqueror ready to be seized without any opposition. Haidar Ali thus occupied the whole of Malabar without much difficulty. The only one of those Chiefs who appears to have remained unaffected by the general overthrow was the Nair of Coringotte who, under the auspices and protection of the French Government of Mahe went out and met Haidar on his march from Chirakkal to Calicut.⁴⁶ It appears that Haidar showed equal respect to the district of Randa-terra which was under the possession of the Tellicherry Factory.⁴⁷

Though he respected the territorial integrity of the English possession in Malabar he was not pleased with their conduct in giving protection to the fugitive princes. His indignation was openly expressed to the Dutch Commandant who met him at Calicut for negotiations with him as regards the Cochin territory.⁴⁸ The Dutch records claim that Haidar Ali proposed an offensive and defensive alliance with them to drive the English out from the Malabar Coast.⁴⁹ The English also regarded the trade privileges confirmed by him to their Company as merely a pretension "to amuse and

45. Moens—p. 135.

46. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 55, pp. 18-19.

47. Ibid., p. 19.

48. D. R. No. 13, p. 153.

49. Ibid., pp. 153-54.

prevent our interfering in his schemes of conquest".⁵⁰ But they were not in a position to come into an open rupture with Haidar Ali as is manifested by the letters received from Madras Government advising the Bombay Council not to enter into an open conflict.⁵¹

The efforts of the Dutch to purchase immunity for Cochin⁵² from invasion were successful. Haidar Ali agreed on a subsidy of two lakhs of rupees and eight elephants.⁵³ But the Raja of Travancore strong in the assurance of the English support objected to contribute anything on the ground that he was already a tributary to the Nawab Mohamed Ali⁵⁴ and that he could not afford to subsidise two suzerains at a time.⁵⁵ Moens says that Haidar Ali dictating terms for immunity from invasion of Cochin and Travancore told them that "they should prevail on Travancore also to pay a substantial sum".⁵⁶ Haidar Ali is reported to have added that if the latter was not inclined to pay "he would pay him a visit".⁵⁷

But the proposed 'visit' was averted by the monsoon that had set in by that time. After putting garrisons at Calicut and Ponnani, Haidar Ali bestowed the Government of this conquered territory on Madanna, an experienced revenue officer, as Civil Governor of the place.⁵⁸ The Aly Raja of Cannanore was required to administer the affairs of the Kolathiri Kingdom of Chirakkal.⁵⁹ The rainy season which is very tempestuous on the Coast of Malabar was

50. Board's Minute, Cons., April 4, 1766.

51. Vide supra—Reference No. 8.

52. See Appendix, ix, for the history of the Rajas of Cochin.

53. D. R. No. 13, pp. 153-54, also Report of the Joint Commissioners of Malabar, para 18.

54. Anjengo Diaries Factory 1764-66, Vol. 1217, pp. 86-90.

55. Moens: '*Memorandum etc.*', p. 154.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. Logan: Vol. I, p. 411.

59. Fgn. (MISC.) S. No. 55, p. 21, para 20.

imminent and this forced Haidar Ali to quit the place, but in order to be at hand to watch his new conquest he retired only to Coimbatore.⁶⁰ The arrival of Mysore army under Haidar Ali and his great success over the Malayalee princes were reported to the Rajahs of Palghat and Coimbatore. The news was received with great jubilation by these rulers. The Achan and the Rajah started from Palghatssery to Kozhikode to greet Haider Ali. They thought of taking the Zamorin prisoner thus avenging the ancient enmity. But the day before they reached Kozhikode the Zamorin committed suicide. The Achan went to the Nawab and followed him to Mankara through Ponnani. The close associates, friends and relations of the Palghat Rajah who followed the Achan to receive the Nawab took Haidar Ali to Chokkanadapuram where he encamped.

Haidar made certain administrative arrangements in Palghat in consultations with the elder Princes of the *Edoms*, before leaving for Coimbatore.

Thus the attempt of Haidar Ali to conquer Kerala was a great success. This was an important acquisition for him, "as it gave him a long coast and made him a sea-power".⁶¹

The over-throw of the Malayalee princes and the conquest of their hereditary principalities, were completed within a period of four months. The task was made easy for him by the disintegrated political condition of Malabar and the mode of Warfare practised by the Nair militia. The defeat of the Kerala Princes was certain under the disunited political set up of the country* on which Professor N. K.

60. M. M. D. L. T.: *History of Hyder Shah, etc.*, p. 72.

61. Sheik Ali: *British Relations with Haidar Ali*, p. 48.

* When Stein Van Gollennesse wrote his *Memorandum of Administration on The Malabar Coast* in 1743 he had enumerated 42 small principalities and four important kingdoms, viz., Kolattiri (Chirakkal), The Zamorin of Kozhikode and the Rajas of Cochin and Travancore. The 42 principalities enumerated by Gollennesse are: 1. Peritally and Ellada surovan (Elayadath Swarupam) 2,

Sinha comments, "it would not have been possible but for the complete disunion that prevailed among the fighting section of the people—the Nairs".⁶² The superior military force with up-to-date war materials and the prowess of its leader on one side and the lack of disciplined and organised opposition and want of centralised leadership on the other side caused the failure of Kerala princes. The Nair soldiers lacked the essential quality of cohesion and combined effort because they were not used to a disciplined and organised army movement. They could fight in a single combat and put up a nice show of their valour and courage but on the face of a trained and disciplined force they failed miserably. This mode of warfare and want of organisation caused their rout and lessened the task of the conqueror.

Coilam (Quilon), 3. Marta, 4. Calicoilam (Kayamkulam) 5. Pannapaly, 6. Pandalam, 7. Pogodingo, 8. Thekkencur, 9. Repolin (Edappally), 10. Porca (Porakkad), 11. Berkuncur (Vadakkumkur). 12. Mangatty (Mangad), 13. Paro (Parur), 14. The Angicalmals (Cheranellur), 15. Murianutty (Muriyanad) 16. Coddacherry (Kodessery) 17. Palyet (Chennamangalam) 18. Bardella (Vaduthala) 19. Tevengel Nair, 20. Correttey (Koratty) 21. Changara boddas (Chengarenkotta) 22. Cranganore, 23. Airur (Vellakallur) 24. Poponetty (Pappinivattom) 25. Belosta Nambiar, 26. Changara Canda, 27. Chittur Nambury, 28. Payencherry Nair, 29. Ainecutty (Thalappally), 30. Punatur (Thalappally), 31. Mannacollam (Thalappally) 32. Manacotta (Thalappally) 33. Valluanatty (Valluvanad) 34. Bettete (Vettethanad or Tanur) 35. Parappur, 36. Repucoil, 37. Palecatcherry (Palghat), 38. Cunje Nair, 39. Balmore of Bargara (Vazhunnar of Badagara) 40. Adi Raja (The Aly Raja of Cannanore) 41. Cottatta (Kottayam), 42. Trikenapaly (Tri-kunnapuzha). North Malabar was under the sway of the Kolattiri Rajas. The Zamorin of Kozhikode enjoyed supremacy over the whole of South Malabar. Cochin and Travancore were ruled by independant rulers. All of them had a number of princes or chieftains who owed allegiance to them. But feuds and mutual jealousies led to perpetual wars and bloodshed. There was no unity among the rulers. They tried to annihilate one another. Thus the political condition of Malabar on the eve of Haidar Ali's invasion was highly favourable to any invader.

62. N. K. Sinha: *Haidar Ali*, Vol. I, p. 250.

REBELLION OF 1766 A. D.

Haidar Ali returned from Malabar, after its conquest on May 27, 1766 without effecting his proposed scheme of "paying a visit"¹ to the Travancore State.² This was due to the impending rainy season that would convert even the smallest rivulets into large rivers and thus cut away all the inland communications and place insurmountable obstacles for military movements. Therefore, he retraced his steps to Coimbatore after leaving an army of 3,000 men under his military commandant Raza Saheb³ at Madakkara, a place bordering Coimbatore where he stayed with the rest of his army to 'watch his new conquest'.⁴

Immediately after his departure, the monsoon had set in with all its ferocity. The vanquished princes and the routed Nair soldiers who were forced to take refuge in the forests,⁵ came out from their hiding places and organised a revolt against the Mysorean occupation of Malabar. This was in the third week of June.⁶ The Nairs of Chirakkal and

1. Andrien Moens : *Memorandum on the Administration of the Malabar Coast*, p. 132.
2. Anjengo Diaries Factory, Vol. 1269, pp. 297-98 dated 28-6-1766.
3. Raza Saheb or Raja Saheb was the son of Chanda Saheb, Ruler of Trichinopoly. Chanda Saheb and later his son Raza Saheb became army Generals under Haidar Ali and later under Tipu Sultan (Index to the Fgn. and Pol. Dept., Records, 1756-80, p. 473).
4. M. M. D. L. T. : *History of Hyder Shah and of his son Tippoo Sultan*, p. 72.
5. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 56, Part I, p. 80.
6. Letter dated 22-8-1766, No. 1, Anjengo Diaries 1, Factory, Vol. 1269, p. 8.

Kadathanad were the leaders of this revolt.⁷ The block houses or military out-posts established by Haidar Ali and garrisoned by a handful of soldiers were surprised by the Nair soldiers. The communications of these out-posts were cut off by the swollen streams and the garrison inside lost all hope of contacting the chief forts at Calicut and Ponnani. One after another the out-posts were closely invested and some of them were captured. Instead of strengthening and fortifying these captured block houses, the rebels destroyed them immediately after their occupation. In this process, a number of Mysore soldiers were killed.⁸

The rebels moved triumphantly to Calicut and Ponnani for a trial of strength. It was only at this stage that the Mysore garrisons at Calicut and Ponnani knew of the adverse developments in the country. Both these garrisons found it well-nigh impossible to convey the news to Raza Saheb, who was at Madakkara, on the frontiers of Coimbatore. At last with the help of a Portuguese sailor, who was promised a handsome reward, the adverse tidings of Malabar was conveyed to Raza Saheb.⁹ Immediately after the receipt of the news of this revolt and the dangerous position of the garrisons, he started with his army giving due information to Haidar Ali who was at Coimbatore.

Raza Saheb had no cavalry with him. The inundated condition under which almost all the country was laid by the over-flowing of the rivers placed before him innumerable impediments. The Nair soldiers attacked the army from unexpected quarters where they were hiding.¹⁰ The haste with which Raza Saheb had to lead his army and the flood all over the country finally led to his being blocked in between Tutakal and Ponnani rivers. It was a dangerous

7. Fgn (Misc.) S. No. 56, p. 97.

8. Buchanan, Op. Cit., p. 182.

9. M. M. D. L. T. : Op. Cit., p. 74.

10. P. R. C., Vol. III, Letter No. 103, p. 124.

situation. The army could not advance further on account of swollen streams nor could it retreat due to the depredations of the Nair rebels who stood strongly in the rear.¹¹

Thus Raza Saheb was entrapped with his force of 3,000 men without any means of escape from the ravages of the rebels. No sooner had Haidar Ali heard of the revolt than he recalled a party of his cavalry that had been cantoned at Coimbatore. He required a chosen few of his infantry to be in readiness to march at the shortest notice. Raza Saheb having contrived to send advice of his perilous situation, Haidar made a bold and remarkable dash with 3,000 horse and 10,000 infantry. The movement of Haidar's army is graphically narrated by the author of "*The History of Hyder Shah etc.*" whose descriptions are the source material used by all historians of Kerala History. The passage is worth quoting. "..... Imagine an army of fifteen thousand men marching from the break of day through a mountainous country.....exposed from morning till night to a constant shower, equal to those that fall in the greatest storms, attended with frequent thunder and lightning.....frequently obliged to cross rivers up to the chin in water and sometimes swimming....."¹² This unexpected march obliged the Nairs to give some relief to the force of Raza Saheb as they had to collect all their troops to put up an organised fight. The position of the Nair soldiers in a strongly entrenched camp near Pudiayangadi in Ponnani Taluk was highly favourable to them. On the other hand, the Mysore army had to expose themselves in the open field.¹³ As the first attempt of the Mysore army to encounter the rebels in an open fight failed, Haidar Ali ordered his European troops to advance forthwith.¹⁴ They jumped into the ditch, hastily ascending the

11 See W. Logan : *Malabar Manual*, Vol. I, p. 410.

12. *The History of Hyder Shah etc.*, pp. 75-6.

13 Moens: *Op. Cit.*, p. 152.

14. *Ibid.*

trenches and were facing the enemy in an instant.¹⁵ The rebels were utterly taken aback by this and fled from their camp helter skelter. The Rajah of Travancore reported this to the Governor of Bombay in two different letters. In the first he wrote "Hyder had returned to the Zamorin's country to take revenge on the people"¹⁶ and in the second, "it appears that the Commadore of Cochin and Hyder act in concert".¹⁷

Moens, the then Dutch Governor of Malabar observes, "no sooner did the forces of the Nabob make a formidable attack, than the Nairs retreated into the woods and the mountains".¹⁸ This easy victory over his enemies gave him "infinite pleasure," so that he gave away a gratification of thirty Rupees to every soldier and twice that sum to each of the wounded. K. M. Panikkar assumes that the fight was a severe one because the distribution of presents by Haidar Ali was the manifestation of his relief in converting the impending defeat of his army into victory.¹⁹ This statement is in contravention of contemporary evidence. In spite of the fact that the Mysore army was exposed to the continuous fire from the entrenched ditch with deadly aim for more than two hours, in the Mysore army "no more than one died".²⁰ This fact discredits the story of the severity of the fight. Thus without losing much blood, Haider Ali could accomplish a brilliant triumph over the rebels.

The causes and consequences of this revolt are described by historians in different ways. K. M. Panikkar says that immediately after Haidar Ali left Malabar with the utmost

15. M. M. D. L. T., Op. Cit., p. 78.

16. Letter dated 22-8-1766, No. 1. Anjengo Diaries (I), Factory Vol. 1269, p. 8,

17. Ibid—Letter No. 2, p. 9.

18. Moens : Op. Cit., p. 153.

19. K. M. Panikkar : *A History of Kerala* p. 341.

20. M. M. D. L. T., Op. Cit., p. 79.

satisfaction of a successful conquest, the Nairs organised a national resistance and that the appointment of "the despised Aly Raja of Cannanore as the Civil Governor of Chirakkal made everyone realise what was in store for them if the Mysore troops were allowed to remain and this inflamed their patriotic ardour".²¹ Haidar Ali reached Coimbatore on the 4th June,²² and "on the 24th Junenews reached the Factors," writes Logan, basing his view on the Tellicherry Factory Diary, "that the Kottayam and Kadathnad Nairs had risen and retaken many places and next day it was reported that the Aly Raja had been appointed civil Governor and his brother Sheik Aly, Military Governor of Kadathnad".²³ This shows that the revolt took place only three weeks after Haidar Ali retired to Coimbatore and not in the days immediately following his departure as K. M. Panikkar would have us believe. K. M. Panikkar himself inadvertently admits that the appointment of the 'despised Aly Raja' as Governor of Chirakkal was the signal for the revolt. This appointment was on 25th June, 1766.²⁴ Haidar Ali no doubt anticipated something like a revolt when he decided to stay at Coimbatore "in order to be at hand to watch his new conquest".²⁵ But the contention of K. M. Panikkar that Haidar Ali left Malabar "with the utmost satisfaction of a triumphant conquest" is meant to detract from the prudence and political sagacity of the conqueror. There was ample time at his disposal to reach Seringapatam before the revolt took place, if he was fully contented with his performance and subsequent arrangements of Malabar. If we are guided entirely by this historian of Kerala, "the vigilance, experience and wisdom"²⁶ attributed to Haidar Ali not only by Kirmani,

21. K. M. Panikkar : *Op. Cit.*, p. 339.

22. Anjengo Diary Vol. 1269, pp. 297-98.

23. Logan—*Op. Cit.*, p. 410.

24. Joint Commissioners' *Report*, para 30.

25. M. M. D. L. T. : *Op. Cit.*, p. 72.

26. *Nishan-i-Hyderi*, p. 184.

but even by hostile historians will appear to have been the very qualities which he lacked. It was because of his wisdom and experience that Haidar Ali thought of giving vigilance over his conquered territory by a watch and ward choosing to remain in the vicinity of Malabar.

K. M. Panikkar attributes the revolt entirely to 'the spirit of patriotism and an unflinching thirst for freedom' of Nair soldiers. Moens, the contemporary writer and the biographer of Haidar Ali remarks that this revolt was the effect of the secret intrigues of the King of Travancore and the nephews of the Zamorin. He continues to say that the English Factory of Tellicherry provided all possible help to the rebels.²⁷ This is corroborated by the author of *'The History of Hyder Shah etc'*.²⁸ The Raja of Travancore fomented disturbances in Malabar and helped his brother rulers who took protection under him,²⁹ with the view of keeping the Mysoreans engaged with the internal problems of Malabar and saving himself from the threatened invasion. The appointment of the Raja of Cannanore as the Governor of Chirakkal deprived the Kolathiri family of all chances of their returning to power which might be the factor that involved them in the rebellion.

The Raja of Travancore wrote in June 28, 1766 to the Company that the Kolathiri and other Kings may be reinstated through the intervention of the Company.³⁰ He continued his request for assistance with money and fire arms in case Haidar Ali declared war against him. The Raja wanted the Company to send officers for training his troops.³¹ In July 3, 1766 he wrote another letter stipulating the terms of agreements if the Malabar princes were reinstated. He

27. Moens: Op. Cit., p. 154.

28. M. M. D. L. T.: Op. Cit., p. 73.

29. P. R. C. Vol. III, No. 37A, pp. 36-7.

30. Anjengo Diaries (I) Factory: Vol. 1269, letter No. 4.

31. Ibid.

wrote "in return for the restoration of their countries the kings agree to permit the Company to build a fort in any part of their country near the sea with grounds as far round the fort as a ball can carry and all pepper in their country... at the rate of Rs. 70 per candy".³²

The Nair princes whose way of thinking was conditioned by the age-old tradition of the victor reinstating the vanquished rulers, sustained a rude shock when this convention was thrown to the wind by the Mysoreans. The situation was made more painful when the Aly Raja, an adherent of a different faith, though a native ruler was elevated to the management of the Kolathiri kingdom. The lack of transport and communication, and the inundated condition of the country favoured the revolt of the native princes who found in the English a strong ally. This kind of help rendered by the English to the rebels was often objected to by Haidar Ali³³ and after him by his son Tipu Sultan.³⁴ The English gave shelter to the fugitive princes³⁵ and always kept them as their trump cards to fan the flame of disturbances in the country. It was a standing complaint with Tipu Sultan that the English were assisting Malabar princes against Mysore.³⁶ In the following discussions, we will see how these rebellions were sponsored as a corollary of the Anglo-Mysore wars. It is inconsistent to name these rebellions as freedom struggles as some of our historians do, when

32. Ibid., pp. 297-98.

33. Fgn. Secret (Dept.) Pro-1-22, September 1788, S. No. 92, pp. 3803-4.

34. P. R. C. No. 37A.

35. Mly. Cons., January 1, 1790, Vol. 133A., Joint Commissioners' Report, para 18.

36. Sec. Pro. December, 1789, S. No. 96A, Tipu to Holland, p. 2901. Also see: Ibid., November 11, 1789, Tipu to Holland, pp. 2977-3070.

their inevitable outcome was the installation of the English in the political void created by the defeat of the Mysoreans.

After the rout of the rebels Haidar Ali is reported to have mercilessly massacred a number of Nair soldiers.³⁷ The author of '*the History of Hyder Shah etc.*' further alleges that before he quitted the country, "Hydar Ali by a solemn edict, declared the Nayars deprived of all their privileges and ordained that their caste, which was first after the Brahmins, should thereafter be the lowest of all castes, subjecting them to salute the Parias and others of the lowest castes by ranging themselves before them as the other Malabars had been obliged to do before the Nairs; permitting all the other castes to bear arms and forbidding them to Nairs who till then had enjoyed the sole right of carrying them; at the same time allowing and commanding all persons to kill such Nairs who were found bearing arms. This ordinance being found to make the submission of the Nairs absolutely impossible because they would have thought death preferable to such a degradation, he made a new edict by which he re-established in all their rights and privileges such Nairs as should embrace the Muhammedan religion".³⁸

The authenticity of these edicts have been taken for granted by all historians of Kerala who have dealt with the subject. Some have tried to justify the royal proclamation on the ground that it was meant for social reform while others have condemned it as a manifestation of religious fanaticism. After a searching scrutiny of available materials, it becomes evident that the so called edicts of Haidar Ali are figments of the imagination of the Author of '*the History of Hyder Shah etc.*' No other contemporary observer has made any mention of these. Kirmani who would have been only too enthusiastic to applaud such edicts, had they existed, as a

37. Fng. (Misc.) S. No. 56, Part I, p. Also see : Wilks : Vol. V, p. 293.

38. M. M. D. L. T. : p. 80

commendable display of religious fervour, does not even mention them. Another important contemporary author is the Dutch Governor Moens. If indeed the edicts were authentic they would not have escaped the notice of Moens who wrote his '*Memorandum on the administration of the Malabar Coast*.' It should also be remembered that Moens had written a biography of Haidar Ali which also contains no reference to these scandalous edicts. The 'linguist' of the Tellicherry Factory who appears to be very informative in his letters to his superiors, gathering even silly news and minor events of the country, for their appraisal of the actual situation of the place does not write anything about these edicts in his correspondence covering this period. Therefore it can safely be presumed that these edicts were an invention of some one determined to malign the Mysorean occupation of Kerala and to affirm it as a period of religious persecution and forced conversions. All historians of Kerala swallowed these allegations without scrutiny. The fundamental mistake made by the writers of this period of Kerala history is that they took the Author of '*the History of Hyder Shah etc.*' as an absolutely reliable authority on whom they could base their conclusions. It never occurred to any one to subject this interesting source to a scientific process of sifting whereby the fact and fiction in it could be separated.

That the two edicts in question are ingenious inventions can be proved by subjecting them to a closer scrutiny. The motive behind the two edicts seems to be to establish Haidar Ali's intention of using coercion to gain converts. If this was so the purpose would have been served by the first edict itself. The second is superfluous and its provisions meaningless for the Nairs who become converts cease to be Nairs and therefore do not come within the purview of the first edict that 'deprives Nairs of their privileges.'

Haidar Ali after suppressing the rebellion made up his mind to construct a fort at Palghat, which lying in the centre

of the gap in the line of ghats, was judiciously chosen as an advanced post and depot to facilitate communications with the newly subdued province³⁹. When the creation of the fort was in execution, his attention was drawn to Mysore where the Nizam and the Marattas supported by the English were threatening his kingdom with an invasion. Therefore, Haidar Ali left Malabar for Mysore.

There was no serious disturbance in Malabar till the out-break of the First Anglo-Mysore War, when under the instigation of the English, some of the vanquished chieftains served them with their retinues⁴⁰. But the two Collectors of British Malabar, whose *Manuals and Gazetteers* supply immense information, tell a different tale of the disturbances that followed the First Anglo-Mysore war. W. Logan writes, "a force despatched for this purpose (for invading Travancore) had been defeated and this reverse seems to have been signal for another general rising in Malabar"⁴¹. Innes, observes "the defeat of a force sent by Haidar Ali, to bring the Travancore Raja to reason, led to another general outbreak"⁴². This evidently is to conceal the part played by the English, with whose connivance and aid the disturbances occurred in 1768. The Authors of *Travancore State Manuals* do not enter this so-called victory of the Raja of Travancore over Haidar Ali, in their flattering account of the Raja. If such an event had happened, the compilers of the *State Manuals* would not have missed it. It is found neither in the *Report* of the Malabar Commissioners' nor in the descriptions of Moens and Buchanan. The Author of '*the History of Hyder Shah etc.*' whose utterances about the cruelties of Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan were afforded the credible acceptance reserved for the scriptures is not referred to as a useful source of information concerning this matter.

39. Kozhikode Archives, 1670/D 250, pp. 135-3.

40. *Tipu Sultan*: p. 230.

41. Logan: Vol. I, p. 414.

42. Innes: Vol. I, p. 63.

He repeatedly makes observations of the military preparations of Haidar Ali with the avowed intention of 'paying a visit to Travancore' and comments that the discovery of the intention of the English, caused the departure of the army for Travancore to be suspended"⁴³. The Dutch Governor, who wrote his '*Memorandum*' in 1781 says "in the year 1766, in the month of October, we thought that he was going to attack Travancore and Cochin. But in the month of January 1767, he got tidings that the Marattas and Nizam Ally were approaching in order to invade Mysore"⁴⁴. He at once moved off his army and threw himself with it into his capital Seringapatam, where he was blockaded and surrounded"⁴⁵. Since Logan, and after him Innes, do not substantiate their contention with reliable authority, it can safely be dismissed as a myth'.

A serious defiance of Mysorean authority in Malabar occurred, when, in the course of the First Anglo-Mysore War, the English invested the Cannanore Fort⁴⁵. The fall of Mangalore⁴⁷ and the early reverses⁴⁸ of the Mysore army in the First Anglo-Mysore War made the Nair chieftains contemplate the decline of Haidar Ali's Power. Therefore, they made themselves willing tools in the hands of the English. Logan writes "on third of March, 1763, the prince of Kolathnad and the Raja of Kottayam had agreed to join (us) with 1,700 Nayars"⁴⁹. On this alliance of the English with the fugitive princes of Malabar, the Author of '*The*

43. Joint Commissioners' Report, Para 21.

44. Fgn. Pol. Select Committee 67 (12, 60-61, 13, 77-79).


45. Moens: Op. Cit., p. 154.

46. Ibid., 68 (14, 151-53, 15, 259-64).

47. Ibid., 69, (Vol. XII, p. 415.

48. Ibid., 68 14, 151-53, 364-65, 15, 259-64, 451-52).

49. Logan: Vol. I, p. 415.



PALGHAT FORT built by Haidar Ali in 1766

History of Hyder Shah etc. observes, the English Government obliged him to abandon the coast of Malabar among the inhabitants of which they proposed to incite a rebellion"⁵⁰. The declared policy of the Company was to help the rebels but not to indulge in any direct action against Haidar Ali which can be evident in the remonstrance of the Bombay Council on the siege of the Cannanore Fort by the Tellicherry Factors. It runs thus: "this precipitate and ill-judged conduct in the present state of affairs lays us under the greatest embarrassment"⁵¹. But the combined forces were repelled by the Aly Raja of Cannanore⁵². Realising that the capture of the place was not an easy task, "the scheme was finally abandoned"⁵³.

The course of First Anglo-Mysore War turned rapidly in favour of Haidar Ali. The recapture of Mangalore⁵⁴ and the panick-stricken flight of the English garrison not only caused demoralisation among the English in India, but also sowed wide-spread disappointment and fear among the Nair soldiers who supported them in Malabar with the fond hope of regaining their lost power⁵⁵. "It was the most shameful retreat", writes, Wilks, "with utmost resentment, there were 41 guns, 200 Europeans, 1200 sepoys in the Fort, the retreat was so shameful that they left behind their sick and wounded consisting of 80 Europeans and 180 sepoys and most of their arms and ammunitions."⁵⁶ The author of the *'History of Hyder Shah'* who claims that he was present in the recapture of the Fort gives the number of the English army thus: "in this manner was the whole English army taken, consisting of the General, forty-

50. M. M. D. L. T.: Op. Cit., p. 136.

51. Fgn. and Home Dept. 1556-80, Cons. No. W.

52. Fgn. Pol. Select Committee, 68 (14, 703-84, 1518, 483-64.)

53. Logan: Vol. I, p. 515.

54. Fgn. Pol. Select Committee, Vol. XIV, pp. 262, 290-92 and 335-36.

55. Fgn. Pol. Select Committee-68, (14, 290, 15 A, 497-98).

56. Wilks: *Historical Sketches etc.*, Vol. I, p. 608.

six officers, six hundred and eighty English troops and above six thousand sepoy together with their arms and baggage.”⁵⁷ Moens in his ‘*Memorandum*’ also gives a greater number than Wilks^{58*}. The indignation of all the English historians is manifested in their down-right condemnation of the manner in which the garrison took to flight. Thus the Bombay force was driven out of Mangalore with much more casualties and captives left behind them than Wilks is inclined to admit. This flight, “with such indecent haste”⁵⁹ paved the way for Haidar Ali to dispossess them of the rest of their Malabar conquests.

In this helpless state of affairs, the vanquished Rajas approached Madanna, the Civil Governor, through the good offices of the Dutch and the French to accept their loyalty and reinstate them in their respective territories as faithful tributaries⁶⁰. “The French Commandant at Mahe, and the Dutch at Cochin, employed themselves with effect to terminate the differences between Haidar Ali and the Nair princes”⁶¹. Negotiations were successfully carried out and Madanna agreed to reinstate the Rajas⁶² on specific conditions that they were to pay war indemnity⁶³

57. *The History of Hyder Shah and his son Tippoo Sultan*, p. 235.

58. Moens: *Op. Cit.*, p. 155.

* But Prof. Mohibbul Hasan Khan and N. K. Sinha find no reason to disagree with Wilks, who in fact was trying to minimise the disgrace that had befallen upon the English.

59. Logan: *Vol. I*, p. 416.

60. *Joint Commissioners' Report*, Para 21.

61. M. M. D. L. T.: *Op. Cit.*, p. 147.

62. Select Committee 1768, *Vol. XIV*, p. 290.

63. Para 22. *Joint Commissioners' Report*, p. 30. “On this second invasion and conquest Maan Vurma, the Rajah of Cartinnad, in the northern division of Malabar, consenting to become tributary to Hyder was restored to his districts on paying (according to the best information we have been able to procure details in the Voucher No. 4), a nazaeranna or gratification to his conqueror of two lakhs of rupees and stipulating to pay a future annual junma of 50,000. But the Cotiote Rajah

and annual tribute⁶⁴. Thus in the month of December 1768, the Mysorean army left Malabar⁶⁵ and formed a forceful support to the rest of the army in their fight against the English.

About this political acumen displayed by Haidar Ali, different views are expressed by our historians. "Hyder's provincial troops, whose escape would otherwise have been impracticable" writes Wilks, "not only retreated in safety but loaded with treasure – the willing contributions⁶⁶ of the chiefs of Malabar – the purchase of a dream of independence"⁶⁷. K. M. Panikkar feels that Haidar Ali knew that it was impossible to subjugate the Nairs and that he began negotiations with them and finally restored them in their respective territories⁶⁸. In Malabar, there was no emergency during this period to make Haidar Ali 'fear the destruction of Mysorean army' as Wilks thinks or to

would not yield to similar terms, whereupon the Rajah of Cherikul, who had by this time become weary of an inactive life in Tellicherry, and despaired of never obtaining the Company's assistance withdrew himself from their bounds and protection, and making his peace with Hyder, through Deningo Rodrigues (the Company's linguist at Tellicherry and the son of Pedro, the original guarantee of Callay), he was thereupon established by Hyder, not only in his own district of Cherikul (which still continued with Aly Rajah), but in Cotiote (including Wayanaad and Nambeloote) together with Irvanaad, upon his agreeing to pay to Hyder for those several districts, an annual income of 1,26,000 Rupees with a nazeranna or fine of entry 2.68,000 or (as others say) of 3,75,000 or of four lacs of Rupees; for all these different sums are mentioned on good apparent authority; the first, on that of the son of Deningo Rodrigues aforesaid; the second, by the chief of Tellicherry; and the third by the Vakeel or carigur of the present Rajah of Cherikul who, although they thus widely differ as to the nazeranna, do more nearly concur as to the amount of the annual stipulated junma which is the most material point".

64. Fgn. (Misc) S. No. 56, Part I, p. 31.

65. Joint Commissioners' Report Para, 21.

66. The Kadathnad Raja alone paid as much as Rs. 80,000 (Tellicherry Diary, December 1768).

67. Wilks: Op. Cit., p. 333.

68. K. M. Panikkar; Op. Cit., p. 446.

prompt him to adopt a policy of pacification. Nor did Haidar Ali have reason to believe that it was not possible to rule over the country peacefully when the Nair rebels were at large as K. M. Panikkar would persuade us to believe. The contemporay writers like Moens and Buchanan assert opposite view. In fact the Rajas began negotiations with the help of the Dutch and the French when they realised that the tide of the war was turning in favour of Mysore. Further the failure of English and the Rajas to capture the Fort of Cannanore also opened their eyes and led them to submit to the will of the Mysorean conqueror. When the Rajas turned reasonable, Haidar Ali agreed to reinstat them. It was strictly in consonance with the Mysorean policy. We have seen that Haidar Ali sent his deputies to the Rajas requiring them to accept his suzerainty before he marched against them. When the Raja of Cochin agreed to pay a tribute annually, Cochin territory was never molested⁶⁹. Therefore, this was not necessitated by any political expediency but because of the general policy followed by them as regards the conquered territories.

It was the condition of the country that helped the rebels to raise the flag of revolt. The rainy season which would cut away all inland communications and the hilly nature of the country that would provide suitable hiding places helped them to carry on "occasional depredations"⁷⁰. At the same time these physical features of the country placed innumerable impediments before the pursuing army. But as military engagements, these rebellions were colossal failures. The Nairs, though trained in spartan style, were no match for the disciplined Mysorean infantry. That all the rebellions in Malabar took place in the Monsoon seasons, is indicative of the nature of military operations, known and practised by the professional Nair soldiers of the country.

69. Joint Commissioners' Report Para 18.

70. P. R. C. No. 103, p. 124.

CONSOLIDATION

It was in December 1768 that the Mysore army retired from Malabar after restoring the local Rajas except the Raja of Chirakkal¹ on condition of stipulated annual tributes². The Kolathiri Kingdom of the Raja of Chirakkal was under the management of the Raja of Cannanore since its conquest in the year 1766³. The Raja of Chirakkal was restored to his ancient possessions only in 1744⁴.

Though the First Anglo-Mysore War was terminated in the early months of 1769, when "Haidar had dictated peace to us under the walls of Madras"⁵ he was confronted with the marauding Marattas who had entered into his territory, ravaging and pillaging the place to the point of ruin, and reaching the Capital of his dominion. He had to purchase peace on humiliating terms. But this loss was soon repaired when dissensions arose in the Maratta Camp consequent on the death of Madhava Rao, in November, 1772. "Haidar as a skilful politician, could not fail to turn this to his advantage"⁶ In a little more than six months – between September, 1773 and February, 1774 – he managed to repossess himself of all the territories he had lost during the English and

1. Fgn. (Misc) S. No. 55, p. 21, Para 21.

2. Moens: *Memorandum* etc. P. 132.

3. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 55, p. 21, para 20.

4. Ibid.

5. Melleeson; G, B.: *Serinagapatam, Capital of Tipu*, p. 146.

6. Mohibbul Hasan Khan: *Tipu Sultan*, p. 14.

the Maratta wars⁷. In this attempt, Haidar Ali turned his attention to Malabar also, where the Rajas defaulted the payment of the promised annual tribute since he had restored them in 1768⁸.

The reason for removing them was the non-payment of the stipulated tribute. Moens observes that in the period of seven years (1768-1774) or since the Nawab had left the Zamorin's country, he had not paid a penny of his annual tribute⁹. This is corroborated by the Author of '*the History of Hyder Shah*' etc. He writes, "this prince (Zamorin) refused to pay the tributes he had consented to give, when Haidar in 1767 restored his dominions"¹⁰. How unconcerned was the Zamorin in acquitting his duties is explained by Moens in his '*Memorandum on the Administration of the Malabar Coast*'. He says that not a month before the Zamorin had to flee, he received letter after letter from him dealing only with the appointment of a Namboodiri or priest in the Triporatty* pagoda by the King of Cochin about which the Zamorin was not consulted. He continues that the position in regard to this pagoda is that the appointment of the Namboodiri was to be made after both the Zamorin and the King of Cochin had been informed. The Zamorin asked as strongly for his support in this matter "as if his head and the existence of his Kingdom depended on it"¹¹. Although the modern author of '*The Zamorins of Calicut*' closely follows the statement of the Dutch Governor in this respect¹², Panikkar has suggested that the reason for removing the Malayalee Rajas was that "Haidar Ali hated the Nair rulers

1. Wilks: *Historical Sketches* etc., Vol II, p. 368.

8. Malabar Joint Commissioners' Report Para h1:

9. Moens: Op. Cit, p, 155

10. M. M. D. L. T.: *History of Hyder Shah* etc. p. 255.

* Thiprayar near Trichur,

11. Moens: Op. Cit., p. 133.

12. Prof. K. V, Krishna Iyyer: *Zamorins of Calicut*, pt 242.

because they were infidels”¹³. This view, however, goes against facts. For example, the Raja of Cochin who agreed to be a tributary to Haidar Ali from the time of his Malabar conquest in the year 1766 was never molested nor made victim of any kind of penalisation¹⁴. On the other hand the relation of the Mysore rulers with the Raja of Cochin was quite friendly¹⁵. That Haidar Ali did not formulate the policy towards the Nair princes on a communal basis, is borne out by further evidence. Even after the Zamorin and the other princes were relieved of their duties, Haidar Ali did not hesitate to consider most favourably the request placed before him by the Kolathiri prince to re-instate him in his ancestral Kingdom on condition of paying tribute to Mysore¹⁶. We have seen that the Aly Raja, a Mappilla prince, was the manager of the Kolathiri Kingdom since its conquest in 1766¹⁷. But the Aly Raja was, however negligent in paying tribute. Therefore, the management of the Kolathiri Kingdom was taken away from him and was offered again to the ruling prince on the condition that he should annually pay a tribute¹⁸. This is supported again by an entry in the Tellicherry Factory Diary¹⁹. “When”, writes Kirmani “this intelligence had been known to that neighbourhood that the Nabob received under the shadow of his protection, who sought his forgiveness and that he punished the rebels with a strong hand.....the Nayamars and Moppi-llas placed the ring of obedience in the ear of their affections”²⁰. It is obvious, therefore, that the reason for

13. K. M. Panikkar: *A History of Kerala*, p. 345.

14. *Joint Commissioners' Report* Para 18.

15. See the topic, The relation of Tipu with the Kingdom of Cochin’.

16. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 94, pp. 66-70, Voucher, 4.

17. *Ibid*, S. No. 55, p. 21, para 30.

18. *Joint Commissioners' Report* para 20.

19. M. R. O. Manuscript Library — Tellicherry Diary, dated 2nd April, 1780.

20. Kirmani: *Nishan—iHyderi*, p. 186,

removing them in 1774²¹ was the non-payment of the stipulated tribute whereas the reason for the restoration of the Kolathiri Raja in 1776 was his solemn agreement to remit an annual tribute without fail.


The period in which these Rajas were re-instated and entrusted with the administration of the country was a period of mis-management and mal-administration. This is testified by Buchanan. He says that the Rajas were vested with despotic authority over the other inhabitants and that the condition of the inhabitants under these Rajas, was worse than it had been under the Canarese Brahmins*. He describes how in the space of a few years many of them amassed treasure to an amount unknown to their ancestors. Buchanan concludes, "Nothing could exceed the despotic rapaciousness of these men, to oppose which there was no barrier; for it is well-known that none of the inhabitants dare complain against a Raja, whatever injuries they may have sustained, assassination being certain follower of complaint"²². Farmer, one of the members of the 'Joint Commissioners of Malabar', recorded his sentiments so early as May 27, 1792, against the introduction of the ancient Zamorin's Government which he considered as replete with political vices and as tending to discourage improvement, decrease the revenue and ultimately to produce a great uncertainty as to the receipt of it or to the continuation of the Company's authority in the country without occasional wars to re-establish it, adding that "it was not till Hyder's experience of the faithlessness of this family that he expelled them and took the management into his own hands....."²³. It was a necessity then for the common weal to replace such irresponsible mal-administration

21. *Second Malabar Commissioners' Report*, p. 9.

*Madanna and Srinivasa Rao, the Civil Governors of Malabar.

22. Buchanan, Vol. II, pp. 189-91.

23. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 55, p. 116, para 114.



by a better one that could compare with any other well-governed territory elsewhere in India. The salient features of this administration are discussed in a later Chapter²⁴.

Accordingly a force was despatched under Sayyid Saheb* and Srinivasa Rao in the month of December, 1773²⁵. The Mysorean force, descending once more on Malabar, took a new and direct route through Wynaad down the Tamarasseri Ghat²⁶. All the Malayalee princes except the Raja of Cannanore, were removed from the responsibility of Government. The only noteworthy event on this occasion was the submission of the Zamorin, his country and his subjects to the King of France in return for promises of protection against his enemies²⁷. A treaty was signed between the Zamorin and Governor Duprat on January 12, 1774, by which the Zamorin submitted himself to be a vassal of the Crown of France in lieu of immunity from Haidar Ali's army²⁸. The Commandant at Mahe accepted this and came with a few troops to take possession of the fortress of Calicut where he hoisted the French standard. "This was a most imprudent and inconsiderate step for many reasons", says the author of *'the History of Hyder Shah and of his son Tippoo Sultan'*²⁹ about this act of French Commandant. Immediately after the French forces took charge of the fortress, the Commandant informed Sreenivas Rao that he had taken the Zamorin under his protection on behalf of the King of France. "The General, however, troubled himself little about this", writes Moens, "but continued his march

24. See Chapter III.

*Sayyid Saheb was one of the military commanders of Haidar Ali. Tipu married his daughter.

25. T. F. D. dated April 2, 1780.

26. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 56, p. 69.

27. Moens: Op. Cit. p. 133.

28. Ibid, p. 155.

29. M. M. D. L. T., Op. Cit., p, 255.

towards Calicut"³⁰. The Commandant of Mahe had no force sufficient to sustain the consequences of a possible clash and hence he evacuated the Fort with all haste and returned to Mahe from Calicut, "on the vessel by which they had arrived"³¹.

Consequent on this failure of the French to save him, the Zamorin made attempt to free himself from the Mysoreans, that can best be described by the words of a contemporary authority. "when the Zamorin fled, he wanted to take shelter in our territory, but I diverted him from it. So he retired with his family by sea to the south on a native vessel to the kingdom of Travancore, where with the connivance of that ruler he still* resides"³². The Zamorin who had submitted to the French and had tried to seek the protection of the Dutch, next, went over to the English. He could not have enjoyed much popular support, otherwise he would not have sought the protection of all the three European powers one after another. Sreenivas Rao was instructed by Haidar Ali to make arrangement this time for direct administration of the country. Thus Malabar formed one of the provinces of Mysore Kingdom.

The consolidation of his Malabar conquest was complete with this direct control of the State affairs. Sreenivas Rao, the Civil Governor of Haidar Ali undertook country-wide enquiries and organised a systematic land revenue administration, based on the principles followed in other parts of the Mysorean Kingdom³³. The whole system of administration was remodelled and set aright. It seems that till 1789 when Colonel Humberstone who had been sent by the Bombay Government to act in conformity with

30. Moens: Op. Cit., p. 156.

31. Ibid.

*Moens wrote his 'Memorandum' in 1781 A. D.

32. Ibid, p. 156.

33. Buchanan, Vol, II, p. 446.

Major Abington from Tellicherry³⁴, landed with his force in Malabar during the Second Anglo-Mysore War, 'the condition of the country as a whole was comparatively peaceful'³⁵.

During this interval, Haidar Ali made up his mind to conquer the Travancore Kingdom and made preparations to this effect*. A letter dated December 31, 1774 from Rowson Hart Baddam, the Chief of Tellicherry Factory, to Fort St. George, conveys the news that Haidar was making great preparations for proceeding down this Coast, by way of the Ghats in land via. Calicut, supposedly with an intention to attack the Cochin Kingdom and after that conquest to proceed to Travancore³⁶. This observation did not fall short of fact. Sardar Khan was set in motion at the head of 10,000 men, in August, 1776, and he entered the Cochin territory⁷. When the Raja agreed to pay the arrears of tribute and promised to remit regularly the annual payments, he returned with his army³⁸, without making any attempt to cross the frontiers of Travancore. At the same time, Haidar Ali renewed his request, to the Dutch Governor Moens, to allow a free passage to his army towards Travancore through the Dutch possessions of Chetwai and Cranganore. Since Moens evaded giving a satisfactory reply, Sardar Khan captured the Fort by a surprise attack. The whole of the island including Chetwai, Ayroor, or Paponetty and the territory of the Raja of Cranganore (excepting the Dutch Fort) all of which were tributary to the Dutch now succumbed to Haidar's General; but he found his further advance impeded by Travancore lines³⁹. This was communicated by the Raja of Travancore

34. Sec. Pro., Maf 23 1782, p. 1684.

35. Sec. Cons. 20 Jan. 1783. Cons. (k), (b) and(d).

* See the topic 'Relation of Tipu with the Kingdom of Travancore'.

36. Fgn. (Sec.) Dept. Cons.. 3-2-1775, No. 7.

37. Select Committee, 4 Jan. 81, Cons. 3, 4.

38. Moens: *Memorandum* etc., p. 158.

39. Batavia Diary: M. S. No. 1054, pp. 219, and 238.

who was in a state of fear, to the Governor of Fort St. George in a letter dated October 20, 1776⁴⁰.

But the scheme of conquering Travancore was averted this time also, because the next few months were wasted partly in skirmishes with the Dutch round Chetwai and Cranganore⁴¹ and partly in fruitless negotiations for an alliance and for a free passage through the Dutch territory along the Coast⁴². "About this time, Hydar who was now most indignant with the Dutch was obliged to go to war with the English and the Nabob of Arcot"⁴³.

On March 13, 1778, the French recognised the 'Declaration of American Independence' and thus brought on another war with the English⁴⁴. "Hyder being informed in the month of August, 1778", writes the Author of the *History of Hyder Shah etc.*, "that hostilities had commenced between England and France, made a truce of six years with the Marattas"⁴⁵. Haidar determined to make war with the English. He was indignant with them for their breach of treaty provisions by evading to help him against the Marattas⁴⁶. Haidar Ali failed also to induce them to renew the treaty of offensive and defensive alliance which they had concluded in 1769⁴⁷. He had made more than one overtures with that end in view, one of them as late as 1778⁴⁸. Therefore, when the news reached him of the outbreak of war between England and France, Haidar Ali foresaw that he had to enter into an open hostility with the English.

40. Fgn. (Sec.) Dept., Cons., 1777, 20th January-D.

41. Sec. Cons. 20 Jan. 1777. Cons. No. d and e.

42. D. R. No. 13, p. 159. Also see Sec. Cons. Oct. 23, 1775. Cons. No. 7.

43. Day: *Land of Perumals*, p. 155.

44. Sec. Cons. Dec. 6, 79, No. 8.

45. M. M. D. L. T., Op. Cit., p. 255.

46. Sec. Committee, 1769, (pP. 409-10).

47. Sec. Cons. March 8, 1775, Cons. No. 3.

48. Rumbold's Minutes: Madras-Mly. Cons., Fort St George, July 1, 1778.

The French possession of Pondicherry fell to the English soon after the commencement of the war and the English wanted to capture Mahe, the French settlement on the Malabar Coast.⁴⁹ This awakened Haidar Ali to the grave situation that would arise if Mahe fell into the hands of the English. Haidar Ali claimed full sovereignty over the whole area including the European settlements. This claim was reiterated in a letter dated March 19, 1779, to the Governor of Madras in which Haidar Ali wrote: "now you have set on foot an expedition against Mahe. There are many factories in my country belonging to the Dutch, English, French, Portuguese and Danes, who trade in my country on the footing of subjects. None of those possess forts or countries which should cause any other to attack them and if anyone should attack them it will be proper for me to give assistance to those whom I consider my subjects",⁵⁰

Subsequently, Prince Regent of Kolathnad was required to join the French with his force and orders were sent to Kadathnad to send a force of 2000, for the same purpose.⁵¹ The Nair soldiers who were all the while completely subservient to the Mysoreans joined the English during this Anglo-French contest on Mahe. The Zamorin and the Rajas of Kadathnad and Kottayam were also inclined to join the English. "The Factors of Tellicherry took every possible means to secure these allies," writes W. Logan, "and as the event turned out, the Kolathnad Prince was the only Chief who remained faithful to Haidar Ali's interest until after Mahe had fallen".⁵² In spite of the combined efforts of the Prince of Kolathnad and the French forces at Mahe, the

49. Sec. Cons. March 1, 1779, No. 1, Ibid, May 13, 79, Nos. 1 and 3.

50. Fgn. (Sec.) Pro. of Sec. Select Committee, 4th January to 20th June, 1779. Haidar Ali to Governor, March 19, 1779.

51. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 56, Part I, p. 74; Sec. Cons.

52. Logan: Vol. I, p. 424; *Joint Commissioners' Report*, Para 27.

English succeeded in capturing the place.⁵³ During this period some of the Nair Chieftains including the Zamorin, with the assistance of the English, made an attempt to recover their lost territory from the Mysorean authorities.⁵⁴

But the Mysorean troops had no difficulty in putting down the recalcitrant chiefs. At the same time, the English after the occupation of Mahe, apparently showed no sign of hostility towards the Mysorean forces, as the Company was nominally at peace with Haidar Ali and therefore "no overt encouragement, beyond the grant of supplies of arms etc., was held out to the country powers".⁵⁵ In short when the English stopped hostility with the Mysore troops, the Nairs found themselves helpless, and "suffered the fury of Haidar Ali single-handed",⁵⁶ in spite of the fact that they received, "the grant of supplies of arms etc.," from the Company.

The Kolathnad prince who was loyal to Haidar Ali, easily dispossessed the Kottayam Nairs and marched against Kadathnad where the senior Raja who had sided with the English was deposed in favour of a young prince.⁵⁷ It was a hard time for the Factors of Tellicherry.⁵⁸ The English did not wish to enter into a war with Haidar Ali at this stage when their affairs elsewhere in India were not favourable to them. In the Secret Consultations of the Select Committee of February 14, 1780, this is clearly stated thus: Part taken by Haidar Ali in fomenting these disturbances and marching a large body of his troops to take possession of the ruins of Mahe, on account of its proximity to Tellicherry showed no favourable disposition towards them and that the gentlemen

53. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 55, p. 32. Also J. Mill, Vol. IV, p. 144.

54. Kirmani: *Nishan-i-Hyderi*, pp. 458-59; Joint Commissioners' Report Para 21.

55. *Joint Commissioners' Report* Para 22.

56. K. M. Panikkar: *Op. Cit.*, p. 454.

57. *Joint Commissioners' Report* Para 22.

58. Fgn. (Pol.) Dept. 1756-80 — Sec. Cons., Jan. 14, 1780, No. 503-4.

at Tellicherry had imprudently provoked hostilities by interfering in the country disputes and giving protection to people obnoxious to Haidar and the Nayars.⁵⁹ The document lays down the line of action that would be taken by the English at Tellicherry. They were required to be always defensive and not to show any sign of hostility towards Haidar Ali.⁶⁰

By November 1779, Mahe had been evacuated and all the British troops in Malabar had been concentrated in Tellicherry for the defence of the town against the forces of the Kolathnad and Kadathnad Rajas.⁶¹ In the month of February, 1780, Sardar Khan arrived in Malabar with a force and after settling some domestic disputes with the Rajas of Kottayam and Kadathnad appeared before Tellicherry on July 8, 1780 and "Tellicherry continued to be closely invested by Hyder's and Rajas' joint forces".⁶² "Sardar Khan refused to assign any reason", says Logan, "for this action. But it was no longer doubtful that Haidar Ali had finally broken with the Company".⁶³ The reason for this drastic step of Sardar Khan can be presumed from a letter sent by Braithwaite to the Governor and President of the Select Committee, Fort St. George, Madras, in the month of February 1780. It is entered in the Proceedings as follows: "I had private intelligence that Sardar Cawn has orders not to enter into the disputes between Tellicherry and the Nairs unless the Madras troops at Mahe took it up in which case he has to join the Prince of Chirakkal. The Commandant and the Factory both write to me that they did not believe that Hyder would interfere but the former still require assistance".⁶⁴ Another reason assigned for this action is that Haidar wrote himself in February, 1780, to the Resident

59. Fgn. (Pol.) Dept. 1756-88, January 14, 1780.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid. Cons, April 5, 1779.

62. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 55, p. 36, Para 30.

63. Logan : Vol. I, p. 428.

64. Fgn. (Pol.) Sec. Pro. 1756-80. S. 14, February, 80 (2).

that the Principals of the Nairs and others who had taken refuge in Tellicherry being delivered up to the Prince of Chirakkal, the troubles should cease.⁶⁵

This affords the reason why Sardar Khan interfered in the siege of Tellicherry. The Madras troops who had evacuated Mahe, in the year 1779, now came to the rescue of Tellicherry Factors and openly fought against the tributaries of Haidar Ali evidently against the directions of the Supreme Council. Thus it is clear that "the gentlemen of Tellicherry had imprudently provoked hostilities." A few days after the siege of Tellicherry commenced, Haidar Ali with an army of 90,000 men descended upon the plain of Carnatic in July 20, 1780 ⁶⁶ Thus began the second Anglo-Mysore War. The defeat of Baillie,⁶⁷ which was summed up by Thomas Munro, as "the severest blow that the English ever sustained in India",⁶⁸ and other reverses of the English in the war made the condition of the besieged in Tellicherry "very serious".⁶⁹ The siege lasted for 18 months. The Factors at Tellicherry showed unabated vigour and inexhaustible heroism in defending the Fort. By the end of the year 1781, reinforcements arrived from Bombay under Colonel Humberstone with the instructions to act in conformity with Major Abington of Tellicherry Factory. On February 8, 1782, Sardar Khan who invested Tellicherry was defeated by Major Abington,⁷⁰ and was taken prisoner with 1200 men.⁷¹ The Author of *Haidar Nama* writes that Sardar Khan who was very much ashamed of this defeat ended his life by committing suicide.⁷²

65. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 55, p. 36, Para 30.

66. Wilks : Op. Cit., Vol. I, p. 812.

67. Kirmani : Op. Cit., p. 198.

68. Gleig : *Munro*, p. 25 (quoted by Mohibbul Hasan Khan, Op. Cit., p. 24).

69. Logan : Op. Cit., p. 428.

70. Sec. Cons. March 13, 1781, No. 9.

71. Ibid, March, 13, 1781, No. 8.

72. *Haidar Nama*, P. 97, quoted by Mohibbul Hasan Khan, p. 24.

Hearing of these losses Haidar sent Makhdum Ali to the Malabar Coast. On this action Wilks comments, "he determined to concentrate his force, to abandon his scheme of conquest in Coromandal and to direct his undivided efforts first, for the expulsion of the English from the Western Coast, and afterwards for the preservation of his dominions and for watching the course of events"⁷³. When the Company knew that the war in the Malabar Coast was intended to be intensified, letters were despatched by the English to the Zamorin and the Raja of Travancore with the request of helping them "to crush Haidar Ali's force on the Coast"⁷⁴. As a result "Colonel Humberstone as senior officer assumed also the command ... and being joined by a body of Nairs anxious to emerge from a long and cruel subjugation he moved about 20 miles to the southward of Calicut and close to Tricalore"⁷⁵ and came in contact with Haidar's detachment under Makhdum Ali already adverted to above.⁷⁶ Makhdum Ali who was confident of the strength of his army gave battle on April 8, 1782⁷⁷, in a strong but dangerous position with a deep and difficult river in the rear of his right.⁷⁸ "He paid the penalty for his temerity with his own life and the loss of a good part of his army"⁷⁹.

It was only after the defeat and death of Makhdum Ali that the Nair rebels joined hands with the English. But their number was also very small. The ruling princes fought on the side of Mysoreans. Wilks himself admits as Humberstone confessed that he was ignorant of the road and situation of the country and could place little dependance on the

73. Wilks. Op. Cit., Vol. II, p. 109.

74. Logan: Op. Cit., p. 430.

75. On 8th April, 1782 — T. F. D., 13th and 15th April, 1782.

76. Wilks: Op. Cit., p. 28.

77. T. F. D., 13th and 15th April, 1782.

78. Wilks: Op. Cit., p. 28.

79. Sec. Pro. May 28, 1782, p. 1684,

information of the Nairs, natives of that part of the country, probably because they might not have thrown off the allegiance⁸⁰. *The Manual of Standing Information of Madras Presidency* reports this instance that a rebellion had broken out in Malabar and a small force of English sent for their aid gained a considerable victory at Tellicherry, which necessitated the immediate despatch of Tipu to the Western Coast⁸¹.

The news of the disaster which befell on Makhдум's army greatly perturbed Haider. He, therefore, ordered Tipu to proceed to the West Coast to retrieve the situation⁸². Colonel Humberstone then at Calicut received information on June 16, 1782, that "Tippu Saheb will most undoubtedly command the army on this side in the ensuing campaign"⁸³. This information proved to be correct and Tipu Sultan marched with a division of the army with incredible rapidity to oppose the invaders. Though the English detachment reached Palghat on October 19, yet Colonel Humberstone finding the place much stronger than he expected and it being rumoured that a large force was advancing against him, "very prudently determined to retreat"⁸⁴. Wilks emphasises that Humberstone was ordered to retreat by the Bombay Government and he would have done so, but for the late receipt of the order⁸⁵. This is corroborated by an entry in the Tellicherry Factory Diary which reveals that he had intended marching on the evening of the 18th⁸⁶.

When Tipu reached Palghat he found that the enemy had retreated. Without loss of time, he pursued the English,

80. Wilks: Op. Cit., p. 161.

81. *The Manual etc.*, 1893, p. 50. Joint Commissioners' Report, para 30.

82. *Joint Commissioners' Report*, Para 30.

83. T. F. D., dated July 1, 1782.

84. Charles Stuart's; *Catalogue and Memoirs of Tipu Sultan*, p. 264.

85. T. F. D., dated July 1, 1782.

86. Wilks: Vol. II, pp. 31-2.

“incessantly harrassed and connonaded”⁸⁷ and a large part of Tipu’s cavalry who had preceded the enemy captured much of their baggage and provisions⁸⁸. This was continued throughout the day until Humberstone reached the river Ponnani by sunset. The river was swollen by rains. Tipu believed that it was impassable. Therefore he determined to rout the English force by the next day break and gave rest to his army. To his surprise, he found early in the morning that the enemy had crossed the river and escaped from his clutches. Wilks gives a graphic description of how the English force was saved from total annihilation: “The early part of the night was passed in anxious search for a practicable ford and at length one was found so deep as to take ordinary men to the chin; yet in clinging together in silence, the tall assisting the short, the whole got across without the loss of a man”⁸⁹. Those who saved their lives from a possible disaster took the greatest speed to escape to a suitable shelter. Though Tipu made a desperate attempt to overtake them he could not, because by that time, they had taken up a safe position in the Ponnani town⁹⁰. There, Colonel Macleod, having arrived with a reinforcement from Bombay, took up the command of the whole army.

Tipu, on reaching Ponnani encamped in front of the English army and made preparations for an effectual assault. On November 29, with the assistance of Lally, he made a regular and vigorous attack on the English line. But the strong position occupied by Macleod obliged Tipu to retreat to his former position⁹¹. Wilks observes that Tipu after his ineffectual attempt retired a further distance to await the arrival of his heavy equipments in order to resume the attack

87. Wilks: Vol. II, p. 30.

88. *Memoirs of Tipu Sultan*, (Miles). p. 264.

89. Wilks, 11. pp. 36-7.

90. Mly. Cons., Jan., 1783, Vol. 85 A, p. 144.

91. Sec. Cons., Nos. 17-19, dated January 23, 1763.

on the position of Ponnani. "But on the 12th of December, the swarm of light troops which had continued to watch the English position was invisible, and successive reports confirmed the intelligence that the whole Mysorean force was proceeding by forced marches to the eastward"⁹². Having received the sad news of the death of his father⁹³, Tipu suddenly broke up his camp and proceeded with all possible haste to Seringapatam⁹⁴. Before he left the place, he ordered Arshed Beg Khan to take charge of the Government of Malabar and to remain on the defensive at Palghat⁹⁵.

No doubt Haidar Ali's achievements on the Malabar Coast were great. But he got only a few years without wars. The consolidation of his conquered territory was thus interrupted by hostilities. Haidar's death in the midst of the Second Anglo-Mysore War left Malabar in an unsettled political State.

92. Wilks: Vol II., pp. 37-8.

93. Sec. Cons., No. 2., dated January 6, 1763.

94. *Catalogue and Memoirs of Tipu Sultan*, p. 265.

95. Mly. Cons., Feb., 1783, Vol., 86 A, p. 719.

RELATION OF HAIDAR ALI WITH THE KINGDOM OF COCHIN

No study of Haidar Ali's rule in Kerala would be complete without an examination of his relations with the ruling chiefs and princes. This problem has been considered to some extent in the previous sections. In the present section, an attempt has been made to trace his relations with one of the most important chiefs, the Raja of Cochin. Apart from the importance of the chief, the study of Haidar Ali's relation with the Raja of Cochin would indicate the fundamental basis of his policy towards the rulers and princes of Kerala.

Haidar Ali reached Calicut in the year 1766 after defeating the Rajas of Chirakkal and Kozhikode. He called upon the other two important rulers of Kerala, the Rajas of Cochin and Travancore to become his tributaries¹. Rama Varma, the *defacto* ruler of Cochin, became a vassal of the ruler of Mysore through the intermediary of the Dutch² and agreed to pay two lakhs of rupees and eight elephants annually³. This was done in consultation with the Raja of Travancore. Dutch Records say that the Raja of Travancore not only advised the Cochin Raja to do so, but also lent him money for it, in order to induce Haidar Ali not to come further south than the Zamorin's territory⁴.

1. D. R. No. 13, p. 154.

2. Buchanan: Vol. III, p. 432.

3. C. R. E. L. LXXI, 1st S., No. 176.

4. D. R. No. 13, p. 157.

The relation of Cochin as a vassal and Mysore as suzerain was continued unhampered. Cochin records indicate that Haidar often wrote friendly letters to the Raja and sent him costly presents every year⁵. The only instance of a quarrel with the Raja occurred in 1776, when he supported the Dutch in a dispute over certain lands around the Chetwa Fort and also defaulted his tribute amount⁶. Consequent upon this, Sardar Khan marched against him and reached Trichur⁷. This insensate act of the Raja forced the Mysoreans to make a show of arms against the Cochin Raja. But the case was soon amicably settled⁸. The Mysore General agreed to withdraw the army provided Cochin would pay a nuzzer of two lakhs of pagodas and eight elephants at once and an annual tribute of fifty thousand pagodas⁹. But Sardar Khan allowed the Raja to represent his case before Haidar Ali when the latter pleaded that the amount demanded was too large when considering the resources of the State¹⁰. Haidar Ali disposed of the matter most favourably when the Raja placed his case before him. He reduced the nuzzer to a lakh of pagodas, inclusive of the nuzzer and tribute from Cranganore¹¹. Accordingly, Sardar Khan returned when assurance was given by the Raja to the effect that he would regularly remit the promised amount annually. Thereafter, no act of high-handedness from the part of the Mysoreans occurred. Their relation with the Raja was "decent, gentle and decorous"¹². All kinds of favours were bestowed upon him. Even the vexed question of Perumpadappu and other villages in Vennari, which have been out of Cochin's possession for over a century, was

5. Vide L. LXXI, L. VIII, 1st s.

6. L. VIII, Dis. No. 166.

7. Buchanan: Vol. II, p. 361.

8. LXXI, S. I, No. 175.

9. L. VIII, S. I, No. 161.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. *Sakthan Thampurann*, Op. Cit., p. 142.

decided in her favour, when their importance to Cochin was brought to the notice of Haidar Ali¹³.

Despite all these friendly connections, the Raja hated his relation with Mysore. It was due to an apprehension of Haidar Ali's power and design that the Raja preferred to be a vassal to the Mysorean conqueror¹⁴. From the very beginning he had fixed up everything with the consent of the Raja of Travancore, the inveterate enemy of Mysore¹⁵. When the Dutch possession of Chetwa and Cranganore was attacked by Sardar Khan, the Raja of Cochin served the Dutch and tried to harm the Mysore interests which can be traced from his correspondence with the then Dutch Governor Van Angelbeck¹⁶. In the year 1782, when the Second Anglo-Mysore War was at its highest pitch, the Cochin Raja allowed the Raja of Travancore to erect a fort at Paliport and dig trenches around it, ignoring the protest registered by the Dutch¹⁷, to impede the expected expedition of the Mysorean army against the Travancore territory. It was with his connivance, again that the *Neduncottah* (Travancore Lines) was strengthened and extended to Cranganore Fort by the Raja of Travancore through the territory of Cochin¹⁸.

Throughout his relation with the Mysoreans the Raja was intriguing with the Raja of Travancore and the Dutch against the Mysoreans. A number of letters written by him to the Supreme Council of Batavia, requesting military help to get him relieved of the vassalage from Mysore have come to light. A letter dated September 18, 1773 to which the Governor-General of East Indies replied on November 13,

13. L. VII Dis No. 166.

14. L. LXXI, S. I. No. 176.

15. D. R. No. 13, p. 156.

16. LXI/A, S. I. No. 4, p. 2711.

17. L. LXII, S. I. No. 31, p. 2760.

18. Ibid: No. 32, p. 2762.

1774, makes it clear that the Raja was conspiring against Mysore even from the early stage of his relation with that State¹⁹. In the year 1782, when the affairs of Malabar were at stake due to the successive defeat of Sardar Khan and Makhdum Ali, by the English, the Raja showed an inclination to join with the English, but was stopped by the Dutch Governor who warned him of "the severe consequences if he incurred the displeasure of Haidar Ali"²⁰. In the month of January of the same year, Angelbeck advised the Raja to take refuge in Travancore, if he was afraid of invasion from Haidar Ali²¹. His fear was probably due to the fact that he was playing a trick on Mysoreans by apparently showing friendliness and at the same time conspiring with their enemies against them.

When Sardar Khan proceeded to lay siege on Tellicherry in 1788, he requested the Raja to allow him to take with him, a contingent of 1000 Nair soldiers of Cochin who were contoned in Calicut "for the uncongenial task of assisting the Mysoreans to put down the disturbances caused by the Zamorin's Nairs"²². The Raja objected to it on the plea that as he had no quarrel with the English, he was reluctant to act offensively against them²³. Thus it can be summed up that the relation of the Raja of Cochin with Haidar Ali was conditioned by fear alone though Haidar Ali was apparently eager to show him goodwill.

19. Letter from J. W. F. Riberio, Governor-General of Indies, to the Raja of Cochin, dated November 18, 1774.

20. L. LXII. S. I., pp. 2760-61, Van Angelbeck to the Raja of Cochin dated November 11, 1782, No. 31 and 32.

21. Ibid: dated January 21, 1782, No. 16, p. 2746.

RELATION OF HAIDAR ALI WITH THE KINGDOM OF TRAVANCORE

Haidar Ali wanted to conquer the Kingdom of Travancore after his Malabar conquest. When the Dutch officers met him at Calicut in the year 1766, on behalf of the Raja of Cochin, he proposed to them an offensive and defensive alliance and guaranteed immunity to the Raja of Cochin from invasion as he was allied with the Dutch, but purposely omitted the mention of Travancore.¹ On his part, Haidar Ali had his own grievances against the Raja of Travancore. When Haidar Ali was Faujdar of Dindigal, in the years 1750-51, Marthanda Varma, the ruler of Travancore requested military help from Haidar Ali,² to quell the refractory Nair nobility of his country who had raised the standard of revolt against him.³ The frantic cry for help that Marthanda Varma raised, Haidar's ready response to the same, the subsequent change of mind of the Travancore Raja and the consequent tension between them have already been discussed elsewhere.⁴ It looked as if the time had finally come when Haidar could pay that long contemplated 'visit' to Travancore. When an attack on Travancore was imminent the Dutch officers prevailed upon Haidar to abandon his scheme. Haidar agreed to retrace his steps provided the Raja would pay him a sum of 15 lakhs of Rupees and 30 elephants.⁵

1. Moens : *Memorandum etc.*, p. 154.

2. N. K. Sinha : *Haidar Ali*, Vol. I, p. 262.

3. Sankunny Menon : *History of Travancore*, p. 159.

4. See the Chapter on Causes for the Conquest.

5. D. R., No. 13, p. 154.

To this the Raja did not agree on the ground that being a tributary to Nawab Mohamed Ali of Carnatic, he could not commit himself to Haidar Ali also.⁶ As the rainy season was about to commence, Haidar Ali returned from Malabar without realising his dream of conquest of Travancore. In 1768, Haidar Ali made military preparations to fulfil his desire of conquering that State.⁷ But it was averted by the discovery of the intention of the English, who were on a war-path against Mysore. This caused the departure of the army for Travancore to be suspended.⁸ Again in the year 1776, Sardar Khan came with 10,000 men with the intention of conquering Travancore.⁹ He tried in vain to get for his army a passage through the Dutch territory of Cranganore towards Travancore.¹⁰ Failing in his attempt to secure a free passage, Sardar Khan captured the Fort of Cranganore and the next few months were spent in skirmishes with the Dutch around Chetwa and Cranganore.¹¹ Meanwhile Haidar Ali came into an open rupture with the English and the Nawab of Carnatic. Thus the scheme of conquering Travancore was not materialised during Haidar's life time.

The Raja was also not idle. He strengthened his Northern frontiers by the famous Travancore Lines (Nedumcotta),¹² and created a standing army which was so far unknown to this 'Land of Perumals.' He persuaded the Raja of Cochin to accept the suzerainty of Mysore, so that a buffer State between his and Haidar Ali's Malabar possessions could be created.¹³ He indulged in inciting rebellions

6. Anjengo Diaries, dated, Factory 1764-66, Vol. XII, 1217, pp. 86-90.

7. M. M. D. L. T., *History of Hyder Shah etc.*, pp. 93-94.

8. Moens : Op. Cit., p. 154.

9. Fgn. (Sec.) Cons., No. 7, February 3, 1776.

10. Day : *Land of Perumals*, Op. Cit., p. 153.

11. *Joint Commissioners' Report*, Para 24.

12. Moens : '*Memorandum etc.*', p. 156.

13. *Ibid.*

in Malabar¹⁴ with the help of fugitive princes to whom he had given shelter in his kingdom,¹⁵ with a view to keeping the Mysoreans fully engaged in the internal problems of Malabar. Rama Varma, the successor of Marthanda Varma as the Raja of Travancore, continued vigorously his hostile activities against Haidar Ali and showed definite inclination towards the English.¹⁶

He allowed the English army to pass through his territory on their way to attack Mahe, the French possession in Malabar, in the year 1778, ignoring the protest registered by the Dutch.¹⁷ Acknowledging this service of the Raja, the Select Committee recorded, "the Raja of Travancore allowed the Honourable Company's army to pass through his territory and gave abundance of food and provisions for them".¹⁸ "I know very well that you are the most sincere friend of the English in India," wrote Colonel Humberstone, to the Raja of Travancore, "I shall let the Governor and Council know the services rendered by you especially to the army led by me".¹⁹ On October 20, 1776, the Raja wrote to the Governor, Fort St. George, Madras, that Haidar Ali's army attacked the Dutch Fort of Cranganore and "some shells fell close to my fort",²⁰ and requested help from the Company. When the second Anglo-Mysore War broke out, the Raja actively helped the English by sending two battalions of his soldiers²¹ and aiding the Nair rebels of Malabar

14. T. F. D., April 2, 1780.

15. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 56, Part I, Voucher No. 4, p. 69.

16. N. K. Sinha: *Haidar Ali*, Vol. I, p. 265; Sec. Cons., February 25, 1782, No. V.

17. L. LXII, S. I., No. 17, p. 2746.

18. Madras Se. Committee to the Board of Directors, March 13, 1779; Se. Committee, January 13, 1783, No. 5.

19. Colonel Humberstone to the Raja of Travancore, March 27, 1782.

20. Fgn. (1777), Sec. Cons., D. January 20, 1777.

21. Se. Committee January 20, 1783, Nos. K-B and D.

to create disturbances in that area.²² For these useful services, the English insisted on including him as 'a friend and ally' of the Company in the First Article of the Treaty of Mangalore which was concluded in the year 1784.²³

The attitude of Haidar Ali and later, of Tipu Sultan had driven the Raja closer and closer to the English camp. He had outwitted all, in his connivance to oust the Mysoreans from Malabar and avert 'the sword of Damocles' hanging over his head. At the same time Haidar Ali and after him, Tipu Sultan felt that the tranquillity of Malabar could be realised only if the Raja of Travancore who was privy to all rebellions in Malabar, was brought under submission. A careful study of the development and culmination of this tension between Mysore and Travancore is attempted in the next section.²⁴

22. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 55, p. 36, Para 30.

23. Logan: *Treaties etc.*, i, XCIII; Se. Committee, October 6, 83, No. 5.

24. See Topic 'Relation of Tipu with the kingdom of Travancore.'

POLITICAL SITUATION OF KERALA DURING THE TIME OF TIPU SULTAN

When the news of Haidar Ali's death was conveyed to Tipu, he left Malabar for Seringapatam, leaving a contingent of Mysorean army under Arshed Beg Khan.¹ Tipu succeeded his father without much opposition contrary to the expectation of his enemies. The peaceful succession gave him confidence to continue the war against the English more enthusiastically than before.

We have seen that the English army under Colonel Macleod in Malabar was in a highly precarious condition when Tipu Sultan suddenly left from Malabar. Immediately after realising the danger in which Colonel Macleod and Humberstone stood at Ponnani, the Bombay Government despatched urgently their Commander-in-Chief Brigadier General Mathews, to relieve them with such forces as were available. But General Mathews retraced his steps under special orders from Bombay,² when he heard of the hasty retreat of the Mysorean forces from Malabar. The Madras Government, who always entertained the wish that Tipu should be stripped of his Malabar possessions to carry out their lucrative business successfully³, did not approve of the Bombay Government considering the fertility of Bednore and furthering its conveyance and communications, was strongly

1. Sec. Cons. March 6, 1783 No. (IB), April 1, 1785, No. 5 and 6.

2. Mly. Cons., February, 1783, Vol., 35A, p. 719.

3. Sec. Pro., January 20, 1783.

of the view that the English effort should primarily be exerted to possess this rich place.⁴ This calculation of the Bombay Government was set at naught when these places were recaptured by Tipu Sultan.³

Therefore to divert Tipu's attention from Carnatic, the English wanted to foment fresh troubles in Malabar. Colonel Fullerton was entrusted with the responsibility of carrying out this English design.⁶ But an armistice was reached by this time between the English and Tipu Sultan, with specific terms of cease-fire to maintain the same positions occupied by each, on the day the armistice was signed.⁷ This did not have any effect on the offensive line adopted by Fullerton.⁸ He conspired with the Zamorin and the Raja of Travancore, to undo the truce provisions. Accordingly, Fullerton did not hesitate to march against Palghat,⁹ immediately after he had intelligence of Tipu recommencing hostilities against Mangalore.¹⁰ "Palghatcherry held forth every advantage", wrote Fullerton, "it was a place of first strength in India, while its territory afforded a superabundance of provisions..... If commanded, further the only practicable communication between the Coasts of Corammandel and Malabar and promised us possessions of all the countries..... in a reach of more than two hundred miles".¹¹ He continues to say that besides, it was of such intrinsic consequence to the Mysore Government that the reduction of it could not fail to weigh essentially in the negotiations for peace,¹² "then

4. Mly. Cons., February, 1782, Vol., 86A, p. 746.

5. Sec. cons. Jan. 30: 1783, No. 2, Ibid. July 28, 83 No. 4, 5 and 6.

6. Sec. Cons. Nov. 10. 1783, No. 22 (a)

7. Sec. Pro. No. 10, 1783.

8. Sec. Cons. Dec. 27, 1783, Nos. 34, Ibid., Dec. 31, 1183 Nos. 30. 31 & 38.

9. Sec. Cons. Dec. 27, 1783 Nos. 3 and 4.

10. Mly. Sundry Book, Vol. 61, 1784, p. 87.

11. Ibid., 1785, Vol. 66, p, 97.

12. Ibid.

said to be in agitation and promised to make Tipu Sultan to raise the siege of Mangalore to oppose our further progress".¹³

Though the idea was good, this invasion of the Mysore territory was a distinct violation of the armistice of Mangalore¹⁴. When the Commander of Tipu Sultan protested, the Madras Government through a letter required Fullerton to stop his further advance.¹⁵ But he did not care the least and proceeded with the scheme of laying siege on the Fort.¹⁶ "The fortunate circumstances attending our attack", observes Fullerton, "and the surrender of the place during night, are explained in my letter of 15th November"¹⁷. The circumstance that favoured them was that the garrison inside the fort under the impression of the armistice did not attach much vigilance and care in defending it.¹⁸ But Wilks finds the fall so easy because the Captain Maitland, being on duty in the trenches, had taken advantage of a heavy fall of rain to drive the enemy from the covered way which was not palisaded and pursuing the fugitives through the first and second gate-ways, struck such a panic into the garrison as to cause its immediate surrender.¹⁹ After describing the process of conquest, Fullerton asserts, "on the surrender of Palghatcherry, I appointed Captain Dewar, to command there.....the heir apparent to the Zamorin left his retirements in the woods and remained with me during the siege.....In answer to his urgent solicitations that I should restore him to his dominions.....I declared that in the event of our moving by Calicut, I hoped to effect his establishment there and that in the meanwhile he should be

13. Fullerton: *A view of English interest in India*, pp. 26-27 also see Sec. Cons. — Dec. 31, 1783, No. 39.

14. Sec. Cons. Dec. 31, 1783, Nos. 24 and 40 (b).

15. Ibid., Sept. 15, 1783, No. 3.

16. Mly. Sundry Book, 1885, Vol. 66, p. 103.

17. Fullerton, *A view of English interest in India*, p. 29.

18. Mly. Sundry Book, 1783, Vol. 60A, pp. 107-8.

19. Wilks: Vol. II, p. 80.

reinstated in the territory of Palghat.....requiring only from him that he should furnish grain for the army while in that vicinity",²⁰ These correspondence of Fullerton with those he had received from Macarteny²¹ prove beyond doubt that though apparently the English Government did not approve the violation of the armistice everything was done with the connivance and support of the Company's superior authorities.

Palghat was occupied by the Zamorin as soon as the English force retired. But he could not hold it any longer. When the English force marched away from Palghat, the Zamorin's force despairing of support had abandoned the place and retired into the mountains.²²

. Another serious event in Malabar during the second Anglo-Mysore War was the attack on the Cannanore Kingdom by Macleod under the pretext that the Beebi* of Cannanore, had made prisoners of Englishmen who were driven ashore by heavy storm and were not returned to the Company.²³ But the actual motive was that he wanted to

20. *A View of English interest in India*, p. 30,

21. Mly. Sundry Book: Vol. 60-B, p. 383, Macarteny to Fullerton December 13, 1782, also see *Ibid.*, Vol. 35, 1785; p. 129,

22. Sec. Cons. Dec. 31, 1784, No. 28. Fullerton in his narrative gives the following curious account of the reasons for abandoning the Fort: "The Zamorin and his people venerate the Brahmins. Tipu's soldiers, therefore, daily exposed the heads of many Brahmins in sight of the Fort. It is asserted that the Zamorin rather than witness such enormities chose to abandon Palghat-cherry." (Fullerton, *Op. Cit.*, p. 41). All Historians of Kerala fully endorse this irrational and fantastic story of Fullerton except K. P. Padmanabha Menon who writes that the Zamorin had run away leaving the fort at the very sight of the Mysorean army in fear of the Sultan. (K. P. Padmanabha Menon: *History of Cochin State*, Vol. II, p. 480). See *Zamorins of Calicut*, p. 224

*Beebi Means Madam. She was called Valiya Beebi (great Madam)

23. Sec. Pro. May 13, 1784

keep his army engaged in plundering and that he wished also to possess, if possible, this coveted principality. Cannanore surrendered after six days of heroic and valiant fighting. Beebi and the whole of her family were made prisoners²⁴. On condition of a tribute of three lakhs of pagodas annually, she was released and her territory was restored.²⁵ The Madras Government was delighted by these tidings but the action was disapproved of by the Bombay Government.

“The Bibi of Cannanore and the Rajas of Malabar Coast”, were included as friends and allies of Tipu in the first Article of the Treaty of Mangalore and as such the Bombay Government who was eager to wind up the war did not want to imperil it by recognising the actions of Macleod towards Cannanore. On the 11th day of March, 1784, the Treaty of Mangalore was signed. Directions were issued to restore the Kingdom of Cannanore undisturbed.²⁶ But it was only after a month that Cannanore was evacuated.

The whole Malabar possession of Tipu thus emerged once more as a part of his Kingdom. With the cessation of hostilities, complete peace was restored in Malabar.

24. Ibid., April 13, 1784.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid., May 13, 1784.

RELATION OF TIPU WITH THE KINGDOM OF COCHIN

The relation of Tipu Sultan with the Cochin Kingdom deserves special treatment, as it reveals the real policy of Mysore rulers towards their dependents. Though this small Kingdom was not sufficiently strong from a military point of view, and though it did not play a conspicuous role in the political drama, during the period under review, its relation with Mysore throws a flood of light upon some of the important points of Mysore-Kerala relations.

All relevant records of this period undoubtedly show that Tipu was quite friendly to the Raja of Cochin throughout his relation. He was always prepared to redress the latter's grievances when they were brought to his notice. Some of such instances are worth mentioning in this connection. The Raja made a representation to Tipu Sultan that some of his territories were also occupied by his Faujdar of Malabar. Tipu disposed of the case in the Raja's favour and ordered the return of the disputed lands with the amount of revenue collected from that area till then¹. The Raja of Cochin was exempted from the customs duty levied at Chetwai and Edathuruthy, when Rama Varma, who is entitled as 'Sakthan Thampuran', the ruler of Cochin, made a request to this effect to Tipu Sultan². This was a matter of dispute with the English after the Raja became a tributary ally of the Company. A series of correspondence range the

1. Archives, Ernakulam: L. II, S. II, No. 182.

2. List IV, 1st Series, Dis. No. 76. Also see *History of Cochin State*, Vol. II, p. 452.

issue in which the Raja reiterates his claim of exemption from customs duties for the passage of timber, rice, etc. quoting precedent from Tipu's time³. Again, when reports reached Tipu Sultan that his officers of Palghat collected customs from the subjects of Cochin Raja, he immediately reacted by rebuking the officers and reminded them not to forget that the Raj of Cochin and his subjects were his dependents⁴. When the question of the small principality of Cranganore which was leased out to Cochin, by the Mysore rulers, cropped up in a controversy between the Malabar Commissioners and the Raja of Cochin, the evidence produced by the Raja was the firman and the receipts issued by Tipu and his officers⁵. So also when there were disputes on Chetwai, Kawlpara and Cranganore between the Zamorin and the Raja of Cochin, the English took a decision in favour of the Raja depending on the letters sent to him by Tipu Sultan relating to these transactions⁶. Regarding Paroor, Alangad and Kongatnayar, Tipu wrote to the Commissioners who referred this to him, that they belonged, to Cochin. He said "these districts did not formerly belong to the Travancore Raja, nor at the commencement of the war, but he had possessed them from sometime by force"⁷.

The Raja in his reply to a letter from Tipu Sultan, assured him, that he had expelled from his territory Thacha Gaunda and Somandra Gaunda with their families who had escaped to his Kingdom after committing criminal deeds in the Mysore territory⁸. An official procedure

3. L. IV, Ist Series, Dis. No. 75.

4. L. LXII, Ist Series, No. 228.

5. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No 55, p. 411.

6. Ibid., pp. 380 to 408, paras 514 to 518. Also L. IV, Ist Series, No. 131.

7. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 55, p. 153, para 154.

8. L. XV, Ist Series, No. 234, p. 1098.

adopted by Tipu Sultan in dismissing a petition addressed to him by some merchants residing in the Cochin territory also unfold to us an interesting chapter of Mysorean diplomatic history. When some merchants from Cochin complained to Tipu Sultan in a petition, about heavy taxes levied from them by the Officers of the Raja, Tipu dismissed the petition with the remark that since the matter represented was under the jurisdiction of the Raja, the petition was forwarded for his information⁹. Thus it is clear that Cochin had no reason to complain against the treatment of Mysore Government.

When Tipu Sultan arrived in Malabar in the year 1880¹⁰, he required the Raja to meet him at Palghat¹¹. The Raja was received most politely and on his departure loaded with costly presents¹². In the course of their conversation, Tipu who was endowed with a subtle intellect and keen power of analysis and who was intimately acquainted with the affairs of Travancore hinted at his intention of conquering the kingdom¹³. To avert such an eventuality he required the Raja to use his good offices with Travancore for a judicious compromise¹⁴.

9. Ibid., No. 238, p. 1128.

10. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 56, part I, p. 95.

11. L. LXXI, S. I. No. 176.

12. *Sakthan Thampuran*, p. 139.

13. L. LXXI, S. I. No. 175.

14. Ibid., Those who wrote on the subject say that the relation between Cochin and Mysore was one of friendship till Tipu Sultan wanted the Raja to help him in his designs against Travancore, which was demanded of him when he had his interview with Tipu Sultan at palghat. This general remark is due to the lack of understanding of the shifts and deviations of the Raja's policy. His intrigues to shake off his vassalage are avident in his hostile activities and unfriendly letters written to the Dutch Governors and the Raja of Travancore some of which were brought out in the preceding topic.

The consternation in the Raja's camp when he was required to meet Tipu Sultan is described by the author of '*Sakthan Thampuran*' (pp. 137-139). The Raja believed that Tipu had

Immediately after returning from Palghat, the whole discussions were communicated to the Dutch and the Raja of Travancore. On his correspondence of this matter, the Raja received a letter from the Governor-General, Dutch East Indies, in which he wrote, ".....in order to avert calamities (we) have been compelled to make a voyage to Palaghatcherry to meet Tipu Sultan, and your Highness has detected at the conference..... the dangerous undertakings, which the same has in his mind against South Malabar (Travancore) of which the Lord Governor too has informed me".¹⁵ The Raja continued his request to the Dutch for military help to prevent any possible attack from Tipu Sultan.¹⁶ Writing in the year 1789, the Raja communicated the helpless state of Cochin before the power of Tipu Sultan and pleads "if necessary help is not forthcoming, Tipu Sultan will commit atrocities in all Malabar".¹⁷ He continues in his letter to repeat the demand that "sufficient number of war ships, arms, and ammunitions, should be despatched"¹⁸ to him. The reply received by the Raja for these letters was not encouraging. The Governor-General of Dutch East Indies regretted in his letter, his inability to send the necessary force.¹⁹ Thus it was clear to the Raja that neither the Supreme Council at Batavia, nor their Governor in Malabar Coast, could help him in case he would break his ties with Tipu Sultan.

evil intentions and therefore all veteran Brahmins were required to perform Yagas and Poojas. (Ibid), The High priest of the palace accompanied him. (Ibid.) The nervousness felt by the Raja was because of his own guilt and fear of severe consequences if his machinations were accounted to by Tipu Sultan.

15. L. LXXI, 1st Series No. 176. The Governor-General of Netherland Indies to the Raja of Cochin, Sept. 10, 1789.
16. L. LXI/A, Series I.
17. L. LXXI. 1st Series No. 175.
18. Ibid., No. 175.
19. Ibid., No. 176.

Therefore, side by side with his correspondence with the Dutch, he began overtures with the English through the intermediary of the Raja of Travancore. The Dutch Governor himself knew the development of this new relation of the Raja with the English when he had received from other sources the copy of a letter sent by the Raja to the English Governor of Madras. On receipt of this information, Van Angelbeck, the Dutch Governor wrote to the Raja on June 24, 1790, intimating him that he had received a letter from the Governor of Madras in which he wrote that the Raja was willing to break away with Tipu and enter into an alliance with the English.²⁰ On July 15, 1790, a letter embodying conditions that would be stipulated when alliance was made with the English was communicated by Van Angelbeck to the Raja.²¹ "Mr. Powney sent me a copy of the draft of the treaty to be concluded between Your Highness and the English," wrote the Dutch Governor again on August 4, 1790, to the Raja. He continued to say "he (Powney) requested me to abide by it and I shall do so".²² The proposed alliance came into effect from September 25, 1790, even though the signature fixed to it by the Madras Council dates only February 2, 1791.²³ Subsequently the Raja helped the English in the Third Anglo-Mysore War.

Despite these developments, Tipu Sultan did not become his enemy. Even after his Malabar possessions were ceded to the English after the Treaty of Seringapatam, Tipu Sultan continued to display his countenance and sympathy towards the Raja of Cochin. When as usual, dispute arose between the Zamorin and the Raja of Cochin over boundary questions and both parties poured possible evidence in favour of their respective claims, the Malabar Commissioners referred the matter to Tipu Sultan to assess his opinion. Causing

20. L. LXII, Series I, No. 166, p. 2895.

21. Ibid., No. 167, pp. 2896-99.

22. Ibid., No. 168, pp. 2899-2900.

23. Fng. (Misc.) S. No. 55, pp. 79-80, para 73.

surprise to all parties concerned, Tipu Sultan wrote "to this silly matter why do you make Cochin suffer the loss".²⁴ This was at a time when his heart was weighed down by the loss of his Malabar territory and the wound that was inflicted on him by the Raja of Cochin who joined with the English in toppling his power in Malabar, was not healed. If Tipu Sultan hated him these opportunities would have been usefully availed of by him to wreak his vengeance. Throughout his relation, Tipu Sultan maintained the same dignity and politeness. No doubt it was not necessitated by any sense of fear or motivated by any kind of selfish interest. In fact, it reveals the consistency that was predominant in the character of Tipu Sultan.

These favourable reports sent by Tipu Sultan and his friendly disposition towards the Raja made the English suspect and even to allege that the Raja was secretly carrying on correspondence with Tipu, and the French with a view of ousting the English from Malabar.²⁵ In a letter written by the Raja in answer to Major Duncan, one of the Malabar Commissioners in the year 1794, he confesses that he neither received nor sent any letter to Tipu Sultan and that he had no relation at all with him. The Raja continued that all these false stories "are coined and propagated by my enemies to land me a victim of the wrath of the Honourable Company which I swear never deserve....."²⁶ The Raja had to swear a lot to convince the English that he had no relation of any kind either with Tipu Sultan or with the French. To prove his antagonism to the French he abuses them in another letter for murdering their emperor and shedding a lot of blood in the course of French Revolution.²⁷

From the foregoing descriptions, it can safely be concluded that not a single untoward incident can be made

24. Ibid., p. 383, para. 515.

25. Ibid., p. 95.

26. L. VII, Series I, Dis. No. 165.

27. List XXXVIII/A, S. I., No. 349/A.

out against the ruler of Mysore in his relation with the princely state of Cochin. But the Raja wanted to be free from the vassalage at the earliest opportunity as any other ruler would desire. Therefore, his relation was always shady and full of intrigue. But the observation of the author of '*Cochin State Manual*' is not correct.²⁸

One thing is certain that the relation with Mysore for nearly a quarter of a century had great impact on the administrative set up of the country. The land tax was first introduced in Cochin when the Raja was hard-pressed to make money to remit his tribute.²⁹ Probably the source of income to raise the tribute money might also have been pointed out to the Raja by the Mysore officers. The land revenue system introduced in Malabar by the Mysoreans, might also have influenced the Raja to turn in this direction. The important roads of Cochin were constructed during this period following the example of Tipu's roads in Malabar.³⁰ Trade monopoly was also planned and carried out to a limited extent again inspired by the Mysorean example. In short all that were attributed to Sakthan Thampuran as great administrative innovations were really inspired and sometimes instructed by the Mysorean pioneers.

28. After enumerating and acknowledging the favours conferred on the Raja of Cochin and the friendly attitude showed always by Tipu Sultan, the Author of *Cochin State Manual* sets down the reason why despite all these, the Raja did not like his relation with Mysore: "With all this, his subjection to a Mohammedan usurper of Mysore was felt as an irksome burden by Cochin...." This remark speaks volumes about these historians for whom it was not the inflexible candour and consistency nor the unruffled serenity of temper and judicious spirit of compromise that was counted but it was unmistakably the religion of the Conqueror. (*Cochin State Manual*, p. 124).

29. K. P. Padmanabha Menon: *History of Cochin State*, Vol. II, p. 428. He writes "when Sreenivas Rao compelled him to clear off the promised amount of 1,00,000 Varaham, towards war expenses and tribute, a tax of two 'panam' on land north of Travancore lines and six 'puthens' south of it per 'para' of paddy field were levied to make up the money.

30. Buchanan, Vol. II, p. 390.

RELATION OF TIPU WITH THE KINGDOM OF TRAVANCORE

We have seen that the relation between Mysore under Haidar Ali and Travancore under Marthanda Varma and after him, his successor Rama Varma, was antagonistic. Haidar Ali always held dear the dream of conquest of Travancore¹. But it always remained a dream. At all times when he made preparations for the conquest of Travancore "some unforeseen events" always diverted his attention to some other parts of his Kingdom². It would have been easy for him under the then political set up to materialise his dream of conquest without even courting a major war with the English, because they were not prepared to come into an open hostility with Haidar Ali³.

But the situation changed very much in favour of Rama Varma, when he was included by the English 'as a friend and ally' of the Company in the Treaty of Mangalore⁴ after the Second Anglo-Mysore War. As a shrewd politician Tipu quickly adjusted himself to the altered situation. Instead of an aggressive policy of 'demanding vassalage', from Travancore, as Haidar Ali has done, Tipu's policy was to appease

1. Moens says that Haidar Ali dictating terms for immunity from invasion of Travancore told him that he should prevail on Travancore also to pay a substantial sum, If the latter was not inclined to, 'he would pay him a visit'." (Moens: p. 154.)
2. *'History of Hyder Shah etc.,* pp. 93-4.
3. Fgn. and Home Dept. Sec. Cons., No. 1, 1756-80.
4. Logan: *Treaties etc.* i, XCIII; Select Committee Oct., 1783, No. 5.

the Raja and win him over by settling peacefully the outstanding disputes with him.⁵ On the other hand, Rama Varma, "confident of English support"⁶ not only ignored the friendly overtures of Tipu but also continued his hostile activities breaking thereby the provisions of the Treaty of Mangalore,⁷ to which he was also one of the signatories. Thus, the Mysore-Travancore relations during the time of Tipu present an absolutely different picture from that at the time of his father.

The Raja persisted in obtaining an English detachment to be stationed in his territory to make sure of the Company's support. Archibald Campbell wrote on August 12, 1788 about the "inconvenience of the Company" to comply with the Raja's request to send officers to command the Travancore army.⁸ However, he forwarded the Raja's letter to the Governor-General with a recommendation to the effect that if the Raja paid the expenses of two or three battalions of the English army that might be stationed at his kingdom, "the matter may be taken up and disposed favourably".⁹ Again, the Raja wrote to Archibald Campbell on September 1, 1788, that the proposal to station a contingent in the island of Ayicottah as mentioned in his letter would not serve as a force in the Travancore territory. "Our object

5. "I understand from what the Raja of Cochin said of you", wrote Tipu to Rama Varma, "that you are a good man and a great ruler who wants to be friendly with our Sircar. Since you are prudent and wise, you can presume the benefit that may accrue from my allying with you I am sending my vakeels with the presents of some jewels, a horse and a dress for your kind acceptance. . . ." (Mathilakom Records, Curuna 1208, pp. 74-75). The request here was for alliance and not for vassalage, clearly unfolds the shift of Mysorean policy.

6. Logan: *Malabar Manual*, Vol. I p. 409.

7. *History of Tipu Sultan*, p. 154.

8. Fgn. Dept. Sec. and Pol. Pro. 1, Sept. 22, 1788, S. No. 92, p. 3461.

9. *Ibid.* p. 3462.

undoubtedly would be to have the troops stationed in the place from where they could with the greatest ease and expedition invade Tipu's country....."¹⁰ The Raja finally succeeded in obtaining two battalions of the Company's native infantry to be stationed in the frontiers of his territory.¹¹ It is thus obvious that Rama Varma followed an offensive line against Tipu Sultan.

Since he never wanted a rapprochement with Tipu, who according to him unjustly deprived his brother rulers of Malabar of their possessions and made a vassal of Cochin and posed always a threat to his kingdom, Rama Varma continued vigorously, as any other prudent politician should do in such circumstances, to strengthen his frontiers, improve his militia and do whatever he could to please the English for bagging their support. With the connivance of the Raja of Cochin, he constructed a fort at Palliport in the year 1782¹², about which the Dutch Governor wrote to the Raja of Cochin in protest that he was surprised to hear that Travancore had sent masons and coolies to dig trenches and erect a fort at Palliport. He continues to say that Rama Varma, the King of Travancore, had nothing to do with that island and that considering the alliance of the Company, "your Highness ought to have at once informed us".¹³ Again, on the same subject, Van Angelbeck, the Dutch Governor, expressed, in strong terms his disapprobation, to the Raja of Cochin¹⁴. Rama Varma extended the Travancore Lines through the territory of the Raja of Cochin upto the Fort of Cranganore, thus cutting the small Kingdom of Cochin into two unequal divisions. Tipu Sultan required the Raja to demolish that part of the Lines that ran through the territory

10. Ibid., p. 3467.

11. See. Cons. No. 2, dated March 18, 1789.

12. Ibid., No. 2, dated February 25, 1789.

13. L.LXII, S. I. No. 31, p. 2760, dated Nov., 11, 1782.

14. Ibid., No. 32, p. 2761

of Cochin which was his tributary¹⁵. The Raja not only ignored this on the ground that it was essential for the safety of his country,¹⁶ but also began negotiations with the Dutch for the purchase of their forts at Cranganore and Pallipuram (Ayicottah) with the same intention¹⁷. He stirred up rebellions in Malabar and even appealed to the Governor of Madras to render possible help to the rebels for capturing their lost power and territory¹⁸. Thus engaged busily in sabotaging the Mysorean power in Kerala, the Raja of Travancore, finding it impossible to fight single-handed against Tipu, naturally bestowed his whole-hearted confidence on 'his old Ally and Friend' — the English¹⁹.

Freed from the Maratta menace, Tipu turned his attention to Malabar affairs. He felt it imperative for the tranquillity of his Malabar possessions to settle either amicably or by show of force the dispute between him and Rama Varma of Travancore. He sent his vakeels to the Raja of Cochin to require him to prevail upon the Raja of Travancore for amicable settlement of all disputes with him²⁰. Tipu Sultan also sent his agents to Rama Varma, the Raja of Travancore with a letter to this effect and some costly presents for his kind acceptance²¹.

15. Mly. Cons. January 1, 1790, Powney to Holland, December 18, 1789, Vol. 133.A, p. 5.

16. The lines, the Raja upheld were erected more than 25 years with the consent of the Raja of Cochin who then was not a tributary to Mysore, (Sec P. R. C. No. 52 pp. 49-50).

17. Fgn. Pol. Sec. Pro., No. 96-A, Parr II, pp. 2555-2562, Raja to Holland.

18. Mly. Country Correspondence, Vol. 38, No. 59 dated June 10 1786, Raja to Holland.

19. "I am an old friend to the Company. I rely upon the assistance of the English in case an attack from Tippoo..... (Fgn. Pol. Sec. Pro. No. 96. A, pp. 2765-66.)

20. Ibid., From Chief of Tellicherry to Holland, September 2, 1789. p. 2393.

21. Mathilakam Records, Curuna, 1308, p. 75,

This letter was written in the month of June 1789, a month and a half earlier than the purchase of the Dutch forts of Palliport (Ayicottah) and Cranganore by the Raja. But this letter was read and its reply was written in consultation with Bennerman, the Company's representative. He wrote in reply that he never adopted any measure without the concurrence of the English Government.²² It is evident then, that all the subsequent developments that precipitated a grave crisis and led to an open hostility were due to the machinations of the English, who were privy to all these hostile activities of the Raja. This can be further substantiated by the following testimonials.

Later in his correspondence with the Governor-General and Governor of Madras, the Raja openly admitted that he had his negotiations with the English and had purchased these Forts from the Dutch with the knowledge of the Company²³. Powney, the Resident of Travancore, was censured by Cornwallis for his unjustifiable conduct in conniving with the Raja in these transactions²⁴. Powney always maintained that the purchase was justified on the ground that the Dutch captured these places from the Portuguese and held them independently of the Cochin Raja. He asks in his letter to Governor Holland, "I wonder how can Dutch be dependent of Cochin, when they were actual masters of Cochin?"²⁵ He concludes his letter with the remark that if this* would

22. P. R. C., Vol. III, No. 52, p. 49.

23. Fgn. Pol. Sec. Pro., S. No. 96.A.; pp. 2751-55.

24. Ibid., Cornwallis to Powney, Dec., 15, 1789; p. 2882.

25. Ibid., Powney to Holland, p. 2755.

*Tipu claimed that the Forts of Cranganore and Ayicottah were held by the Dutch on the strength of a *Theettooram* given by the Raja of Cochin, and therefore they had no right to sell them out. He held that since these forts were situated in the Cochin territory and the title of these places rests with that Raja, these should be handed over to Cochin or he being the suzerain of Cochin be given the right of pre-emption. On the other hand, the Raja contended that these Forts were captured by

provoke Tipu Sultan to commence hostilities against the Raja, he would have done everything in his power to restrain him from engaging in it.²⁶ Holland, the Madras Governor, who was strongly opposed to the Raja purchasing these forts, was confronted himself with the twists and turns of the Company's superiors. He had expressed this in his letter to Cornwallis intimating to him the instructions he had given to the Raja to give back to the Dutch the place he had purchased from them and also requiring from the Governor-General to make it clear to him "whether it is your intention that Tipu Sultan should be suffered to take possession of Cranganore and Ayicottah if he should move with force for that purpose".²⁷ Finally, Holland was censured by the Governor-General,²⁸ and was replaced by Medows, "who was very hostile to Tipu."²⁹ Cornwallis wrote to Holland "it is none of your business to sit in judgement on a policy formulated by the Company",³⁰ and required him to furnish explanation for the charges framed against him. From the above, it is obvious that all the English Officers persuaded the Raja to purchase these Dutch forts by encouraging him with the sure prospect of English assistance in case there was a rupture on this issue. In fact the only person who strictly adhered to the principles laid down by the Council Proceedings of November 13, 1789³¹ was the Madras Governor, Holland, for which act of consistency he was censured.

the Dutch from the Portuguese directly and thus the Cochin Raja himself had no claim over them. Hence they were free to sell them out. For a fuller treatment vide; *History of Tipu Sultan* by Prof. Mohibbul Hasan Khan, Chapter on "the war with the Raja of Travancore", pp. 151 to 169.

26. Ibid., p. 2756.

27. Ibid., 96.A., Sec. Pro., May 5, to July 2, 1770, November 11, No. 92, p. 105.

28. P. R. C. Vol. III, No. 92, p. 105.

29. *History of Tipu Sultan*, p. 164.

30. Mill, J. — *History of British India*, Vol. V, p. 343.

31. Fgn. Pol. — Sec. Pro. Nov., 13, 1789, pp. 2588-90.

On the part of Tipu Sultan, he sincerely believed that the Company would use its influence and good offices to mete out justice as he had intelligence to that effect from them. He, therefore, continued his effort, for a peaceful settlement of the whole disputes with the Raja, through the intermediary of the Company. He wrote to Holland requiring him to ask the Raja to vacate his people from the Fort of Cranganore belonging to the Circar".³² He made it clear in the same communication that the Raja gave protection to the rebels of his place and incited them to disturbance and thus "the whole Calicut and other countries had been laid waste and destroyed".³³ This was dated October 30, 1789. Another letter of November 11, 1789, written by Tipu Sultan to Holland, makes out the following demands: (i) to advise the Raja of Travancore to release to him the rebel Rajas and chieftains sheltered by him in his country; (ii) to vacate the Fort of Cranganore; and (iii) to demolish that part of Travancore Lines which ran through the Cochin territory³⁴.


These were written on the strength of the assurance given by Holland in his letter to Tipu on October 19, 1789 in which he wrote that he had very much disapproved of the conduct of the Raja negotiating a bargain for the purchase of Cranganore and Ayicottah from the Dutch and that he had ordered a strict enquiry to be made into this business and that if it was found that the above mentioned places were dependent on the Cochin District and annual rent was paid by the Dutch under the condition Tipu Sultan mentioned in his letter, he would order them again to be restored to the proper owners.³⁵ He continues to say, "this measure will manifest my resolution to act conformally to the engagements entered into with you and will prove my desire of using

32. Ibid., S. No. 96-A, Dec. 1789, Part II, p. 2901.

33. Ibid., p. 2902.

34. Ibid., Dec., 1789, p. 2777.

35. Ibid., Holland to Tipu, p. 2571.



PALLIPURAM FORT (Ayicottah) The First European Fort built by the Portuguese in 1503, Captured by the Dutch in 1663, and purchased from them by Dharma Raja of Travancore in 1789.

every means to maintain the friendship which subsists between the Honourable Company and your Circar³⁶

This letter was written by Holland even after he had representation from Rama Varma, describing the history of the subsequent change of sovereignty of these Forts from the Portuguese to the Dutch and the necessity of keeping them for the security of his country.³⁷ Holland in a letter to the Governor General on November 4, 1789, intimated the line of action he had adopted relating to the purchase of these Forts by the Raja and stated that he had advised him for obliging the Raja to give back to the Dutch the places he had purchased from them.³⁸ But George Powney in his long report about his meeting with the Minister of the Raja, submitted to the Governor-General, sums up the arguments of the minister of Travancore, that "these places were essential for the tranquillity of Travancore."³⁹ Powney narrates the negotiations of Tipu Sultan's vakeels with the Dutch Governor, through the good offices of the Raja of Cochin, to induce him to sell the Fort of Cochin to Tipu Sultan or at least to cancel the sales of Ayicottah and Cranganore and to make them over to him for which he offered double the price.⁴⁰ Powney favours the Raja on the ground that these were highly necessary for the security of his country.⁴¹ But this was quite against the principles laid down by the Council Proceedings of November 13, 1789. It specified, "of whatever importance the two places in question may appear to the defence of the territories of the Raja of Travancore it cannot be supported considering the consequences resulting from a war."⁴² The council in its proceedings admitted that

36. Ibid.,

37. Ibid., Raja to Holland, pp. 2555-62

38. Ibid., Holland to Governor-General, p. 2554

39. Ibid., Powney to Governor-General, pp 2751-55

40. Ibid.,

41. Ibid.,

42. Ibid., Council. Pro. of November 13, 1789, p. 2585

the documents before the Board were insufficient to decide the case with certainty. Therefore, they proposed that Commissioners would be appointed to settle the claim set up by both parties under mutual engagements and to abide by the proof exhibited in the course of discussion which should be determined upon these principles — that if Ayicottah and Cranganore belonged originally to the Portuguese and were made over by them to the Dutch and if the Dutch held independent possession of them without any reserve of allegiance to the Raja of Cochin, who is tributary to Tipu Sultan the transfer of them by the Dutch to the Raja of Travancore should be valid and just and possession shall be given to him.⁴³ It continues that if on the contrary the Dutch were dependent on the Raja of Cochin and had not the independent possession of Ayicottah and Cranganore, they should be considered as belonging to the territories of his tributary and as such his sovereignty over them should be acknowledged and the possession would remain with him uninterrupted.⁴⁴ With all these, Tipu Sultan believed that the English would not overlook his claim or come to an open hostility on this issue.

Thus by the end of October 1789, Tipu Sultan reached Palghat and on December 4, Powney wrote to Cornwallis about the movement of Tipu Sultan through Palghat with the apprehension that Tellicherry might be stormed, even though it was impossible to decide "what Tippoo's designs are".⁴⁵ He continues his letter to say that the Travancore Raja also amassed his troops of "a hundred thousand men" about 8000 of them "clothed and armoured like our sepoys".⁴⁶ On December 14, Tipu Sultan arrived at a distance of about

43. Ibid., p. 2589.

44. Ibid., p. 2590.

45. Ibid., December 1789, Powney to Governor-General, S. No. 96-A Part II, p. 2881.

46. Ibid., p. 2882.

25 miles from the Lines.⁴⁷ Next day he sent his envoy to Rama Varma, the ruler of Travancore with certain specific demands⁴⁸ Powney, the Resident of Travancore reports about these demands of Tipu Sultan on the Raja of Travancore and the latter's reactions on these demands in a letter sent to Major Alexander Dow, the Chief of Tellicherry on December 20, 1789.⁴⁹ He concludes that it would appear from his present operations that Tipu Sultan intended to support his demands by force and that his armies within 10 miles of the Lines and that he was there with an advance party consisting of 4000 men with 10 guns within four miles of them which "makes us expect every hour to hear that they are attacked".⁵⁰ The Raja's reply to his demand for the expulsion of the rebel Chieftains of his country was also irksome. He sent word that no demand for their repatriation had ever been made by Tipu and that he had given protection to the rulers of Chirakkal, Calicut and Kadathnad only because they were his relations⁵¹ We have seen that from the time of Haidar Ali a number of complaints were launched against the protection given by the Raja to the rebels belonging to the Mysore territory. Therefore, what Rama Varma had written was a gross misrepresentation of real facts.

When this provocative reply came to Tipu Sultan, he marched nearer and on December 24, encamped at a place

47. Sec. Cons. No. 10, dated January 27, 1790.

48. Ibid., Nos. 1-4, January 27, 1790.

49. P. R. C., Vol. III, No. 52, p. 49, Powney to Dow, December 20, 1790.

50. Ibid., p. 50. Tipu demanded that the troops of the Raja stationed in the Cranganore Fort should be withdrawn; that the Malabar Rajas who were with him should be handed over; and that the Raja's lines erected on the Cochin territory should be demolished. The Raja replied that he could take a decision on these demands only after hearing from the English Government to whom these were referred (Ibid.).

51. Mly. Cons., January 1, 1790, Vol. 133-A.

about four miles from the Lines.⁵² If Tipu Sultan wanted to attack the Lines, his movement would not have been so slow and actions so lukewarm. Since he reached Palghat on December 4, 1789, it was easy for his intrepid dash to reach the lines within a day or two. But he lulled it simply because he did not want a war and "did not come prepared for the same".⁵³ He thought that since the English disapproved of the actions of the Raja in strong terms, his appearance with an army would induce him to come to amicable terms. But the actual turn of events fell short of his expectations. The Raja was quite aware that the military preparations and discussions were being carried on uninterruptedly in camera, by the English, and he would finally get their support. Therefore, he did not at all mind the overtures that Tipu Sultan showed and as Powney made it clear the Raja rallied 'a hundred thousand of his soldiers' to meet any eventuality.

Meanwhile on the night of December 29, there occurred an encounter between the Mysorean troops, who were clearing jungles in pursuit of certain Malabar rebels, and the forces of the Raja of Travancore. It was actually an unprovoked assault on the Mysorean army. They retaliated with the result that the Travancore army ran away pell-mell and a considerable portion of the Lines fell into the hands of the Mysoreans who occupied it.⁵⁴ On December 29, 1789, Powney wrote from Parur, the vicinity of these developments to Major Alexander Dow, "Tippoo had this morning opened three batteries against the Raja's Lines. I am afraid they will soon be carried. We must do the best with our small detachment, but unsupported it cannot be expected, we can do much".⁵⁵ It appears from the intelligence of Powney that

52. Sec. Cons. No. 10, dated January 27, 1790.

53. Wilks *Historical Sketches etc.* Vol. II, P. 373.

54. Pol. Pro., February 10, 1790, Tipu to Holland, January, 1, Cons. No. 9.

55. P. R. C., Vol. III, No. 54, p. 51, Powney to Major Dow.

Mysore troops encouraged by the success of the preceding day were also prepared to occupy the Lines by an attack. But the Travancore troops retreated to the Lines followed closely by the Mysoreans until they reached some vantage point from where "they received reinforcements from the Raja, coming from the right and left, (and) the enemy were hemmed in between two fires and were driven out with great slaughter".⁵⁶ This frontier skirmish has been grossly exaggerated by our historians. Wilks says that out of 15,000 of the Mysorean troops only 20 of them returned to tell this tragedy.⁵⁷ No doubt it is based on the report of the incident by the Raja. Though the Raja puts the number of the Mysorean army as 15,000, he did not give the number lost by the Mysoreans. We will see in the following discussions that the number given might in all possibility be a wrong figure, because to defeat the Raja's troops when an actual assault was made, only some "6000 dismounted horsemen" were employed by Tipu Sultan.⁵⁸ Therefore, if there were 15,000 men on the part of Mysoreans, it would have been well-nigh impossible to dislodge them.

Powney who was in the neighbourhood wrote in jubilation to Holland, "Tippoo has met with a repulse from the Raja's troopsNear a thousand were left dead within the Lines".⁵⁹ The Raja in his letter dated January 2, 1790, wrote to Hutchinson, "on the 29th December, the troops of Tipu Sultan consisting of horse and foot about 15,000, appeared in front of my Fort. My people opposed them and a battle ensued, when some of them, (were) killed, others wounded and the remaining fled. My people are now strongly entrenched".⁶⁰ From these letters of the Raja and

56. Fgn. (Sec.) Pol. Pro. February 10, 1790, No. 5, January 4, Powney to Holland.

57. Wilks: Vol. II, pp. 357-58.

58. Pol. Pro. May 14, 1790, Cons. No. 11.

59. Ibid., February 3, 1790, February 4, Cons. No. 5, Powney to Holland.

60. P. R. C., Vol. III, No. 56, p. 52.

Powney, it can safely be presumed that the loss of the Mysorean army was not so heavy as Wilks makes out in his statement.

Again our historians declare that Tipu Sultan was himself present in the fight and that he was wounded and narrowly escaped from death. "He escaped only with much difficulty", writes Wilks "and the lameness which occasionally continued until his death, was occasioned by the severe contusions he received on this occasion".⁶¹ Wilks who invented the lameness of Tipu Sultan continues to say that his palanquin, his seals, his sword, his diamond rings and jewels fell as trophies in the hands of the enemy.⁶² This is also one of the baseless stories relating to this incident. Powney, the first to report the matter observes: "A Brahmin of some consequence is among the prisoners, he says that Tipu was at the attack and had a horse shot under him... Reports say that he has crossed the Chetwa River and is advancing along the sea-side with the intentions of attacking Cranganore and Ayicottah".⁶³ If Tipu Sultan was wounded 'his advance along the sea-side and the intentions of attack' attached to it by Powney would be impossible. At the same time the letters written by the Raja of Travancore and Cochin, to the Governor of Madras⁶⁴ and the Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies,⁶⁵ respectively, do not make any mention of the presence of Tipu at the incident of December 29. Tipu in his letter to Holland made it clear in unequivocal terms that the incident happened without his knowledge and that soon after he was aware of it he ordered

61. Wilks: Vol. II, p. 146.

62. Ibid., p. 145.

63. Pol. Pro.—February 3, 1790, Cons. No. 5, January 4, Powney to Holland.

64. Ibid., 1790, No. 3.

65. L. LXI-A, No. 7.

the return of the prisoners of the Raja.⁶⁶ This was corroborated by Holland when he wrote to Madras that "it was accidental without any specific orders from Tipu."⁶⁷ "I have this instance received the following intelligence from the southern frontier of the State" writes C. W. Malet to W. Medows on March 24, 1790, "the news of his being wounded is not circulated in this part, but it is said Meer Kamaruddeen fell in the attack of Travancore Line".⁶⁸ The concluding part of the information is also false because Qamaruddeen Khan survived even the Fourth Anglo-Mysore war.⁶⁹ Malet himself corrects this mistake in his letter to Abercromby dated April 11, 1790, that a man of his just arrived from Tipu's camp before the Travancore Lines which he had left by the middle of February and that he assured him that he saw Tipu Sultan in the beginning of that month in perfect health and that he had not been wounded. But his cousin Qamaruddeen Khan received two deep wounds on his breast from which he was recovering fast.⁷⁰ After the capture of the Lines by Tipu Sultan the ceremonial demolition of the same is picturesquely described by Wilks in these words: "The whole army off duty was regularly paraded without arms and marched in divisions to the appointed station. The Sultan placed on an eminence set the example of striking the fire stroke with pick axe; the ceremony was repeated by the courtiers and Chiefs and followers of every description".⁷¹ If Tipu Sultan was lame the historians would not have failed to comment on this comic scene of the performance of a lame-footed man with an axe striking from an eminence at the wall. Evidently these are false stories.

66. Pol. Pro., February 10, 1790, Cons. No. 9, Jan., 1, 1790, Tipu to Holland.

67. Ibid, April 2, 1790., Cons. No. 1.

68. P. R. C., Vol. III, No. 81, p. 89.

69. *History of Tipu Sultan*, p. 302.

70. P. R. C., Vol. III, No. 88, p. 100.

71. Wilks : Vol. II, p. 154.

The only explanation for the spread of such a story is that the Travancoreans might have been apt to mistake any well-dressed Mysorean soldier to be Tipu Sultan.

As regards the trophies of war, the Travancore records mention only two stands of colours and one small bell.⁷² It is unusual for Tipu Sultan to use a palanquin since he was usually mounted and attached great importance to horse-manship, "in which he was considered to excel. The conveyances in a palanquin he derided and in a great degree prohibited even to the aged and infirm".⁷³ Therefore, the version that a person who hated such a conveyance was carried in a palanquin to lead an attack can never be accepted. The Madras Government itself regarded the incident of December 29, "a minor affair and not regular hostilities".⁷⁴ In this connection, let us take note that before the actual hostilities commenced in April 14, 1790, the Travancore force repeated the same provocative attack twice and on both these occasions they were beaten back. Therefore, it can be rightly presumed that the first shot might have been fired by the Travancore army.

The performance of the Raja's army on December 29, is highly extolled by historians. But Tipu knew it was an outcome of a foolhardy venture of a small portion of his army"⁷⁵ availing of the opportunity to occupy the Lines against the Raja's force of more than 'a hundred thousand men.' He was confident to overcome the Raja's force easily but waited for a just and reasonable settlement of his disputes with him. No other reason can be assigned for the inordinate delay in attacking the Lines after this incident of December 29, 1789. Hostile Historians of Tipu Sultan write that he waited for the reinforcement and was afraid of a

72. Mathilakom Records—Curuna, 1308, FF. 154-56.

73. Wilks: Vol. II, p. 154.

74. Mly. Desp. to Court of Directors, Sept., 16, 1790, Vol. 20, p. 69.

75. Fgn. Pol. Sec Pro., S. No. 96-A, pp. 2584 to 2592.

second attack on the Lines due to the disastrous result of December 29. But Tipu Sultan calculated the strength of the Raja's force without error. Even after this "frontier incident",⁷⁶ he had no hesitation when he wrote to the Governor of Madras to convey these sentiments in these words: "It is not a great task to demolish the Lines",⁷⁷ but Tipu Sultan anxiously avoided open hostility to obtain a judicious compromise through the good offices of the Company.⁷⁷ This estimate of Tipu Sultan did not fall short of precision and judgement when he actually started an organised assault on April 14, 1790 with only 6000 of his men engaged in the attack.⁷⁸ Therefore, any impartial observer can very well come to a just conclusion that Tipu Sultan was for a peaceful settlement of his disputes with the Raja, and that actually he was betrayed by the friendly overtures shown to him by the English.

After the incident of December 29, 1789, nothing serious happened, except that the Raja's force were driven back twice where they sallied forth from the lines and attacked the Mysoreans encamped nearby as referred to above. These were on March 1, and April 9, 1790. Tipu Sultan, as we have seen wanted to settle his disputes with the Raja amicably through negotiations. Therefore, he waited for more than three months without attempting to capture the place. Immediately after the incident of December 29, 1789, if Tipu Sultan made an organised assault on the Lines, he could have easily captured it. If this were to happen the Company would not have got time to flout the decisions of their Council Proceedings of November 13, 1789.⁷⁹ But Tipu Sultan's desire to come to a peaceful

16. *History of Tipu Sultan*, Op. Cit., p. 165.

17. J. Mill: *History of British India*, Vol. V, p. 343.

17-a. Egn. Pol. Sec. Pro., February 10, 1790, Cons. No. 9, Tipu to Holland, January 1.

18. Pol. Pro., May 14, 1790, Cons. No. 11.

19. Ego. Pol. Sec. Pro., No. 96-A, pp. 2584-92

settlement with the Raja through the good offices of Holland⁸⁰ and Powney caused the delay, that gave ample time to the English to twist their own decisions of the Council Proceedings of November 13. Tipu Sultan wrote to Powney to visit his camp along with some confidential persons for an amicable settlement of the disputes with the Raja.⁸¹

Failing in his attempts to obtain a reasonable settlement, Tipu Sultan determined to make an attack. "From the morning of April 12, 1790, the Mysoreans began a regular cannonade which within a few hours made a practical breach of at least three quarters of a mile."⁸² In the early hours of April 15, 1790, Tipu Sultan attacked the Lines and with little or no resistance occupied it. Powney reported the matter on the same day from Ayicottah "the enemy all last night kept up a heavy cannonade and this morning at day break stormed. It is said that 6000 of Tipu's dismounted horsemen made the assault.....in short the army was in possession of the Lines."⁸³ The Raja of Travancore conveyed this in his letter of April 20, 1790, in these words: ".....on the 15th in the morning they entered the Lines, made a desperate attack, killed and wounded 4000 of my people and as they are in great force, my Lines surrendered to the Sultan. It is my bad fortune that no opportunity presented to the Company's troops to come to my assistance."⁸⁴ This was reported by Hartley from Cochin on May 10, 1790. He says that "Tipu met with no resistance."⁸⁵ The consternation of the Raja's people was so great that all attempts to rally them proved abortive.

80. Pol. Cons. No. 9, dated February 10, 1790.

81. Ibid., No. 7, February 17, 1790.

82. *History of Tipu Sultan*, Op. Cit., p. 166.

83. Pol. Pro. May 14, 1790, Cons. No- 11

84. P. R. C. Vol. III, No. 73-A, p. 113, Raja to the Resident of Travancore.

85. Ibid., No. 106, A, p. 129.

Colonel Hartley in another letter to Abercromby written from Ayicottah on May 1, 1790 observes the panic prevailing on Tipu taking the Travancore Lines. "that the Raja's army had fled precipitatedly in the greatest disorder leaving everything in the possession of Tipu, that the two Madras Battalions quitted Paroor..... The whole Kingdom was panic struck, not five thousand of the Raja's army were together, inhabitants of every description had fled to the southward far beyond Cochin."⁸⁶ The flight was universal. This general panic was indicated by Powney when he wrote, "never was there such a shameful flight."⁸⁷

The Line was completely demolished and the whole Travancore territory lay open before Tipu Sultan.⁸⁸ He then marched towards Cranganore Fort, which was occupied by him on May 7, 1790⁸⁹ when colonel Hartley withdrew his garrison from the Fort.⁹⁰ One after another Ayicottah, Parur and other forts fell into the hands of Mysoreans. It was only a matter of time for him to conquer the whole of Travancore territory. But having received intelligence about the movement of the English army to his own Kingdom, Tipu Sultan withdrew from Alwaye to rush to the defence of his Kingdom.⁹¹

Cornwallis declared war against Tipu Sultan for his attack on the "Company's Ally and friend."⁹⁰ Had the political situation of the country not been suitable for the English to carry out the evil designs over their enemy, they would have merely compelled the Raja to abide by the just and wise course. But the trend of time was such that in the words of Cornwallis "at present we have every prospect of aid from

86. Ibid., No. 98, p. 117.

87. Fgn. Pol. Sec. Pro., May 14, 1720, Cons. No. 9.

88. Pol. Cons. No. 11, dated May 14, 1790.

89. Ibid., No. 3, May 26, 1790.

90. Ibid., No. 10, June 2, 1790.

91. Ibid., No. 8, dated May 14, 1790.

the country powers, whilst he (Tipu) can expect no assistance from France."⁹³ Explaining the point further to C.W. Malet, Cornwallis wrote in another letter that he depended much on the support of the Marattas and the Nizam on this occasion and hoped that they would also seize the opportunity to reduce the power of "a prince whose ambition knows no bounds", and that there are no reasons to believe that "Tipu has on this occasion acted in concert with the French Government"⁹⁴ considering the convulsed state of affairs of that nation in Europe. All English Generals in India construed the time most favourable to their aggressive designs. C. W. Malet in his letter of February 5, 1790, written to Cornwallis puts this general feeling in these words, ".....the vigour of British Government now in India is equal to the prosecution of our just resentment against Tipu to his extirpation."⁹⁵ John Kennaway writing to Campbell endorsed the same opinion. He felt that the time was most favourable that "affords to the execution of our design."⁹⁶ Thus the cause of the Raja of Travancore was made a pawn to fructify the aggressive motives of the English.

The relation of Mysore with Travancore indicates how the native powers who could not stand on their legs, were made use of for the motives of the English to get rid of their enemies in India and how these petty powers were treated after the successful realisation of the evil designs of the English. All rulers of India during this period sought help from foreign powers either to carry out their aggressive designs against their neighbours or to defend their kingdoms

92. Fgn. Pol. Sec. Pro. No. 96-A, pp. 2765-2766.

93. Ibid., April 2, 1970, Cons. No. 1.

94. P. R. C., Vol. III, No. 72, February 20, 1790, pp. 77-78.

95. Ibid., Vol. III, No. 63, p. 651.

96. Fgn. Pol. Sec. Pro., S. No. 92, pp. 3768-3769,

from them. The Rajas of Kerala are not an exception to this general rule. But it is an irony of fate that all of them soon found themselves entangled in the meshes of foreign dominance. The Raja of Travancore also became a subsidiary ally after the Third Anglo-Mysore War, like the other Malabar Rajas before him.⁹⁷

97. T. K. Velu Pillai; *Travancore State Manual*, Vol. II, p. 433.

THE THIRD ANGLO-MYSORE WAR

In order to establish their political sway over India the English began systematic manoeuvring to cripple if not to crush the growing popularity and power of Tipu Sultan. Therefore, from the very beginning, they began to violate the provisions of the Treaty of Mangalore. The reason for the wanton violations of this solemn treaty by the English was that "it was the ruler of Mysore alone who had shown himself at all equal to the English on the field of battle".¹ The English thought that they were forced to conclude a disadvantageous treaty with Tipu Sultan. "This is the first time a country enemy has gained an advantage over us".² It was in fact "not considered as a treaty but as a truce" by the English.³

In violation of the Fourth Article of the Treaty,⁴ that stipulated that Cannanore should be evacuated by the English, it was adhered to only after strong complaints from Tipu Sultan. The Chief of Tellicherry had a letter from Tipu Sultan expressing his discomfiture about the Cannanore fort that had been looted of everything: "the said fort was made empty as a jungle and then your troops went away.....".⁵ The Nair rebels of Tipu's dominion were

1. G. B. Mclleson: *Seringapatam, the Capital of Tipu*, p. 146.

2. Letter from Josias Du Pre to Robert Orme, Indian Record Series, Vol. II, p. 599.

3. Mly. Sundry Book, Vol. 61, pp. 1462-64.

4. Logan: *Treaties etc.*, i, XC.

5. Mly. Cons., May 29, 1784, Vol. 99 B, p. 2050.

given protection by the Tellicherry Factors and they used them as instruments for inciting rebellions in his territory. In his letter dated April 23, 1789, addressed to the Chief of Tellicherry, Tipu Sultan accused the English in strong terms of violating the provisions of the treaty. He wrote that the English had broken the Treaty in the following instances:

“First, you have taken Dharmapatanam, a place belonging to the Sircar. Secondly the Raja of Cotiote and of Cherickal with their families fled to Tellicherry with 20 lakhs of rupees, you embarked all these on board a ship and sent them to Ram Raja’s country”.⁶ He continues that nearly 20,000 Nairs were given protection by the Factors and that with the help of the English, they got out at night to make depredations in the country.⁷ In another letter, Tipu Sultan required the Chief to send back all rebels who took protection under them and also to give back to Ravi Varma, the Raja of Chirakkal, Dharmapatanam which, Tipu Sultan reiterated, the English had taken by force from him.⁸ The Prince of Chirakkal also made known to the Factors by his people to take possession of Dharmapatanam for which he says that he had received orders from Tipu Sultan.⁹ These preparations were reported by the Factors on June 26 to the Bombay Government with a request to send reinforcements to defend the place.¹⁰ As the answers given to Tipu Sultan by the Chief of Tellicherry were couched in arrogant and impolite words, Tipu expressed his resentment in strong words, requiring him “not to write to me on any business from this time forward”.¹¹

6. P. R. C., Vol. III, No. 37 A, p. 36.

7. Ibid: p. 37.

8. Fgn. Sec. Dept. Pro., 1-22, September, 1788, S. No. 92, pp. 3803-4.

9. Ibid: Prince of Chirakkal to the Chief of Tellicherry, May 28, 1788, p. 3802.

10. Ibid., From the Factors, June 26, 1788, p. 3801.

11. P. R. C., Vol. III, No. 37 A, p. 37.

Tipu Sultan retaliated the English by imposing a total ban on export which affected them grievously, in their business in Malabar. In the Council Proceedings of August 26, 1789, this was recorded thus, "Tipu seems determined to preserve the prohibiting the exportation of the Coast productions... the Company can device little or no benefit from the trade at Tellicherry...".¹² But they hoped at the same time that if through some fortuitous events the Malabar Rajas shake off the yoke of Tipu Sultan and circumstances should justify "our forming alliance with them", one might venture to predict that Tellicherry would become a possession highly valuable to "our employers in point of commerce and of great political weight"¹³. Therefore, it had become imperative for their bare existence in Malabar to foment rebellions and create disorder to which end they did their best.

To facilitate these schemes they found in the Raja of Travancore "a faithful ally and a best friend in India".¹⁴ The rebels of Malabar reached the territory of Travancore through Tellicherry. All facilities were provided by the Factors to see them reach Trivandrum safely. Though the Raja of Travancore was one of the parties of the Treaty of Mangalore, it did not prevent him from giving protection to the fugitive princes and nobles of Malabar. Tipu Sultan wrote to the Raja and the Governor of Madras requiring the former to send back the rebels,¹⁵ and the latter to use his good offices with the Raja not to give asylum to those criminals who had been guilty of the country being "laid waste and destroyed".¹⁶ These protests were totally ignored and no sanctity was attached to the provisions of the Treaty.

12. Sec. Pro. 25th Sept., 1789, S. No. 96, August 26, p. 1819.

13. Ibid: pp. 1855-56.

14. T. K. Velu Pillai: *Travancore State Manual*, Vol. 11, p. 354.

15. Sec. Pro. December 1789, S. No. 96 A, Tipu to Holland, Oct. 30, 1789, p. 2901.

16. Ibid: Nov. 11, 1789, Tipu to Holland, pp. 2977-3070.

Hardly an year had elapsed since Cornwallis had assumed the office of the Governor-General, when the prospect of a war in Europe darkened the political horizon of India also. The English expected that Tipu Sultan would make an attack on Carnatic.¹⁷ His embassies to France¹⁸ and Constantinople,¹⁹ the arrival of French troops to his service,²⁰ and his ceaseless activities to improve his militia,²¹ made them believe that Tipu Sultan would violate the Treaty of Mangalore. But it was soon confirmed "that he was not to make any movements of a hostile nature I shall be convinced that he is no way disposed to quarrel with us".²² On August 28, 1788, Campbell wrote to Captain Kenneway endorsing the same opinion that "Tipoo is not disposed to quarrel with us this time".²³ But negotiations to ally with the Marattas and the Nizam were carried out successfully. The success of the English diplomacy lay in the fact that Cornwallis could create an impression in the minds of the Nizam and the Marattas that the alliance with the Company would be always for their own good.

Cornwallis did not stop with the alliance of the Nizam and Marattas but continued his effort to get the support of all the affected nobles and princes of Malabar area. A paper of protection was publised inviting the rebels to come under the Company's shelter and support them in their attempt to oust Tipu Sultan from Malabar Coast. It reads: "In the name of the Honourable English East India Company, I, Robert Teylor, Chief for transacting all affairs of the English nation at Tellicherry who hereby assure you (here

17. P. R. C. No. 11, Cornwallis to Malet, August 29, 1787, p. 9.

18. Ibid: No. 5, p. 4, Archibald Campbell to Malet June 8, 1788

19. Ibid: No. 12, p. 10.

20. Ibid: No. 10, pp. 8-9.

21. Ibid: No. 21, p. 9, Oct. 20, 1787-R. H. Boddain to Malet-Sec. Sec. and Pol. Pro. 1-22 Sept, 1788, S. No. 92. August 11, 1788, Malet to Bay.

22. Ibid: 1-22 Sept. S. No. 92, p. p. 3461.

23. Ibid: p. 3829.

enter the Raja's name and titles) that provided you will enter heartily into the war against Tipu Sultan, and act vigorously against him, the English East India Company will assist and protect you and do everything in their power to render you independent of Tipu Sultan . . . I do hereby further assure you, that in any future treaty that may take place between the Company and Tipu Sultan you shall be included and considered as an ally of the Honourable Company. In witness whereof I have here-unto set my hand and the Honourable Company's seal and you have affixed your seal at Tellicherry, this 4th day of May, 1790".²⁴ This was proclaimed to ensure the rebels security and instil courage in them to come out of their hiding places because Taylor himself complains in the same letter that some extraordinary exertion must be made to drive the enemy from the frontiers, for they were convinced that while Tipu's post continued in force all round them, even close to their advance guards, "not a man of Malabar would have come over to us".²⁵ Subsequently Taylor could report to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors "that the Chirakkal, Cattinadu, and Cotiote Rajas are with us here. The Coorg Raja is well-inclined towards us but the Beebi of Cannanore has not declared herself".²⁶ Within a few days, Taylor wrote to Abercromby the operation of Chirakkal and Cotiote Rajas who had signed a treaty of friendship with the Company and also the Coorg Raja's eagerness for friendship with the English.²⁷ Similarly, a treaty of friendship was entered into between the Raja of Cochin and the English, through the good offices of Powney, Resident of Travancore.²⁸ On August 8, 1790, the Beebi of Cannanore was compelled to sign a treaty with them.²⁹ Thus all possible preparations were taken by the English to single out Tipu Sultan.

24. P. R. C., No. 103, p. 125, also see Logan: *Treaties etc.* i, CLVIII.-Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 56, Part I, Voucher No. 10, pp. 455-56.

25. Ibid: p. 123.

26. Ibid: No. 101, p. 122. Also see Logan: *Treaties etc.*, i, XCV.

27. Ibid: No. 109, p. 137, dated May 17, 1790.

28. C. R. E., 167, L. LXII. S. I See Logan: *Treaties etc.*, i, XCIX.

29. Logan: *Treaties etc.*, i, XCVI.

This was at a time when all writers upheld that Tipu Sultan was not prepared for a war with the English.³⁰ The dread the English had of the power of Tipu Sultan can easily be seen from these war preparations and military alliances. All the efforts of Tipu Sultan to counteract the machinations of Cornwallis, through his vakils at Poona and Hyderabad, proved futile. Likewise, his effort to secure the help of the French bore no fruit, whereas Cornwallis could successfully induce Tipu Sultan's tributaries like Beebi of Cannanore and Rama Varma of Cochin to throw off their allegiance to Tipu Sultan. Thus unlike in other Anglo-Mysore Wars, Tipu Sultan this time had to fight single-handed against the combined forces of the English who allied with the native forces of the country.

As we have seen, Tipu Sultan after reducing the Travancore lines and advancing as far as the south of Alwaye, returned hastily when he heard the English had made use of this attack to declare war against him. The English who were manoeuvring to isolate Tipu Sultan and thus encircle him to curb his power got a *causesbelli* to pounce upon him. Cornwallis communicated his directions to Malet and Kenneway on January 27, 1790, in these words "you will probably know before this letter can reach you that Tipu has committed actual hostilities against our ally, the Raja of Travancore, which being considered by this Government, as equal to a declaration of war against the Company, the most vigorous measures will be taken immediately".³¹ The date of this letter is particularly important to show that during this time Tipu Sultan did not make any assault on the Lines. The only instance of hostility which occurred was on December 29, 1789 and it was according to the Madras Government

30. Sec. Pro. June 16, 1788, Cons. No. 24. Wilks: *Historical Sketches* etc., Vol. II, p. 373. Mohibul Hasan Khan: *Tipu Sultan*, p. 165.

31. P. R. C. No. 60, pp. 54-6 dated January 27, 1790, Cornwallis to Malet.

itself, "not a serious act of hostility but only a frontier incident" It was admitted by the officers of the Company that it happened by the provocation of Travancoreans and without the least knowledge of Tipu Sultan.³² This clearly indicates the malicious intention of the English to make use of this favourable opportunity to crush the growing power of their formidable enemy. H H Dowdell writing in the *Cambridge History of India* puts the English version of the story thus: "However with the usual English good fortune, Tipu selected as the time for his provocative attack upon Travancore, the time when the French were much too engrossed by their domestic affairs to spare a thought to India so that he was left to meet Cornwallis, attack alone".³³

The war started with all vigour and enthusiasm on the part of the English as they were well aware that they could at last trap the Tiger of Mysore. In the first phase of the war itself, the whole of Malabar was captured by the English even though Tipu Sultan had won some brilliant victories over his enemy in the Carnatic and in his own kingdom. Colonel Stuart who was ordered to move to Malabar appeared before Palghat Fort, the stronghold of the Mysoreans, on Sept. 21, 1790.³⁴ In less than two hours the fort was silenced and before night a practicable breach was effected. But all these labours were rendered unnecessary by the impression produced on the garrison, who before day-light called out that they desired to capitulate.³⁵ In fact, "the garrison offered only feeble resistance" as Mohibul Hasan Khan, puts it ³⁶ Cornwallis reviewing the English victory at Malabar wrote to Malet "The complete success of General Medows and the association of the Beebi of Cannanore to our alliance

32. Pol. Sec. Pro., February 10, 1790.

33. H. H. Dodwell: *Cambridge History of India*, Vol. V, p. 326.

34. Wilks: *Historical Sketches etc.*, Vol. II, p. 163.

35. Mohibbul Hasan Khan: *History of Tipu Sultan*, p. 188.
Wilks: Vol. II, p. 164.

36. Mohibbul Hasan Khan: *History of Tipu Sultan*, p. 188.

gave us possession of all the Southern parts of the Malabar Coast".³⁷

We have seen that Colonel Hartely who was sent for the assistance of the Raja of Travancore, but who could not render any help owing to the superior power of Tipu Sultan, withdrew to the fort of Cranganore without offering any resistance.³⁸ No sooner had Tipu Sultan retraced his steps to Mysore than Hartely moved up the Coast from Ayicottah capturing Chetwai and Chawghat from where he proceeded to Ponnani. Colonel Hartely did not meet any opposition in these operations and by October 9, he reached Palghat which was already occupied by Colonel Stuart. Making arrangements for a convenient junction with the force of Major Dow of Tellicherry Factory at Ponnani, Colonel Hartely set his force in motion from Palghat towards the West about the middle of November.³⁹ After reducing unimportant posts, Hartely reached Ponnani, in the first week of December where he met with a fierce opposition from the Mysore force under Martab Khan and Husan Ali Khan. On December 10, 1790, Hartely won a brilliant victory over the Mysoreans and inflicted heavy casualties upon them. The war is described by Major Dirom, who was deputy Adjutant-General of the army thus: "He (Hartely) encountered two of Tipu's commanders, Martab Khan and Husan Ali Khan, at the head of 9000 Tipu's men and 4000 Mappillas, on the plains of Terveanengurry,⁴⁰ on the morning of the 10th instant".⁴¹ After a smart action, the Colonel routed Martab Khan with the right wing of the enemy and put them to a total flight. The retreat of Husain Ali being cut off by the highland or 75th regiment, he, with the remaining troops was

37. P. R. C. No. 153, p. 207, dated Sept., 27, 1790.

38. Pol. Pro. June 2, 1790. Powney to Madras, May i, Cons. No. 10.

39. Logan: *Malabar Manual*, Vol. I, p. 469.

40. The place is evidently Tirurangady some miles south of Calicut.

41. Major Dirom: *A Narrative of the campaign in India which terminated the war with Tipoo Sultan in 1792*, p. 263.

obliged to fly towards the fort of Tirurangady but the 7th battalion coming up with him before he could effectually enter the fort put 400 of his men to the sword in the covert way".⁴² Being then surrounded on all sides by the English, Husain Ali loudly called out for quarter, which being granted, he surrendered himself with two sardars and 900 men, prisoners of war".⁴³ "The loss on our side during this action is very trifling The loss on the side of the enemy independent of the captured, is estimated at about 1000 killed and wounded".⁴⁴ Major Dirom continues his narration as follows. "Colonel Hartely finding that Martab Khan had retreated to Ferokia or New Calicut, a place lately strengthened and considerably improved by Tipu, pursued him thither, without a moment's loss of time".⁴⁵ On the night previous to the arrival of the detachment, Martab Khan again fled from them and carried with him from thence, on elephants, all the treasure of the place towards the Thamara-serry pass.⁴⁶ The remainder of his garrison, consisting of 1500 men, laid down their arms, on the Colonel's appearance, who consequently took possession of the fort, guns etc. without further opposition. Beypore also surrendered to him immediately, with a considerable number of vessels and boats laying in the river⁴⁷. On this exhilarating news from Malabar C. W. Malet communicated to Cornwallis "... .. I have received by a private letter from Bombay, the very pleasing and important intelligence of Colonel Hartely's having gained a complete victory over Tipu's army in the Coast of Malabar commanded by Husain Ali Khan and reduced the fort of Tricalore and Furruckabad... .."⁴⁸ The Governor-General on his part communicated this news of the victory

42. Ibid: p. 263.

43. Ibid: p. 264.

44. Ibid:

45. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 55, Para 77, p.

46. Dirom: p. 264.

47. Ibid: p. 264.

48. P. R. C. No. 193, December 31, 1790.

gained by the Company's forces in Malabar with a little bit of exaggeration probably to convince the Nizam that "in view of the relations of amity and friendship, existing between the allies, it has been possible to defeat the enemy".⁴⁹ The whole of South Malabar had thus come under the sway of the English.

The English attempts to reduce Cannanore⁵⁰ and prevent the Mysore forces forming a junction with the Beebi's army failed as she preferred to be faithful to Tipu rather than to the Company. At last under pressure she agreed to sign a treaty,⁵¹ as adverted to above, with the English on August 8, 1790, when she knew that Mysore power was fading out from Malabar. But when the troops of Tipu Sultan arrived she admitted them into the Cannanore fort which was against the treaty provisions newly entered into⁵². Accordingly, General Abercromby who arrived from Bombay with a fresh force invested the place on December 13, 1790. The garrison put up a gallant defence but finding their position weaker and weaker made an unconditional surrender on December 17, 1790⁵³. All military and naval stores, vessels, grains etc. were confiscated. "The Beebi's husband, who it seems had headed the opposition to the English," writes W. Logan, "died during the early part of the siege and her Minister and heir apparent were therefore sent as hostages to the English camp"⁵⁴. Nearly 5000 of the Mysorean troops laid down their arms and were taken as prisoners by the English. Thus "Cannanore, the first place in India to

49. Diplomatic Cor: between Mir Nizam Ali Khan and the East India Company (1780-1798). A. R. No. 7958, January 22, 1791. pp. 134-5, Cornwallis to Nizam.

50. P. R. C. No. 130. p. 167, Taylor to Abercromby June 28, 1790

51. Logan: *Treaties etc.* i, XCVI.

52. Pol. Pro., December 24, 1790. Cons., Nos. 22, 23.

53. Logan: *Treaties etc.*, i, CLIX. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 55, p. 83.

54. Logan: *Malabar Manual*, Vol. I. p. 471.

welcome Europeans to Indian shores, was the last of the important places in Malabar to pass into the conquering hands of the British"⁵⁵.

Thus by the end of 1790, the Mysore occupation of Malabar was practically replaced by that of the East India Company. The complete routing of the Mysorean forces paved the way for the British supremacy in the Western Coast. It brought about the realisation of a cherished desire of the Company to master her ports,⁵⁶ and to establish the trade monopoly in the most lucrative business in spices.

55. Ibid: p. 471.

56. P. R. C., No. 130, p. 168, Taylor to Abercromby.

THE TREATY OF SERINGAPATAM AND THE CESSION OF MALABAR TO THE ENGLISH

Tipu Sultan began his peace overtures jointly¹ and severally² with the allied powers from the very beginning of the war. In fact, he tried to avert the war by all possible means.³ But as circumstances were highly favourable for the victory of the English in the war, Cornwallis declined to receive a representative from Tipu.⁴ But Tipu Sultan continued his effort repeatedly when he knew that the tide of war was turning against him.⁵ When from all sides Seringapatam was invested by the Allies, Tipu Sultan, realising his position to be hopeless, decided to release the English prisoners captured on the fall of Coimbatore, as was the condition precedent laid down by the Governor-General for any negotiation of peace.⁶ One of Tipu's confidants Mohamed Ali also accompanied them with a special message.⁷ On the release of these prisoners, Cornwallis agreed to receive Tipu's envoy at an appointed place through his letter dated February 11, 1792.⁸

1. Mly. Cons., June 17, 1791, Vol. 149-B, pp. 3032-33 Cornwallis to Tipu, May 19
2. P. R. C. No. 292, p. 388, April 15, 1791, N A.I. No. 16, Tipu to Nizam. Ibid No. 379, Tipu to Bakshi Begum.
3. Ibid: Tipu to Cornwallis, March 3, 1791.
4. P.R.C., Vol. III, No. 126, June 16, 1790, Cornwallis to Malet, p. 162.
5. Mly. Cons., January 24, 1792, Tipu to Cornwallis, Jan., 7, Vol. 158-B, pp. 429-30.
6. Fgn. Pol. Sec. Pro. S. No. 96-A, P. 3068.
7. O.R. No. 88, Tipu to Cornwallis.
8. P.R.C. No. 436, p. 577, Cornwallis to Tipu, Feb. 11, 1790.

On receipt of this letter, Tipu sent Gulam Ali Khan and Ali Raza Khan on February 13, 1792 to the camp prepared for this purpose. John Kenneway represented the Company, Mir Alam, the Nizam, Govind Ram Kishen and Bachaji Mahendale represented the Peshwa. John Kenneway prepared a long report of the negotiations between the parties and subsequent treaty provisions agreed upon in a big volume comprising 189 folio pages.⁹ After long and protracted negotiations, Tipu Sultan signed the preliminaries on February 23, and on the morning of the 24th, hostilities ceased.¹⁰ The preliminary treaty consisted of the following Articles:—

Article I One half of the dominions which were in the possession of Tipu Sultan at the commencement of the present war, shall be ceded to the allies, adjacent to their respective boundaries and agreeably to their selection.

Article II. Three crores and thirty lakhs of sicca rupees shall be paid to the allies agreeably to the following particulars: viz., (i) one crore and sixty five lakhs of sicca rupees shall be paid immediately in pagodas or gold Mohors or rupees of full weight and standard or in gold or silver bullion. (ii) The remainder one crore and sixty five lakhs at three instalments not exceeding four months each in the three coins above-mentioned.

Article III All subjects of the four sovereign powers who may have been prisoners from the time of late Haidar Ali Khan to the present period shall fairly and unequivocally released.

Article IV. Until the due performance of the three Articles above-mentioned two of the three eldest sons of Tipu shall be given as hostages, on the arrival of whom, a cessation of hostilities shall take place.

9. Fgn. Misc. Vol. 57, 1792.

10. Mohibbul Hasan Khan, Op. Cit., p. 260.

Article V. When an agreement containing the articles above written shall arrive bearing the seal and signature of Tipu Sultan, counter agreements shall be sent from the three powers and after the cessation of the hostilities, such a definite treaty of perpetual friendship as shall be settled by the several parties shall be adjusted and entered into.¹¹

But the finalisation of the treaty provisions presented a number of difficulties. The English wanted an arbitrary valuation and division of Tipu's kingdom. They ignored the definite provision of the preliminary treaty, that the territories ceded to the allies might be "adjacent to their respective boundaries".¹² The English demanded the Coorg country which had no geographical contiguity or territorial continuity with that of the allies, but was on the contrary the 'gateway of Seringapatam'.¹³ Tipu was very much perturbed to see that the draft drawn included Coorg,¹⁴ on the ground that the English had entered into an agreement with the Raja of Coorg to which Tipu was not bound. Further, according to the list given by the officers of the Sultan, Coorg country was put down as 'the ancient possession of the Ahamedy Sircar'.¹⁵ Tipu's vakeels were given assurance that his ancient possessions would not be included for partition between the Allies. But all the assurances and treaty provisions were thrown to winds when the English insisted on the inclusion of Coorg. It was a gross infringement of the preliminary treaty.

The question of Coorg brought the finalisation of the treaty to a stand-still. No sane argument or logic was

11. Fgn. (Misc.) Vol. 54, 1792, John Kenneway. Kirk Patric *Select letters of Tippoo Sultan*, Appendix A (i), p. 77. Logan: *Treaties etc.* ii, p. 1.

12. Mly. Sundries, Vol. 106, p. 35.

13. Miles: *Op. Cit.*, p. 321.

14. Wilks: *Historical Sketches etc.* II, p. 553.

15. Fgn. Misc. Vol., 54, 1792.

acceptable to the English. Therefore, the talks broke down. Cornwallis subsequently gave orders to resume the siege of Seringapatam. Parasuram Bhau who had arrived on February 24, was ordered to cross the river and be in readiness to invest the south side of the Fort.¹⁶ Meanwhile the condition of the allied armies was fast deteriorating. All observes write that if Tipu Sultan resumed hostilities and held out for a few months he could have saved his money and his kingdom.¹⁷ Tipu Sultan was also in a position to assess the real condition of his enemies through his efficient system of espionage. "That in spite of this", writes Mohibbul Hasan Khan, "he gave up the idea of resuming hostilities was because he felt alarmed for the safety of his sons who were with the English as hostages and whom Cornwallis refused to send back to the Fort."¹⁸ In fact the detention of these princes, was a clear violation of the guarantee given by Cornwallis in his letter to Tipu dated May 19, 1791¹⁹. Therefore, on March 18, 1792, he sent the treaty duly signed back to the allied camp,²⁰ and "on 22nd Cornwallis with the representatives of Nizam and Marattas went to the tent of the princes and delivered to them the ratified counterparts of the definite treaty."²¹ By the end of March the allied armies retraced their steps to their respective countries.

There is differences of opinion among the scholars about the allies agreeing on ending the war after the breakdown of the "definite treaty". "But the progress of the English arms after Cornwallis took charge of the campaign greatly alarmed the Marattas", observes Mohibbul Hasan

16. Mohibbul Hasan Khan: Op. Cit., p. 264.

17. For details see, *History of Tipu Sultan*, by Mohibbul Hasan Khan, pp. 252-224.

18. Ibid. p. 238.

19. Mly. Cons. January 17, 1791, Cornwallis to Tipu May 19, Vol. 149 B, pp. 3027-31.

20. Logan: *Treaties etc.*, ii, II.

21. Dirom: Op. Cit., pp. 246-7.

Khan, "who wanted Tipu Sultan's power to be weakened not to be destroyed"²² The Poona Residency Correspondence numbering 344 and 385 substantiate the statement given above "The general and the quick reduction of the strongest hill forts", writes Mirod Bhushan Ray, "awakened in the Poona Durbar an apprehension of the ascendancy of the English and instead of employing Bhau's arms in forwarding the success of the English, his energies were now directed to extending the sphere of Maratta conquest. The more Malet began to press Bhau's advance to Margy, the more did he recede towards the west".²³ In spite of the above contentions it is doubtful whether the Marattas and the Nizam possessed such political acumen to create a balance of power. Every one was interested in the enhancement of his authority at the expense of another. In the process of negotiation it was the Marattas and the Nizam who harassed Tipu by exorbitant demands. The demand of 15 crores as war indemnity and the whole of Tipu's territory except that much, which would yield one crore of revenue came from Musbir-ul-Mulk, though it was rejected by Cornwallis.²⁴ The 'Durbar charges' required by Haripant from Tipu's vakeels were sixty lakhs of rupees which was finally reduced to its half by the intervention of the English.²⁵ Even after the treaty was signed, Parasuram Bhau made devastation of Tipu's territory against which Tipu remonstrated in these words: "On the proclamation of peace many of the ryots and others who had fled were encouraged to return to their respective villages, but some horses belonging to Parasuram Bhau have lately plundered and carried off many of these people, besides 63 camels and 3000 gun bullocks belonging to the Sircar".²⁶ Tipu wrote again, "today the cavalry outposts of

22. Mohibbul Hasan Khan: Op. cit., p. 255.

23. Mirod Bhushan Ray: Introduction to Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. III.

24. Mly. Sundries, Vol. 106., p. 84.

25. -bid: P. S.

26. Fgn. Misc. No. 54, p. 335. Tipu to Ghulam Ali Khan and Ali Reza, March 18, 1792.

Sircar have represented that a thousand horse and some infantry belonging to Parasuram Bhau plundered and beat the ryots.....I sent you this note to settle the business in some fitting manner as necessary.....Parasuram Bhau's Cavalry are plundering and destroying the whole country. They did the same formerly after peace was established....."²⁷ Tipu's vakeels wrote to Kenneway on the receipt of this information²⁸, to which he agreed to advise Bhau to stop his atrocities.²⁹ Accordingly Kenneway wrote to Buchaji Pandit requiring him to persuade Bhau to withdraw his army.³⁰ He received a reply of assurance that this request would be complied with.³¹ Major Dirom says that Tipu requested Cornwallis that he would consider it as a favour if he would be allowed to go out and bring him to reason.³² He continues that Parasuram Bhau was prepared to meet the challenge posed by Tipu.³³ This shows that he was not pleased with the cessation of hostilities. All these activities and a number of exorbitant demands made by them in the course of the peace talks that were rejected by Kenneway but were recorded in his voluminous report point out that the Marattas wanted more territories and more money even at the extirpation of Tipu's authority.

On the other hand, the English had their plans of war and peace prior to the actual engagement. They had arrived at a definite programme as to where to end. As early as February 5, 1790, Malet wrote to Cornwallis "were it possible to conduct a war with Tipu to such a conclusion as we might dictate, it is probable that a more honourable to us would not be wished than to drive him from the sea-coast of

27. Ibid: Appendix No. 46.

28. Ibid: Appendix No. 58.

29. Ibid: Appendix No. 59.

30. Ibid: Appendix No. 60.

31. Ibid: Appendix No. 61.

32. Ibid: Appendix No. 62.

33. Dirom. Op. Cit., p. 246.

Malabar, to reinstate the Nair princes in their ancient freedom and tenures to secure such a possession on the Coast as should be equal to the purpose of our commerce, and to the supply of the deficiencies of the Bombay revenue, to procure such of the forts, between the Carnatic Balghaut and Payenghaut as should be judged requisite for our security on the frontiers and lay him under engagements to hold the remainder of his dominions in perpetual friendship and alliance with the Company, by which means a solid barrier would be opposed to the views of the Marattas, so long as the firmness and authority of our power, the only permanent basis of all political arrangements supported our influence over his councils.”³⁵ The English desired ardently no doubt to reduce the hostile power of Tipu Sultan but not to extinguish his authority, because they considered him a force to keep the growing power of Marattas and the Nizam in check. They even liked him to be friendly with the Company provided he eschewed British hatred. This English sentiment was expressed by Marquis of Wellesly in his despatch to the Secret Committee of the Honourable Court of Directors on July 13, 1804, in these words: “.....the growth of the hostile power of Mysore from the year 1792 to 1798, might probably have been controlled or even converted to the purpose of our security had it been possible to induce Tippoo Sultan to enter into a subsidiary alliance with the Company at the close of the war in 1792”.³⁶ In all his letters, Cornwallis was particularly careful to stress the words “only the reduction of Tipu Saheb’s power”.³⁷, and not the elimination

34. Ibid: p. 247.

35. P. R. C., Vol. III, No. 63, p. 67, February 2, 1790, Malet to Cornwallis.

36. *The Despatches, Minutes and Correspondence of the Marquis Wellesly K. G.*, Edited by Montgomery Martin, Vol. IV, No. XXXIII, p. 160.

37. P. R. C., Vol. III, No. 121, p. 157.

of this enemy. The cause for concluding a treaty of "moderation and conciliation,"³⁸ according to Munro, was manifested by Cornwallis in his letter to Dundas, in which he wrote, "we have at length concluded our Indian war handsomely, and I think as advantageously, as any reasonable person could expect. We have crippled our enemy without making our friends too formidable."³⁹ This might be the reason for the termination of hostilities even against the desire of a number of English officers who wanted the complete destruction of Tipu Sultan's power. General Medows was so much perturbed when he heard about the cessation of the war that he committed suicide by shooting himself.⁴⁰

The English coveted the Malabar possessions of Tipu Sultan as they had immense commercial and military importance. The continuance of the place under his dominance would deprive them of the trade they had carried on extensively prior to the Mysorean occupation.⁴¹ By ousting Tipu Sultan from Malabar they wished to convert their Tellicherry settlement into a possession highly valuable in point of commerce and great political weight.⁴² Pleading for reduction of Cannanore, Taylor the Chief of Tellicherry settlement pointed out to Abercromby on June 28, 1790 "in another point of view the reduction of Cannanore would prove very beneficial by securing the Company a considerable quantity of pepper annually exported by Bibi in vessels of her own and sold at different ports in India on her own account."⁴³ When the peace talks were going on, the Bombay Government did not forget to bring to the notice of

38. Gleig: *Munro*, i, p. 131, quoted by Mohibbul Hasan Khan, p. 270.

39. Ross: *Corn Wallis* ii, p. 155, quoted by Mohibbul Hasan Khan p. 271

40. Kirmani: *History of Tipu Sultan* (Miles), p. 103.

41. Fgn. Sec. Pol. Pro., August 20, 1789, S. No. 96, Sept, 25, p. 1849.

42. Ibid: pp. 1855-6.

43. P. R. C., No. 130, p. 167.

Abercromby the immense importance of the Malabar Coast with a view of its acquisition. They wrote to him, "the territory from Goa, to Cochin, from the sea-coast to the ghats includes a country valuable in every respect of situation, produce, revenue, and commerce by fortifying the passes in the mountains it may be defended with a small body of troops and by our having possessions of the ports, Tipu Sultan will be cut off from all communications with the French and other European powers who have hitherto supplied him with military stores and he will thereby be effectually excluded from a very essential resources for carrying on future wars."⁴⁴

Thus "Calicut 63 Taluks" valued at "C. pagodas 48765 4½" and "Palghatcherry" with an estimated revenue of "C Pagodas 58000", were passed finally under the dominance of the English East India Company.⁴⁵ Apart from this the English obtained the districts of Baramahal and Dindigal and the whole territory of the Raja of Coorg. The cession of Malabar to the English, a place of strategic and commercial importance facilitated the English supremacy in India. Soon after the conclusion of the peace, Cornwallis directed Abercromby to make speedy arrangements for evolving a system for the future Government of Malabar. He promised two civil servants to act in concert with the gentleman to be appointed by the Bombay Government, to enquire and settle the Malabar affairs. General Abercromby came down to Cannanore and appointed Farmer, a senior merchant and Major Dow the military commandant of Tellicherry as Commissioners.⁴⁶ The Malabar Rajas came under the protection of the English at the commencement of the war on certain agreements, which were "not so comprehensive as could be wished, since they provided for the emancipation of

44. Ibid: No. 448, p. 585.

45. Fgn. Misc. No, 54, 1792, Kenneway. Also Ibid: S. No. 55, pp. 84-5. Logan: *Treaties etc.*, ii: II.

46. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 55, Para 80, p. 90.

the Malabar Rajas from Tipu, but did not clearly express their dependence on the Company.”⁴⁷ Therefore, new treaties were signed by these Rajas as desired by the Company.⁴⁸ The Kadathnad Raja was the first to agree to a settlement on April 25, 1792. The Treaty provisions were as follows:—

1. The Raja to remain in the exercise of all his rights and authority subject only to the control of the Bombay in case of oppressing the inhabitants.

2. A resident or Diwan to reside with him to enquire into any complaint of oppression.

3. Two persons on the part of the Company and two on that of the Raja to make a valuation of the revenues of each District.

4. Amount of revenue payable by each subject to be ascertained.

5. The Raja's tribute to be settled in October, according to the appearance of the crop.

6. The Government share of the pepper to be delivered to the Company at a price fixed in December.

7. The remaining pepper must be purchased exclusively by merchants appointed by the Company, and

8. Lesser points which might arise from time to time to be left with Taylor, the Chief of Tellicherry to adjust and the whole was to be considered as temporary and subject to the confirmation of General Abercromby on his return to the Coast.⁴⁹

Similar treaties were signed and exchanged between the Company and all the Rajas. The treaty provisions will clearly show how arbitrarily the English had dictated terms to the local Rajas.

47. Ibid: para 81, p. 90.

48. Ibid: para 82, p. 92.

49. Logan: *Treaties ect.* ii, IV.

As we have seen, the ostensible reason for the declaration of war against Tipu Sultan by the English was the defence of Travancore. But no importance was given to her when the treaty was concluded with Tipu Sultan. The name of the Raja was not even mentioned in the Treaty. It was he who suffered the attack of Mysoreans and avowedly supported the English with men, money and materials. For the conduct of war, he contributed twenty-five lakhs of rupees.⁵⁰ The official historian of Travancore laments that the English counted very much on money, not on friendship.⁵¹ The Travancore Raja's cherished idea of becoming the undisputed Perumal or emperor of Kerala after removing the Mysorean supremacy with the help of the English was shattered to dust and instead he was made one of the vassals of the English on the same conditions as those by which other Rajas of Malabar became their dependents. Not only did he fail to obtain any indemnity either in cash or in territory but forfeited his status as an independent ruler. The outbreak of hostility between Tipu Sultan and the Raja of Travancore occurred on the question of the purchase of Ayyacottah (Pallipuram or Paliport as it is called now) and Cranganore Fort. The net result after the successful completion of the war was that the Raja was required to hand over Cranganore to the Cochin Raja.⁵²

In fact the whole of Malabar did not come under the English by the Treaty of Seringapatam. The North-eastern part of Malabar namely Wynad was not included in the cession. But the English possessed it more or less till the eve of the last Mysore war. Tipu made remonstrances against this illegal occupation of his territory which was not either included in the partition or ceded to them.⁵³ A number of letters were exchanged between him and the Company.⁵⁴ During March, 1797 when Colonel Bow, pursuing his operations against the Pazhassi Raja wanted to

50. Pol. Pro., July 13, 1791, Cons., Nos. 11, & 12.

51. Sankunny Menon: *History of Travancore*, p. 240.

52. Mohibbul Hasan Khan: *Op. Cit.*, p. 269.

53. Beatson: *The Origin and Conduct of War with Tippoo Sultan*, Appendix No. V, Tipu to Sir John Shore, April 27, 1798.

54. See Fgn. Sec. Cons., March 13, 1798, Country powers.

ascertain the Company's right over Wynad, he ascended the Thamarasseri pass and marched through the Wynad district as far as Periah. Shortly after reaching there, he received letters from Tipu's officer protesting against his marching with a force through Wynad which he claimed as a portion of the Sultan's territory.⁵⁵ In the Consultations of March 13, 1798, instructions were issued "not to employ force if Tipu sent army to occupy Wynad." The English were required to withdraw to the posts "after giving a protest to the Commandant of Tippoo's army".⁵⁶ It was only in September 1798, that the Governor-General Lord Mornington, after a full consideration of the matter came to the conclusion that "Wynad was not ceded to the Company by the late treaty of peace and that it belongs by right to His said Highness, the Nawab Tipoo Sultan Bahadur?" who was to be permitted "consequently to occupy the said district whenever it may suit his pleasure".⁵⁷ On the eve of the commencement of the Fourth Anglo-Mysore War N. B. Edimonstone before enumerating the charges levelled against Tipu, wrote "the Company was always just to see justice is done and accordingly Wynad was given back..... Yet the hostility and design to destroy the Company's interest in India is predominate with Tippoo"⁵⁸ But it took more than six and a half years to do justice to a just claim and strangely enough within a few months the place again fell into the hands of the English after the fall of Tipu Sultan. Thus the whole of Malabar came under their sway. With the close of the 18th century, all the Malabar rulers were pensioned and removed from the responsibility of administration and Malabar became one of the districts of Madras Presidency.


55. Fgn. (Misc.) S No. 55, Paras—233-34, pp. 215-17.

56. Fgn. Sec. Cons., 1798, Country powers, 1st January to 11th May, 1798, Cons., 13th March.

57. Logan: Treaties etc , ii, CLXXXII.

58. Fgn. (1799) Dept , Sec. Cons., 8th February No. 6, N.B. Edimonstone to Tipu Sultan, 9th March, 1799.

ADMINISTRATION OF MYSORE NAWABS



partitioned," writes Warden, "into gradations of military divisions from the *Naduvazhi*⁵ to *Desavazhi* and every division or sub-division was designated by the allotted quota of Nairs it was required to bring into the field."⁶ Thus the Kingdom was divided into a number of *nads* or districts of varying extent, each presided over by a hereditary chief called *Naduvazhi* and each *nad* was, for military and other purposes, divided into *desams*, some of which were presided over by hereditary *Desavazhis*. Each of these rulers had private property of his own which was administered directly by them or by officers appointed by them. The *Desam* was further sub-divided not into territorial units but into caste and tribal groups such as the *Gramam* of the Namboodiris, the *Tara* of the Nairs, the *Cheri* of the low castes, the territorial limits of which, though more or less well-defined, overlapped into each other. The *nad* and *desam* of this coast differed from analogous territorial divisions elsewhere in that they consisted not of so many towns and villages but of so many Nairs, such as 'the Five Hundred of Kodakaranad', 'the Four Hundred of Annamanad'.⁷ The affairs of the caste or tribal groups were under the management of the headmen or leaders, *Gramanis*, *Karanavas*, *Tandas* etc. as the case might be. The *Karanavas* looked after the local affairs of the *Tara*, superintended the cultivation of the demesne of their chief who might be a king, a *Naduvazhi*, a *Desavazhi* or a mere *Jenmi*, received a share of the produce for their maintenance and rendered military services to him, whenever called upon to do so. The *Desavazhis*, where they existed, had control over all the affairs of the *Naduvazhis*.⁸ They were also military leaders subject to the authority of the *Naduvazhis* and marched at the Heads of their quotas when

5. *Nadu* means country equivalent to a modern district. *Naduvazhi* is the ruler of a *Nad*, whereas *Desavazhi*, the ruler of *Desom*

6. Wardea, *Report of Board of Revenue*, September 12, 1815 para 63

7. See, *Cochin State Manual*, p. 48

8. See, *Cochin State Manual*, p. 48

INTEGRATION OF SMALL PRINCIPALITIES

The most important revolution brought about by the Mysorean rule in Kerala was the integration of the small principalities, as a result of which "the whole of Malabar came to be organised under one political control."¹ The disappearance of the feudal system of administration and its replacement by a centralised system of Government had far reaching consequences not only in the political sphere but also in the social and economic fields of Kerala. K. V. Krishna Iyyer, in his work *The Zamorins of Calicut* admits that "during the Mysore occupation the old order was completely changed."² We have to add to this that a new set up which was hitherto unknown to the people of Kerala, based on modern and progressive ideas, emerged in its place. The Nair nobles and princes could not compromise with these modern and progressive measures introduced by the Mysorean administrators, because the principles of Government followed by the Mysoreans were opposed to the usages of the country.

Before the Mysorean occupation, the country was parcelled out into congeries of small states, "the Government of which being perfectly feudal, neither laws nor systems of revenue were known amongst the inhabitants."³ Stein Van Gollennesse enumerates 42 small principalities and four important kingdoms in the year 1743.⁴ "Each State was

1. P. K. K. Menon, *Kerala and the East India Company, History on the March* p. 222
2. K. V. Krishna Iyyer, *Zamorins of Calicut*, p. 254
3. Buchanan, Vol. II p. 548
4. D. R. No. 13, pp. 45-16

ordered to the field. The *Naduvazhis* had authority in their respective *nads* in all civil and military matters, but the extent of that authority and the degree of their subordination to the king depended upon their political status.⁹

Thus the 'Hindu Village' which existed in other parts of India was conspicuous by its absence in Kerala.¹⁰ Instead, the caste and tribal units of *Tara*, *Gramam* and *Cheri* formed the lowest division in the political set up. These *Taras* and *Gramams* were virtually independent of the *Naduvazhis* and *Desavazhis*. The peculiar political usages observed by the rulers and nobles alike tended to develop such a system of disintegration of political authority that the result was anarchy and confusion. "The Nair inhabitants of a *Tara* formed a small republic".¹¹ Andrian Van Rheede, the Dutch Governor of Cochin from 1673 to 1677 made it very clear when he wrote, "no king of Malabar has the power to make contracts which are prejudicial to the interests of the land-lords, noblemen or Nayars; such a king would run the risk of being expelled or rejected by his subjects".¹² The representative of the English East India Company at Calicut, reported to his superiors in 1746, "the Nayars being heads of the Calicut people, resemble the Parliament, and do not obey the King's dictates, but chastise his ministers when they do unwarrantable acts".¹³ "It appears from such sources of information as are within my reach" writes T. H. Baber, Collector of Malabar, "that when these provinces were invaded by Hyder, it was distributed amongst the Rajas, Karthawahs and Nambiars, all of whom exercised sovereign power, nor was this delegated to them, it had descend from immemorial to them".¹⁴ Thus "the inefficient feudal hosts

9. Buchanan, Vol. II p. 394

10. Logan: *Malabar Manual* Vol. I, p. 87

11. Ibid, p. 88

12. Quoted by Gollennesse in his 'Memorandum' 1743, p. 52.

13. T. F. D., May 28, 1746.

14. *Report on the Karakumpuram, Wadakumpuram and Perwaye Districts*, p. 5.

of traditional Malabar warfare",¹⁵ made the unification of the country well-nigh impossible. Buchanan testifies to this fact in the year 1800, when he writes that the '*Desavazhis*' assumed the title of the Rajas in their respective territories and possessed full jurisdiction.¹⁶ The *Naduvazhis* and *Desavazhis* always fought against each other. The whole country was, thus in the words of N. K. Sinha, "in a state of anarchy, a sea of intrigues, conflicting interests and mutual jealousies"¹⁷ before the Mysorean occupation of Malabar.

The peculiar condition of Kerala on the eve of the Mysorean occupations was the absence of a paramount power. The Zamorin wanted to exert his authority.¹⁸ But the traditions and usages were such that he could not do away with his tributaries and chieftains. The ruler had no right to interfere in the internal affairs of a chieftain, much less of a tributary. The land held by them was hereditary and they enjoyed a right to hold in demesne. No ruler could deprive them of their ancient property. This was one of the important customs followed by the rulers of Kerala. Herein lies the conspicuous difference between a feudal baron of medieval Europe and a Nair chieftain of Kerala. As the ownership of land rested with the nobles of Kerala, their properties could not be confiscated. The king was not the owner of the land contrary to the system of feudal Europe.¹⁹ These nobles acquired lands not in the name of the kings.

The princes and chieftains were quite free to enter into any alliance or treaty with any power, or declare war and conclude peace or collect taxes and tolls. They were quite

15. K. M. Panikkar, *Malabar and the Dutch*, p. 64.

16. Buchanan, Vol. II, p. 395.

17. N. K. Sinha, *Haidar Ali*, p. 252.

18. Foreign (Misc.) S. No. 55, p. 18.

19. Buchanan, Vol. II, p. 360.

independent as free rulers. The only check upon their power was that they were not permitted to wear crowns or mint coins or keep a canopy over their heads, all of which were considered royal prerogatives.²⁰ The strange political usage of reinstalling the vanquished rulers and chieftains after a war²¹ and abstaining from awarding capital punishments to them²² kept them unchecked and left them free from any fear of destruction. Another factor to be reckoned with was the influence of the temple kingdoms of the time. Most of the lands were temple properties.²³ Just like the Medieval Christian Church of Europe before the Reformation, they asserted rights and privileges over the temporal power. No ruler of Kerala was brave enough to fight against them and to pursue a fugitive prince who had taken asylum in these temples. They were sacrosanct and therefore inviolable. Sometimes the feudal elements combined with these ecclesiastical authorities raised the flag of revolt against their suzerain.²⁴ The rulers could not check these violent and disruptive tendencies because of the usages and traditions followed by them.

Therefore, neither these *Naduvazhis* or *Desavazhis* nor even the major Rajas possessed unfettered sovereign authority. Royal power was restricted to a great extent by the Nair nobles like *Kaimals*, *Pillais*, *Karthavus*, *Nambiars* etc. who possessed armies of their own.²⁵ The feudal nature of the military organisation made even the major rulers dependent upon the willing obedience of the Brahmin priests and Nair chieftains. Thus the absolute absence of a unifying

20. Barbosa: *A Description of the Coast of East Africa and Malabar*, p. 107.

21. P. K. S. Raja : *Medieval Kerala*, p. 273.

22. *Ibid*, p. 274.

23. Buchanan, Vol. II, p. 368.

24. A. Balakrishna Pillai : *Research in the History of Ancient Kerala*, pp. 13-16.

25. K. M. Panikkar, p. 28.

central authority was the outstanding feature of Malabar politics on the eve of Haidar Ali's conquest.

But this feudal anarchy and political instability ceased with the advent of Mysoreans in Malabar. The *Desavazhis* and *Naduvazhis* with their unbridled power were reduced to submission. The Central Government became effective and powerful. A country where a number of Chieftains rendering the administration of their respective territories at their will and pleasure could not hold a uniform system of administration. Buchanan testifies to this fact when he says "owing to the quarrels between the different Rajas and the turbulent spirit of the Nair Chiefs who were frequently in arms against each other, the state of the country was little favourable to the introduction of good Government".²⁶ Malabar, when it came under the Mysoreans, gave a shock treatment to the ills of these out-moded feudal legacy and became one of the districts of a well-managed kingdom of India. It was placed under Madanna, "an experienced revenue officer as Civil Governor of the place".²⁷

The Malabar district was divided into 12 *Tookries* or collectorships to each of which *Tookridars* and *Seristtadars* were appointed.²⁸ These were again divided into taluks. After the Treaty of Seringapatam, those ceded to the Company on March 16, 1792 were: Calicut-62 Taluks; Cotiote-3 Taluks; Cartinaad- 3 Taluks; Cannanore- 1 taluk and Cochin- 14 Taluks.²⁹ The *Tara* organisation though it underwent certain changes was maintained by the Mysorean officers as the lowest unit of administration. "The experienced Mysorean administrators of Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan", observes W. Logan, "applied to the territorial units which they endeavoured to

26. Buchanan, Vol. II, p. 548.

27. Logan, Vol. I, p. 409.

28. Foreign (Misc.) S. No. 56, part I, p. 95

29. Ibid, No. 55, p. 84-85

foster and keep alive as villages with hereditary heads, an essential branch of their system.”³⁰ Thus Calicut *nad* was divided into 125 *desoms*. They embraced precisely the same lands as the 72 *Taras* into which that *nad* was like-wise divided. Even the hostile historians of Mysore rule in Kerala have to agree that the British administrators built up their administrative and political system in Malabar on the foundations laid by Mysoreans, and that the Mysore activities in Malabar prepared the political and administrative background for the assumption of sovereignty later by the Company.³¹ As the pioneers of the system, both Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan had to face innumerable impediments placed before them by the Nair chieftains who were wedded to the age-old traditions of the place that have already been referred to. The severe repercussions felt when a longstanding system was swept away to make way for a new one, that too, one instituted by an outside agency may very well be imagined. In this task of replacing feudal anarchy by a strong centralised Government, both Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan encountered a number of rebellions and difficulties which they successfully overcame. Had the English not intervened and instigated the Nair rebels to revolt against the established government, the result would have been very beneficial. When the political system known to the Malayalees was thoroughly changed they could not get themselves reconciled to the altered situation for a long time. It deprived them of their old privileges and rights to assert their independence and assume at their will and pleasure sovereignty over the small territories they held by hereditary right. On the other hand, it enjoined them to be loyal subjects, like other sections of the society. The political organisation again drastically affected their social and economic structure because these were built upon the foundations of political privileges and prerogatives. When

30. Logan, Vol. I, p. 88

31. P. K. K. Menon, Op. cit. p. 222

the political power of the Nairs ceased, "with it went the feudal conception of Malabar polity."³²

The greatness attributed to the achievements of Marthanda Varma of Travancore and Paliyath Komi Achan of Cochin is "the ruthless suppression of all the recalcitrant nobles,"³³ who like the Malabar chieftains defied the royal authority and made the formation of a strong monarchy impossible. Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan did the same in Malabar with the avowed intention of the unification of the country, for which act of political insight, both of them have been severely criticised by the same historians who praise Marthanda Varma and Komi Achan. This remains a paradox in the method of historical analysis. "It was he (Marthanda Varma) who in one generation expanded his kingdom," writes E. M. S. Namboothiripad, "from a petty principality of a few dozen square miles to the later State of Travancore and is thus rightly considered 'the builder of modern Travancore.'"³⁴ The accession of Marthanda Varma in 1729, opened a new chapter in the history of Travancore as well as in the history of Kerala.³⁵ The time was such that "the country was honey-combed," observes Nagam Ayya, the author of *Travancore State Manual*, "with petty chieftains who collecting round themselves bands of brigands subsisted on pillage and plunder and harassed the Raja and his subjects by turns frustrating all attempts to establish order or any settled form of Government."³⁶ He rose to the occasion and overcame the grave danger that posed a threat to his royal authority. He genuinely desired to unify the whole of Kerala and wished to be the emperor therein.³⁷ By following a vigorous and aggressive policy the Raja was

32. K. M. Panikkar, *Malabar and the Dutch*, p. 63

33. P. K. S. Raja: *Medieval Kerala*, p. 197

34. E. M. S. Namboodiripad: *Kerala, Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow*, p. 75

35. P. Shanganunni Menon, *The History of Travancore*, p. 201

36. Nagam Ayya, *Travancore State Manual*, Vol. I, p. 333

37. K. M. Panikkar, *Op. cit.*, p. 497

able not only to bring about the political unification but also to strike at the root of the feudal nobility in Travancore. 'The Ettuveettil Pillamar' (the Pillais or Nairs of eight celebrated feudal houses of Travancore), were all seized and executed.³⁸ What Haidar Ali and Tipu sultan had done in Malabar was no more severe than the punishment meted out to the turbulent Nair nobles by Marthanda Varma. What Marthanda Varma did was an outright violation of one of the principal customs of Kerala according to which the Nair lords were not to be punished with death even if they revolted against the established authority. Marthanda Varma was a prince trained in the school of modern developments and was determined to break the old customs. He began to annex the neighbouring States one after another. "This was the first occasion in which a state was thus dealt with in Malabar history" writes K. M. Panikkar, "for until this time, the custom was merely to reduce the ruler of a conquered territory to the position of a subordinate chief and leave him in the enjoyment of his territory."³⁸ He continued his violation of the principles of *Kerala dharma* again by the suppression of his fissiparous nobles. K. M. Panikkar goes on to say, "he showed himself during the whole of his career entirely devoid of a feeling for *Kerala dharma*...His attempt was to sweep off the whole Malabar polity and establish in its place an autocracy of the type which prevailed in Madura under the Naiks and in Trichinopoly under the Nabobs."³⁹ What prompted K. M. Panikkar and similar historians of Kerala to pounce upon the Mysore rulers was that they also did act against the *Kerala dharma*. The ruler of Travancore who was a tributary to the Nawab of Carnatic and who was in the close neighbourhood of the Naiks of Madura was inspired by the centralised system of Governments that existed in that part of the country and tried to translate it into practical

38. K. M. Panikkar, *Malabar and the Dutch*, p. 64

39. *Ibid.*, pp. 62-63

politics of Kerala. The historians, therefore, call him 'the maker of modern Travancore' and extoll him in hyperbolic terms. The same process of unification of the country was carried out by Komi Achan, the hereditary Diwan of Cochin in that State. He is esteemed by all historians for this sacrifice of his class interest for the sake of the exaltation of the kingly power. It is therefore inconsistent to ensure Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan for undertaking a course of action identical with that for which Marthanda Varma and Komi Achan have been enthusiastically praised.

The task of integration of the small principalities of Malabar fell upon the shoulders of the Mysorean conqueror. In Malabar, the feudal nobility continued to be powerful and there was no indication of its immediate disappearance. "In fact, there was every reason to believe, that the existing system of civil and military organisation would have continued in North Kerala, but for the Mysorean invasion."⁴⁰ The Mysorean system of administration put an end to the feudal anarchy in Malabar, just as Marthanda Varma destroyed it in Travancore and Komi Achan in Cochin. The fact that Travancore and Cochin existed as separate States till the formation of linguistic states on November 1, 1956 when these were integrated into the modern State of Kerala, shows how effectively the elimination of petty principalities was carried out in Malabar by the Mysore rulers.⁴¹ The English, after the cession of Malabar to them, tried to reinstate the old Rajas and re-establish old traditions but failed deplorably in this respect. All they could do was to do away with the better aspects of Mysorean reforms without conferring any particular benefit upon the people. The Malabar Rajas were finally pensioned and were reduced to the position of *Jenmis* or landlords under the English.

40. P. K. S. Raja, *Medieval Kerala*, p. 219

41. J. Spencer, J. Smee and W. Walker (Second Malabar Commissioners), *A Report on The Administration of Malabar*, p. 32

CHANGES IN AGRARIAN RELATIONS

The radical changes introduced in the agrarian relations and revenue administration can better be understood only if we know the salient features of Malayalee system of land tenure before the Mysorean occupation of Malabar. The most important point that has to be borne in mind is that the ownership right of the *Jenmis* or landlords was quite different from that in any other part of India. When the Mysoreans took up the task of land settlement they found the prevailing system of property right different from their own kingdom.¹ As against the system of rulers having absolute ownership of all lands in the country as in other parts of India, the rulers in Kerala had no right to receive the annual land revenue.² The ownership rights of the rulers over the land was the least while those of private *jenmis* were most in Kerala.³ Major Walker in his *Report on the land Tenures of Malabar*, made it clear in 1801 when he wrote, "in no country in the world is the nature of this species of property better understood than in Malabar nor its rights so tenaciously maintained... The *Jenmakaren* possesses the entire right to the soil and no earthly authority can with justice deprive him of it."⁴ The nature of ownership of land vested upon *Jenmis* or landlords, is amply borne out by the *Reports* of the different

1. See Appendix XI

2. Foreign (Misc.) S. No. 55, para 9, p. 10

3. William Thackeray: *Report on The Revenue Affairs of Malabar And Canara*, September 8, 1807, p. 3

4. Major Walker: *Report on the Land Tenure of Malabar* 1801, p. 3
Also see Major Macleod: *Jamabundy Report* 1802, para 16, p. 4

'Commissioners appointed by the English for the purpose of studying the land tenure in Malabar.⁵ In the year 1807 and 1815 when Thackeray and Major Warden submitted their *Reports* to the Board of Revenue, they emphatically declared, "the whole of land in Malabar cultivated or uncultivated is private property held by *Jenm* right."⁶ "the *Jenm* rights of Malabar vest in the holder an absolute right in the soil."⁷ Dr. Buchanan who visited the place in 1800, gave a detailed description of the system of land tenure and the peculiar type of *Jenm* right enjoyed by the landlords of Malabar.⁸ "*Jenmam* right is antecedent to sovereign right," writes Nagam Ayya, "the peculiarity of the *Jenmam* property is that their owners have absolute control over them in connection with their revenue and rents and they take from their ryots the '*pattam*' or rents as well as the *Raja Bhogam*."⁹ "Even forests, mountains and rivers in the country", testifies Hamilton, "are private properties".¹⁰ All travellers to this country have noted this particular feature. The ruler had no right on the *Jenmam* properties held by landlords. At the same time, *Jenmam* lands embraced more than seventy-five per cent of the land, the rest being apportioned as '*cherickal*' lands held by the king and '*Devastanam*' or the *Devaswam* lands appertained for the maintenance of the temples.¹¹

5. Vide *Second Malabar Commissioners' Report: Report on the Provinces of Malabar And Canara*, June 29, 1841 by Sullivan, p. 11; *Jamnbundy Report* 1802, by Major Macleod; *Report on the Survey And Assessment of South Malabar*. J. Smee, 1801, *Report on the Land Assessment in Malabar*, April 20, 1815, Thomas Warden; *Report on the Revenue system in Malabar*, June 16, 1813 by Thomas Warden.
6. Thackeray's *Report to the Board of Revenue* dated Aug. 4, 1807
7. Major Warden's *Report*, Sept. 12, 1815
8. Buchanan, Vol. II, pp. 358-80
9. Nagam Ayya, *Travancore State Manual*, Vol. III, p. 315
10. Hamilton: *Description of Hindoostan*, Vol. II, p. 276
11. Buchanan, *Op. cit.* Vol. II, pp. 368

Another important feature of land holding in Malabar was that no land tax was levied on the landed property.¹² This made the ownership of the lands absolute with the *Jenmis*. "In the political history of Malabar", writes W Robinson, "one fact is at least supported by a considerable amount of evidence viz, that the lands were originally held free of rent and taxes."¹³ Many a scholar dwells on the subject to find out reasons for this peculiar condition. W. Logan and C. A. Innes think that in the ancient period of Kerala history, land tax might probably have existed, but after the break-up of the empire of Perumals it ceased to exist. Both these writers have made a detailed study of the agrarian system of Kerala in their '*Malabar Manual*' and '*Malabar Gazetteer*' respectively.¹⁴ "The absence of land revenue which appeared to the early enquirers and to the Court of Directors as extraordinary," observes Charles Turner, "is explained on the hypothesis", that the Brahmin whom the Hindu law declared free from tax was the owner of the soil..... It is probable that some of the land was held throughout by Nayars, but these and Mopilahs who were in possession as *Jenmis* when the district was ceded by Tipu claimed the same completeness of ownership as was claimed by the Brahmins."¹⁵ The Zamorin had in a characteristic letter to the 'Joint Commissioners in 1792 assured them that "by the ancient customs of Malabar, the Nayars held their lands free; they paid no revenue to anyone..."¹⁶ Sheik Zainuddeen, declared "whatever might be the extent of the land held by the people, the Government did not levy either land tax or share of the produce."¹⁷

12. Fgn. (Misc) S. No. 55, para 9, p. 10

13. *Report of the Malabar Land Tenures Committee* p. 122

14. Logan: *Malabar Manual*, Vol. I, pp. 596-721

15. Charles Turner's *Minute on the Draft Bill relating to the Land Tenures of Malabar*, Chapter II

16. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 56, p. 207

17. Sheik Zainuddeen, *Tuhfat-ul-Muja-hideen*, p. 83

This unbridled right of the ownership of land without any kind of obligation to the Government found a drastic change with the advent of the Mysoreans.¹⁸ As early as 1766 Haidar Ali entrusted his civil Governor Madanna, with the task of organising an efficient land revenue administration. It is not quite certain how far the work was carried out by Madanna to the desire of his Master in the early years of Mysorean occupation. But the reference of Buchanan to the effect that the condition of the country under the reinstated Rajas between 1768-1773 was "worse than it had been under the Canarese Brahmins..."¹⁹ shows that Madanna might have started his work right earnestly from the early years of Mysorean rule. The revenue settlement started by Madanna was, however, suspended after two years when the Malabar Rajas were reinstated on condition of a stipulated tribute in the year 1768.²⁰ Accordingly the Kadathnad Raja made his peace with Haidar Ali and was received as a tributary on paying a fine of two lakhs of rupees stipulating for a future annual *Jema* of Rs. 50,000.²¹ The Kottayam Raja refusing to submit to similar terms and the Raja of Chirakkal, despairing from any assistance from the Company having made his submission to Haidar Ali, was established not only in his own domain of Chirakkal but also in Kottayam, including Wynaad and Nambolacottah, together with Irvanaad on paying a fine of Rupees two lakhs and sixtyeight thousand with an annual *Jema* of 1,25,000 rupees.²² Similarly the Zamorin was also reinstated in his ancient territory.

Failing in this experiment, Haidar Ali took direct control of the administration of the Malabar affairs in 1773

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18. William Thakkeray, *Report on the Revenue Affairs of Malabar and Canara*, Sept 8, 1807, pp 7-8
 19. Buchanan, *Op. cit* Vol. II, pp. 548-49
 20. *Second Malabar Commissioners' Report*, para 9
 21. *Ibid*, para 10
 22. *Second Malabar Commissioners' Report*, para 10

and Srinivas Rao was appointed as Civil Governor.²³ Based on the principles followed in other parts of Mysore kingdom, he organised a systematic land revenue administration. As a prelude to this, the first land survey in the history of Kerala was conducted by him. The Mysorean administrators surveyed the land and fixed the land tax on the basis of the produce. Such things were absolutely unknown to Malabar.²⁴ The measurement of land was calculated, till then, according to the quantity of seed grain required to sow a certain field.²⁵ No land survey was known to the people,²⁶ and "the Malayalee had no means of determining correctly the extent of his cultivated land."²⁷ But he knew for certain how much seed was required for a certain field, what was the output of the land, and how much of the produce he had to give away as *pattom* or rent to the *jenmi*. Thus in the *pattom* paid to the *jenmi*, the Mysoreans found the simplest and most expeditious way of assessing the land revenue.²⁸ "It was with the husbandmen and not with the landlords that the settlement was made."²⁹ A certain portion of the *pattom* or so-called rent paid by the husbandmen to the *Jenmis*, was taken by the Government as revenue. The important features of this system were that the intermediaries between the Government and the cultivator were eliminated, lands were surveyed, the Government share was fixed on the actual produce, and above all the Government established direct relations with the tenants. The salient feature was that feudal aristocracy was completely eliminated. The settlement was made with the *Kanamdars* or tenants.

Only wet land was taxed. Dry land and the property held by temples (*Devaswom* lands) were exempted from taxa-

23. Buchanan, Vol. II, p. 432

24. John W. Wye, *A Report on the Southern Division of Malabar*, p. 8

25. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 56, p. 863 (Part I)

26. Buchanan, Vol. II, p. 355

27. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 56, Part II, p. 937

28. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 55, para 51, page 57

29. Logan, Vol. I, p. 623

tion.³⁰ "It was", writes Buchanan, "to prevent them (*jenmis*) from falling into absolute want".³¹ Thus it can be seen that the land revenue, though a novel introduction in Malabar, did not overburden the tenants.³² That the tax was collected on the *Jenmi's* share or rent, has to be taken into account. The Mysoreans called the land assessment as '*the Huzur niguthi*' (the Government tax) and the settlement can be styled as the 'Ryotwari system' which was followed by the English in certain provinces after many years of this Mysorean experiment.

After the Treaty of Mangalore (1784), Malabar was restored to Tipu who appointed Arshad Beg Khan to re-organise the revenue administration.³³ The reforms of Arshad Beg Khan in the revenue settlement have been praised even by hostile historians.³⁴ The Joint Commissioners of Malabar (1792) and the Second Malabar Commissioners (1801) in their *Reports* admitted "the whole of our subsequent arrangements for the realisation of the revenues of the Southern parts of Malabar, have been founded upon his settlements and investigation of the country."³⁵

In the first years of Arshad Beg Khan's administration he concluded settlements with all the Rajas of North Malabar. The settlement with the Raja of Chirakkal was for Rupees 1,20,000 or 1,25,000 exclusive of Randethara and with the Kottayam Raja was for Rupees 1,00,000 including Wynaad. The Kadathnad Raja was required to pay annually only Rupees 50,000 but the arrears for last two years were also collected from him. Thus in the year 1784-85 the Raja paid a sum of Rupees 1,70,000. The settlement of Irvenaad

30. Buchanan, Vol. II, p. 368

31. Buchanan, Vol. II, p. 367

32. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No; 56, part II, Voucher No. 40, p. 897

33. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 55, p. 51

34. Ibid, para 32, p. 40

35. *Second Commissioners Report*, para 12

(exclusive of Koringotte) was made with the Nambiaris for Rupees 25,000 and Cannanore was rated at Rupees 18,750.³⁶ The method of Arshad Beg Khan supposes that one *para* of seed sown will, on a medium produce in each year, give ten *paras*, whereof $5\frac{1}{2}$ will go to the cultivator and $4\frac{1}{2}$ will remain to be divided between the landholder and the Government. On the share of land holder and the Government, viz, $4\frac{1}{2}$ *paras*, $1\frac{1}{2}$ went to the land owner and three to the Government.³⁷ Buchanan writes that the *pattom* or rent paid for a *para* sowing land varied from 2 to 4 *paras* of grain. The land that yielded two crops in an year paid the high rent whereas that yielded only one crop paid the low rent.³⁸ The grain measure was commuted into money at Rs. 40/ per 1000 seers of paddy. "In Hyder Ali's time... 50 percent of the *pattom*", writes Logan, "payable either in kind or commutable into money at Rs. 40/. per 1000 seers. In Tipu's the rate continued to be the same, the revenue being collected in kind."³⁹ At the same time, those belonging to the English East India Company were assessed at 100 per cent the *pattom* commuted to money at Rs. 45/- per 1000 seers.⁴⁰ This shows the assessment was highly moderate and reasonable.

The assessment on garden lands varied from locality to locality taking into consideration the fertility of the soil and yield of the garden. Crops like cashew, cardamom, cinnamon etc. and garden produce like plantains, vegetables etc. were exempted from taxation.⁴¹ Only cocoanut trees, jack trees and pepper vines were assessed. The nominal fixation for each kind of tree was usually at the rate of one *fanam* (Annas two)

36. *Second Commissioners Report*, para 30

37. Fgn. (Misc. S. No. 55, para 35, p. 41

38. Buchanan, Vol. II, p. 368

39. Logan, Op. cit, Vol. I. p. 634

40. Ibid, p. 677

41. Buchanan, Op. cit. p. 366

for every bearing cocoanut tree, Annas four for every bearing jack tree, eight paise (four naye paise) for every bearing arecanut and Annas twelve for every pepper vine estimated to produce 15 seers of green pepper.⁴² Cocoanut trees which did not produce more than 10 cocoanuts considered unproductive and excluded from taxation.⁴³ Thus in a garden of 100 cocoanut trees, old and unproductive trees would be less than 50 according to this calculation. The owner had to pay tax for 50 trees alone whereas both old trees and those yielding not more than ten, would also bring him some yield. But these were exempted from taxation. Besides these trees, plantains, kitchen plants etc. were also exempted.⁴⁴ For the purpose of fixing the assessment, cocoanuts were converted at Rs. 7-8-0 per 1000 nuts, arecanuts at Rs 4/- per thousand nuts, jacks at Rs. 4 per tree. "The commutation rate", observes Buchanan, "were so much below market prices as not to leave the *Jenmi* altogether destitute."⁴⁵

Further Arshad Beg Khan, Tipu's Governor, on receipt of complaints reduced the *jema* (demand) 20 per cent all round on wet lands and gardens.⁴⁶ It is evident that the policy pursued by Arshad Beg Khan was one of conciliation. The total *jammabandy* of the southern Division of Malabar collected in the year 1774-75 by Haidar Ali's Revenue Officers was Hoons 50283 fanams 5. Arshad Beg Khan gave a reduction of nearly a lakh of Hoons on this assessment. Hereunder is given his plan of assessment.⁴⁷

42. Buchanan, Op. cit. p. 404-405

43. Ibid, p. 404. Also see Major Macleod, *Jamabandy Report*, 1802, para 25, p. 5

44. Ibid, p. 405

45. Ibid, p. 404

46. Buchanan, Op. cit. p. 446

47. *Second Malabar Commissioners' Report* 1801, para 16

<i>Firstly</i>		<i>Jema or Rental</i>		
		Hs	Fs	K
Paramba or plantations in number 1380 14 in which the number of cocoa-nut trees.	28,96,099			
Young trees termed as unproductive.	21,62,508			
Fruitful or productive	7,33,591	36,724	0	5½
Bettlenut trees.	33,61,195			
Young or old ones.	21,61,115			
Productive.	12,00,080	20,018	0	0
Jack trees.	4,87,858			
Young and old unproductive.	3,39,138			
Fruitful.	1,48,720	14,872	0	0
Pepper vines.	3,67,281			
Young or old ones.	3,16,612			
Fruitful.	50,669	15,200	0	0
Total of Paramba Jema.		86,815	0	2½
<i>Secondly</i>				
Rice fields paras.	7,43,031			
Fallow.	38,386			
Sowable land.	7,04,645	2,31,451	0	4
Hills, casual.		8,425	0	6
<i>Thirdly</i>				
Houses of Nair, Mappillas etc. in No.	92,624	25,516	0	2
<i>Fourthly</i>				
Chalier or Weavers, Mukkuvars, Chatty or toddy pots, Kathy or the knife of toddy tappers and on shop keepers' walls.		11,026	0	2
Total.		2,76,449	4	0
Total Jema of paramba.		86,815	2	8
Grand total.		3,63,264	6	8

Thus all reasonable grievances of the cultivators were readily redressed by the revenue officers of Tipu Sultan.⁴⁸ Similarly reasonable representations were agreeably entertained by Tipu Sultan when they were brought to his notice. In 1785 the three Northern Rajas of Chirakkal, Kottayam and Kadathnad paid a visit to Tipu Sultan at Coorg. On representation from them Tipu Sultan revised Arshed Beg Khan's settlements with them taking from the Raja of Chirakkal an agreement to pay a nuzzer of Rupees 30,000 and an annual *Jema* of Rupees 1,20,000. With the Kadathnad Raja he agreed for a *Jema* of Rupees 62,500. But from the Kottayam Raja, he demanded a deed of relinquishment of Wynaad District in consideration of which he allowed a deduction of about Rupees 35,000 from the former *Jema* of Rupees one lakh. Again on their representation that their countries were overassessed the Sultan agreed to appoint officers for ascertaining their real resources and at the same time granting an allowance out of the realised revenues of Rupees 15,000 to the Raja of Chirakkal, Rupees 12,000 to the Raja of Kottayam and Rupees 7,000 to the Raja of Kadathnad.⁴⁹

The Officers who were appointed to ascertain the real resources of the northern districts of Malabar recommended a reduction of Rupees 15,000 and Rupees 19,000 to the Rajas of Chirakkal and Kottayam respectively.⁵⁰ But the system was not above criticism. The Mysorean officers who assessed the land were strangers to the place and could easily be misled by the local informants who with the connivance of the land-holders underestimated their lands or if prejudiced against them overestimated their property. Thus as Buchanan testifies, "all the vigilance of the commander and his Master were certainly inadequate to prevent unjust

48. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No 57, p. 57, para 51.

49. *Second Malabar Commissioners' Report*, 1801, para 17.

50. *Ibid*, para 20, 21 and 22.

inequalities in the original assessment and there cannot be a doubt that many land-lords who chose to corrupt the officers of revenue had their lands valued at a low rate and the deficiency which this occasioned was made up by valuing high the lands of those who were poor or too proud to corrupt the assessors".⁵¹ But when attempts were made by Tipu in a later stage for rectifying these defects by resurveying the land and refixing the revenue, and separating the civil and military administrations under different officers these measures were again criticised by Buchanan himself.⁵² The anomalies that crept into the first survey and assessment were eliminated. English historians here also found matter for censure and not for praise. This is the general treatment of the history of this period by all English historians. Even now, instances are not wanting to substantiate the possibility of the officers being corrupted, thereby defeating all lofty aims of beneficial schemes. The process of revenue settlement, always cumbersome, is especially difficult in a country where it was previously unknown. Here there was the added handicap that Tipu's revenue officers were from Mysore, who, as strangers to the land could easily be misled by the local informants especially since communication was difficult. However, both Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan were always prepared to redress the grievances when complaints were lodged to that effect.⁵³

In the year 1786, Tipu Sultan separated the civil and military functions of the Government as an effective step to prevent corruption and improve the efficiency of the revenue administration. Mir Ibrahim was made the Governor of Civil Administration and Arshed Beg Khan retained the military functions. The land survey was again conducted and a number of irregularities of the first survey was

51. Buchanan, *Op. cit.* p. 446.

52. *Ibid*, p. 446.

53. *Fgn. (Misc.) S. No, 55, para 39, p. 43.*

detected.⁵⁴ Subsequent to this, land held without title and payment of tax was brought under the purview of taxation. Following the opinions of Buchanan and Wilks who say that Arshed Beg's administration was successful and it was made at naught by the interference of Tipu by the separation of the civil and the military, K. M. Panikkar makes this charge, "He (Mir Ibrahim) broke all the treaties, imposed new exactions, and generally infuriated the Nair Chiefs. Even the Moplah notable Mancheri Kurukal turned against Mysore".⁵⁵ These accusations are baseless. If stopping the evasion of land tax and bringing the illegal possessors of unauthorised land under the jurisdiction of the revenue administration were a breach of treaty, the Mysoreans broke all treaties. They applied the law universally. The fact that even the Muslim landlord and divine Manjeri Kurukkal was not allowed to defy the law of the country amply illustrates that the Mysorean system was above caste or religious considerations. It is probable that the Kurukkal, because of his status in the Muslim community might have made use of his position to possess more land than was actually shown in the title deeds and he might also have evaded land revenue. More cases of a similar nature might have been detected when these illegal possessions were brought under the revenue law and the parties affected might have raised a hue and cry. It is interesting to see that the revolt of Manjeri Kurukkal was suppressed with the help of Ravi Varma, a prince of the Zamorin's family.⁵⁶ It is also seen from the Second Malabar Commissioners' Report that Tipu Sultan conferred on Ravi Varma, one of the young rajas of Zamorin's family a considerable jagir in the year 1785 or 1786 in consideration of assistance rendered by him to Arshed Beg Khan in suppressing the rebel Mappilla Kurukkal of Manjeri.⁵⁷

54. Buchanan, Vol. II, p. 447.

55. K. M. Panikkar, *Op. cit.*, p. 357.

56. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 55, para 51, p. 57.

57. Second Malabar Commissioners' Report, 1801, para 22.

The land-lords of Kerala were all Nairs and Namboodiris⁵⁸ except a few Muslims like Kurukkal of Manjeri.⁵⁹ The policy of Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan was to eliminate the intermediaries between the actual cultivator and the Government. In Malabar, when they began the work of revenue settlement, they found that most of the *Jenmis* had fled from the country. This helped them to make the settlement with *Kanamdars* or cultivators directly. The peasants and cultivators especially in South Malabar even now are Muslims whereas the landlords or *Jenmis* are Namboodiris and Nairs. The hostile critics of Mysore administration argue that the settlement was made with the cultivators in Malabar because most of them were Muslims. It is a gross misrepresentation of the fact as it was consistent with the policy pursued by the Mysoreans throughout their dominion. In short, the new agrarian policy of the Mysore Nawabs shook the edifice of the feudal society and pulled down the cracking pillars of its polity.

58. See Appendix X, Namboodiris.

59. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 56, Part II, p. 881.

MEANS OF TRANSPORT

Perhaps by far the most notable legacy of Mysore rule in Kerala, that has stood the ravages of time, is the network of roads furnished by them in Malabar. The inland communications were carried out through waterways till the advent of the Mysoreans.¹ Since the country was compartmented into petty feudal fiefs which were in perpetual feud and the mode of warfare in vogue in this part of the country was such that "a force on the march went in single file and unencumbered by artillery"², the necessity of roads was never felt by the rulers. Further, the innumerable rivers that divide the country into small pieces made roadmaking impossible. It was only because of the absence of roads that the foreigners who were constantly in the Coast for more than 260 years (before the advent of the Mysoreans) could not influence or enter into the interior parts of the country. In the minutes written by Colonel Dow 'on the State of Roads in Malabar' after its cession to the English, he comments, "the necessity for spacious and broad roads was not probably felt until the Muhammedan conquest."³ Corroborating Colonel Dow, W. Logan sums up: "it was only after the Mysorean invasion, that the necessity of roads capable of carrying heavy guns began to be felt."⁴ The Author of *Cochin State Manual* enumerating the achievements of Cochin in the 1st half of 19th century, says "all the

1. Innes: *Malabar Gazetteer*, Vol. I, p. 267

2. Logan: *Malabar Manual*, Vol. I, p. 62

3. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 56, Part I, p. 1021, Voucher No. XIX.

4. Logan: *Op. Cit.*, p. 62

great roads in the Statewere constructed during this short period.. ...".⁵ This shows that till the 19th century, there were no roads in any part of Cochin. This can safely be accepted as a general rule regarding the whole of Kerala.

Another aspect closely connected with the means of transport that should be taken into account, is that before the Mysorean invasion, wheeled traffic was unknown to Kerala. Ibn Battuta writing in the 14th century made his observation thus: "no one travels in these parts upon beasts of burden.....which however any merchant has to buy or sell goods, they are carried upon the backs of men who are either slaves or coolies hired for this purpose. Big merchants may have hundred or more of these men to transmit their goods from one place to another."⁶ Buchanan who inspected this country between 1800-1801, testifies: "In Malabar even cattle are little used for transportation of goods which are generally carried by porters."⁷ He goes on to say that in this country, "there are no carriages."⁸ Innes who wrote his *Malabar Gazetteer* in 1908 made the following observation: "Before his (Tipu's) time wheeled traffic was unknown and even packbullocks were not used until comparatively recent times."⁹ Therefore, the state of affairs that prevailed in the latter half of the 18th century can very well be imagined. In this connection, an instance mentioned by the author of *Cochin State Manual* is worth reproducing to throw some light on the situation. He writes "wheeled traffic was established between Coimbatore and Trichur for the first time in 1844. When one fine morning twelve bullock carts laden with goods from Coimbatore arrived at Trichur, where most people had not seen such a conveyance before, there was by all accounts

5. C. Achutha Menon: *Cochin State Manual*, p. 165

6. Ibn Battuta: *Travel* (Malayalam Translation), p. 27

7. Buchanan: Vol. II, p. 434

8. Ibid.

9. C. A. Innes: *Op. Cit.*, p. 236

more excitement in the place than when the railway train first passed through it 58 years later.”¹⁰ It was against this background that the Mysorean rulers undertook the tremendous task of knitting their vast kingdom by a net-work of roads, some of which are still in use even after the lapse of two centuries.

When Haidar Ali descended from Mysore for the invasion of Malabar, he found no road for the passage of his cavalry. It was with much difficulty through “the roads or passages scarcely admitting more than three men abreast”¹¹ that he came with his army when he knew of the revolt in the province after a few weeks of its invasion. We have seen that the small Mysore garrison in the block house failed even to communicate the attack of rebels on these military posts to the contingents cantoned in Ponnani and Calicut, because of the want of any inland communication. Therefore, Haidar Ali, after the suppression of the revolt, resorted to the easier means of water transport and required his Commandant the Aly Raja of Cannanore to construct an artificial canal connecting the Mount Deli river and the back-water of Taliparamba and Vallarpatanam rivers which was done in 1766. This canal made the delivery of goods quicker and means of transport easier. It is called even now “The Sultan’s Canal”,¹² and is one of the important canals of today that serves as a speedy and shorter route in the whole of water transport machinery in Kerala. Another major work carried out in their direction under Haidar Ali was the setting up of a number of outposts at reasonable distances to facilitate the inland communications. The mighty Palghat Fort that stands in tact to the present day conveyed communication between Malabar and Seringapatam. As Haidar Ali did not get much time to spend in Malabar, and as he was engaged in

10. C. Achutha Menon: *Cochin State Manual*, p. 165

11. *History of Haidar Shah etc.*, p. 76

12. Innes: *Op. Cit.*, p. 267

bloody wars with the English and Marattas, he could not claim the credit of being the pioneer of road-makers in Kerala.

This great task was enthusiastically carried out by his famous son Tipu Sultan. "Tipu projected and in a greater part finished an extensive chain of roads", observes Colonel Dow in his *Minutes on the Affairs of Roads in Malabar*, "that connected all principal places in Malabar, and pervaded (even) the wildest part of the country".¹³ In this context the observation found in the *Salem District Gazetteer* is also noteworthy. It declared "the Britishers are not the first roadmakers of India. Tipu's road engineering was of no mean order".¹⁴ In the South, Tipu Sultan is, therefore, considered to have been the greatest of road-builders in the 18th Century.¹⁵ Considering the extensive and pervading network of roads and also considering the total lack of any such contribution by the English in this part of the country, we may legitimately claim that Tipu is by far the only ruler to take up the task of improving communication in Kerala. Needless to elaborate the point as it is evident that Tipu was "the pioneer of its (Malabar) roads".¹⁶

The whole of Malabar was connected with a chain of roads. As it is said that all roads of the Roman Empire led to Rome, "the grand termination of the inter-communications was Seringapatam and as the route necessarily led over the Ghats neither labour nor expense was spared in rendering it practicable for artillery".¹⁷ The following is the important gun roads enumerated in the '*Minutes*' of Colonel Dow :—

1. From Calicut to the present cantonment Polway by Purrinalettu, Cheakkur, Tamaracherri.

13. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 56, Part II, Voucher, No. XIX.

14. *Salem District Gazetteer*, Vol I, Part II, p. XIX.

15. B. K. Sarkar: *Inland Transport and Communications in Medieval India*, p. 32.

16. Innes: *Op. cit.*, p. 268.

17. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 56, Part II, Voucher No. XIX.

2. From Malappuram to Tamaracherri.
3. From Malappuram to Pudupani and from thence to the Ghat.
4. From Calicut to Ferokia, Carate Hobli, Elamaruthoo, Chatamungal, Purrinelattu, Tamaracherri.
5. From Ferokia through Shernad Taluk by Chalapoor Hobli, Poolor, Tirurangadi, Venkattakotta, Poolanelatta, Erakelu, Kemaro, Waleakoomuttu, Tricharaparambha, Cowlpara, Manjeri River, Pattambi, Walayar River, Coimbatore.

6. From Palghat to Dindigal. Tattamangala, Wundelarrullatiel, Nellimoottiel, Wellikumbil, Margienayampaliam, Peelachi, Woranmalakatu, Kanneneruvaturu, Palni, Virupakshu, Dindigal.

7. From Venkatakotta, Purumbil Walluanatakuny, Palketeri, Angadipuram, Muleakuruchi, Karialuty, Vellatur, Rapelallawuloora, Peyuat, Koondepulla River, Mannar, Attaparu, Tengraumhooroo, Wellimamuttu, Coimbatore.

"The northern division is in like manner pervaded by roads They lead from Mount Deli both by the sea-shore and through the interior parts of Chirakal, Cotiote, etc. generally having the direction the passes of Pudiacherrim and Tamaracherri".¹⁸

This report shows that no part of Malabar was left without roads. The Tamarasser Ghat up which a steep gunroad ran, was the meeting place of no less than four roads, two led, by different routes from Malappuram and two from Calicut, one following more or less the line of the present Mysore road and the other passing through Feroke and Chathamangalam".¹⁹ Feroke, Tipu's capital of Malabar, was connected with the Karkkur Ghat, by a road which

18. Ibid.

19. Innes: Op. Cit., p. 268.

runs through Kondotti, Edavanna and Nilambur, and with Coimbatore by two alternative routes referred to by Colonel Dow in his '*Minutes*'. A road led via Tirurangadi to Kottakkal in the Ernad Taluk and then bifurcated, one branch going to Coimbatore by Angadipuram, Mannarghat, and Wakayat.²⁰ The Coast road from Beypore to Cranganore, which is even now called *Tipu Sultan Road* and which runs through Tanur, Ponnani, Valiyangadi, and Chetwai was another gun-road as was also the existing road from Tanur to Palghat by way of Pudiayangadi, Trittala and Lakkidi. Palghat was also connected with Dindigal and Kollengode, by lines of communication.²¹ The Raja of Travancore apprehended this undertaking as an attempt to invade his country. In a letter written by the Chief of Tellicherry R. H. Boddham to C. W. Malet, the project of road-making by Tipu is conveyed in these words: "The Resident Anjengo under the 23rd ultimo, transmitted us a letter which the king of Travancore had addressed him expressing his apprehension, on account of having received advice from the king of Cochin, that Tipu was expected at Calicut, from which place towards the Ghats, a road was making to facilitate his approach".²²

The intensive nature of the work undertaken and the fast pace at which it was executed can be known when we see that this grand work was completed within six years immediately after the Second Anglo-Mysore War. In fact, in 1790 itself, Malabar was lost to Tipu though it was legally ceded to the English only after the Treaty of Seringapatam in 1792. It cannot escape our notice that the English, even after ruling the country for 150 years, could not do what Tipu did during these six years in Kerala. He employed thousands of labourers for the construction of this work. In 1800, Buchanan saw in Trithala and other places inns

20. Ibid : p. 269.

21. Ibid: p. 269.

22. P.R.C., Vol. III, No. 21, p. 19, October 19, 1787.

established by Tipu Sultan for the use of the travellers as well as the labourers employed by him.²³ He testifies that Tipu had to bring down Brahmins from Mysore to run the inns as the local Hindus considered the work as a menial and shameful job.²⁴ In 1807, Thackeray, felt justified in reporting to the Board that "Malabar was intersected by better roads perhaps than any other province in India".²⁵ "His (Tipu's) routes are in general well-chosen," wrote Colonel Dow, "and led through almost every part of the province."²⁶ Tipu's gun roads are said to have been a prominent feature in his reign. The road-making in Malabar was only a part of his work of the same nature which was undertaken in all parts of his empire.

The hitherto unknown political unity and integration of the country was complete by welding together these places that were once parcelled out as congeries of small principalities into a single political unit. The speedy transmission of conveyance, quicker and easier arrangements of communication and safer means of travel and transport are indispensable for commercial and industrial development. As we have discussed in the preceding topic that Tipu was the only Indian prince who felt the significance of the Industrial Revolution as it affected the means of transport and communication. Improvement of the means of transport is indispensable to foster industries and trade. Tipu's network of roads guaranteed political security, economic prosperity and commercial development. It also helped the establishment of an administrative machinery and its working with precision and speed.

In all countries, even to the present day public works are undertaken only during the time of peace and security.

23. Buchanan: Op. Cit., p. 427.

24. Ibid.

25. Thackeray—*A Report on the Revenue Administration of Malabar and Canara*, 1807, p. 4.

26. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 56, Part II, Voucher No. XIX.

We are made to believe by the writings of historians that this period of Malabar was certainly a period of rebellions and disturbances, chaos and disorder. If it were so, such major schemes could not have been executed. Further, no one would have expended that much of money and effort in a place where his authority was questioned and was at stake. The roads of Tipu Sultan speak to the students of history that it was a period of political and economic stability and that huge amount of money were expended by the Sultan on public works. We have seen that feudal hosts were subjugated and the country was knitted together under an efficient administrative system. Again, it was a time when easier means of transport and communication facilitated trade and travel on an unprecedented scale. Above all, it was a period when people from different States of India could constantly contact with one another and converse together helping the fusion of different cultures and habits into a homogenous cultural synthesis. The English who made every attempt possible to belittle Tipu and to wipe out from records his great deeds could not however obliterate the roads of Malabar that speak volumes about the efficient administration of the Mysorean prince. Even James Mill has conceded "as a domestic ruler, he bears advantageous comparison with the great princes of the East."²⁷ Even if Tipu had not made any other reform in Malabar, his being a pioneer in road-making alone will crown him with lasting glory.

27. Mill: *History of British India*, Vol. VI, p. 148.

TRADE AND INDUSTRY

We have seen that both Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan considered the possession of Malabar with its ancient ports of Calicut, Cannanore and Mangalore, extremely important. That is why they held Malabar dear and promoted its industry and trade. Kirmani testifies to the multifarious activities undertaken by Haidar Ali to promote trade and industry in his kingdom. He writes that Haidar Ali kept all merchants, traders and bankers with him by making them kindly presents and he also purchased their goods with the greatest avidity and at high prices. To horse dealers, he gave presents of gold and raiment besides the value of the horses he purchased and so liberal was he, that if on the road through his territories any horse by chance died he paid half the price of the horse. He continues: "His loans and advances of money were scattered like sand ever in the face of earth."¹ He encouraged merchants from foreign countries to come and settle in Mysore so that the benefit of trade might enrich his kingdom. But unlike the Rajas of Cochin, Travancore and Malabar who either became vassals of foreign traders or yielded to their dictates and gave trade monopoly to the Europeans, the Mysore rulers considered them only as mere merchants subjected to the law of the country like other subjects. This is clear from the letter written by Haidar Ali to the Governor, Fort William, on March 19, 1779, on the eve of the Second Anglo-Mysore War. "There are many factories in my country", wrote he "belonging to the

1. Kirmani: *Nishan-i-Haidari* (Miles) p. 575.

Dutch, English, French, Portuguese, and Danes who trade in my country on the footing of subjects..."² Never in the reigns of Haidar Ali and his son could the European traders succeed in inserting a favourable provision of trade monopoly in any treaty engagements, even though they exerted their utmost influence to this effect. But they were allowed to continue their business like ordinary merchants of the country. After the Malabar conquest, Haidar Ali extended his grant to the Dutch and the English to carry on their commercial activities in the Malabar Coast, subject to the limit of the earlier contracts entered into with the Rajas of the Coast. At the same time, he created a fleet under his naval commandant the Aly Raja of Cannanore and promoted maritime commerce.

In the time of Tipu Sultan also, trade and industry of Malabar received a great fillip, "He was alone among the Indian rulers", writes Prof. Mohibbul Hasan Khan, "to realise that a country could be great and powerful only by developing its trade and industry."³ A person of rare talents having "the audacity of conception, fertility of resource, and an over-weening sense of majesty,"⁴ would seldom fail to grasp the unprecedented attainments of European nations who had entered into the arena of commerce and industry. Therefore, like the Europeans, Tipu also endeavoured to reap the benefit of trade and commerce. Accordingly, the State monopoly on import and export commodities was imposed. He sought to set up State monopoly on gold ore and other precious minerals and metals as well as on tobacco and sandalwood, elephants, teakwood, cocoanut and pepper. That the European settlements in the Malabar coast suffered very much in their trade activities due to this, is evident from the letter of the Chief of Tellicherry to the Governor, Fort

2. Fgn. (Sec.) Dept., Fort William, Pro. of the Second Select Committee from 4th January to 28th January 1779

3. Mohibbul Hasan Khan: *History of Tipu Sultan*, p. 344

4. Mirod Bushan Ray: *Op. Cit.*

William.⁵ The English even felt like winding up the Tellicherry Factory due to the enormous loss in maintaining an establishment without any trade prospects.⁶ But they believed that in future if Tipu could be dislodged from the Malabar Coast "Tellicherry would be most important a settlement from the point of view of military and commerce."⁷ This State monopoly introduced in Malabar was only the implementation of the commercial policy of Mysore Government pursued throughout their kingdom. How zealous were the officers of Tipu in carrying out successfully their master's prohibitory order and in preventing the unauthorised foreign merchants from conducting business in the country, is evident in the reply given by Tipu Sultan to the Governor of Pondicherry to his complaint that the officers in Malabar molested the merchants from Pondicherry and stopped them at the frontiers with their merchandise. Tipu reminded the Governor; "in future when you despatch *boupries* into our dominions to purchase goods you must give them a letter from yourself to the Talukdar written in Malabar language when he will in confirmity with your desire, suffer the specified article to pass. The reason of the orders issued on this subject is that of late certain strangers have come into our dominions, were borrowing money of the ryots and others, they have been guilty of various unwarrantable practices."⁸ In another letter to Raja Ram Chundar, Tipu wrote, "two letters from you have been received. You write, 'vermillion is not procurable within our dominions and is only to be got at Pondicherry.' This being the case, you must send money and buy at those ports..... There is no need of sending goods or merchandise to barter for it."⁹ This is another example

5. Fgn. (Sec.) Pol. Pro. August 26 - September 25, 1769, No. 96, Council Pro. of August 26, 1789, p. 1849

6. Ibid, p. 1849

7. Ibid, pp. 1855-46

8. Kirk Patrick: *Select letters of Tippoo Sultan*, No. XXI pp. 34-5

9. Ibid, No. XIX, April 9, 1785, p. 32

to show his strict adherence to the commercial policy of Mysore Government. Tipu enumerated his import and export policy in his letter to the Imam of Muscat telling him the circumstances in which he was compelled to promulgate the policy of prohibition of trade without licence and permit.¹⁰ The Government under Tipu Sultan did not want to give the profit that accrued from business to the foreigners and "realising that the European nations owed their greatness to commerce and industry, he undertook, the role of trader, manufacturer, banker and money changer."¹¹

He had established ware-houses throughout his country with a view to monopolising the wholesale trade. When he received a letter of complaint from Raja Ram Chundar that the merchants and money lenders seldom came to make purchase, Tipu replied advising him to go forward even if the profit was not much in the beginning. People would come when they realised the benefit of the system.¹² It was a novel feature hitherto unknown in the country and at the time in which he lived. The State discharged the functions of traders and merchants. To facilitate trade and commerce, a commercial department was established by him.¹³ A sum of four lakhs of Rohitis equivalent to £128000 sterling was placed under the head of the commercial department for the purpose of fostering trade and commerce.¹⁴ This zeal and enthusiasm can easily be understood when we read the commercial regulations issued by Tipu Sultan in the years 1793 and 1794.¹⁵ He has constituted a Board of Commissioners of trade and established 17 foreign and 30 home factories in several countries and districts.

10. Ibid, No. CCVII, p. 241

11. Mohibbul Hasan Khan, Op, cit. p. 33I

12. Kirk Patrick Letters of Tippoo Sultan, No. XCVIII, p. 129.

13. Ibid, Appendix E, No. V

14. Ibid, XV, III

15. Ibid, XXXIII, Appendix E

Another commendable reform introduced by Tipu in his kingdom was the State trading corporation. This was set up with a view of making the people participate in the commercial and trade activities. Shares were sold to his subjects, the value of which ranged from Rs. 5 to Rs. 5000.¹⁶ Share-holders of Rs. 5 to Rs. 500 were given at the end of the year a profit of 50% depositors of Rs. 500 to Rs. 5000 received a profit of 25% and those of Rs. 5000 above got only 12%.¹⁷ If a share-holder wanted to sell his shares, he could do so without any difficulty. He would receive the share value and the profit due to him.¹⁸ By this regulation, he aimed at giving more benefit to the poor as the ratio of profit varied in the inverse ratio of the amount of deposit.¹⁹ No other prince in India at this time thought of such beneficial and modern schemes. The introduction of banking and exchange business was another important scheme that gave great impetus to trade and industry. The exploitation of the poor peasants by the usurers was to some extent prevented by the State monopoly of banking business. No doubt the country and its people benefited much by these economic measures.

The Mysore Government exported sandalwood, ivory, rice, spices, cotton and silk fabrics. Tipu's officers in Malabar collected the land revenue in kind as against the practice under Haidar Ali who took cash.²⁰ This was because of the increase in export business. As an intelligent businessman, Tipu readily relieved the people from the burden of paying cash but allowed to pay in kind and thus made profit out of it by exporting the excess rice and cocoanuts. A number of letters of Tipu written to his *Deroghs* of different factories inside and outside India, show that Tipu excelled in the

16. Wilks, *History of Mysore*, Vol II, p. 268

17. Kirk Patrick: Appendix E

18. Wilks: Op. cit. p. 268

19. Hayavadana Rao: *Mysore Gazetteer*, Vol. IV, pp. 21-25

20. Wilks: Op. cit. Vol. I, p. 414-5

qualities of a professional merchant and a successful businessman. When he knew that the price of pepper and sandalwood had come down, he wrote to Meer Kasim, *Derogh* of Muscat, "not to dispose hastily or immediately of the black pepper and sandal wood but to wait till they had attained a desirable price."²¹ The same instruction is conveyed to him in two other letters of different dates in which Tipu writes "you must not be in haste to dispose of the cinnamon, sandalwood, black pepper and rice imported at Muscat from Mangalore. Keep them carefully till they became dear and yield a profit and then sell them."²² In another interesting letter, the Sultan gives instructions regarding the sale of sandalwood at the rate of 120 pagodas for the first kind, of 100 pagodas for the second quality, of 90 pagodas for the third kind and of 80 pagodas for the fourth quality and pepper for 80 pagodas per candy.

Not only did he make extensive export of commodities of his dominion but also encouraged the foreign merchants to establish factories and further the trade of the country. When Khaja Heratoon and others requested him for trade facilities, Tipu readily responded to them in these words: "We highly approve of your intention and desire you will repair in the utmost confidence with your merchandise either to the port of Mangalore or to the port of Calicut; where landing your goods, you shall in the first instance supply us a fair price with such articles which we may want, after which you shall be set at liberty to sell the remainder at your pleasure."²³ A remission of 4/10 of customary duties was allowed by Tipu, when one Mao Saith, *Dullal* at Muscat wrote him of "his determination to establish a factory at Calicut."²⁴ Even when providing

21. Kirk Patrick: No. CLIV, p. 185

22. Ibid, CLVI, p. 187 and CLX, p. 189

23. Ibid, CLXIII, p. 189

24. Krik Patrick: No. CCVI, p. 239

facilities for foreign merchants to establish factories and carry on trade, the State interest was zealously watched and looked after. No other Indian ruler tried to establish factories and ware houses in foreign countries. Tipu had his regular factory establishments in Muscat, Jiddah and Ormuz. He made efforts to establish factories in Aden and Basara.²⁵ In India outside his domain he had two factories at Cutch, one at Mundhi and the other at Mudra.²⁶

One of the important duties entrusted to his embassies in foreign countries, was to fetch technical knowhow to manufacture various items of industrial goods which could be put to use in establishing such units within the country. It was a cherished desire of Tipu Sultan to establish a pearl fishery in Malabar. He required his *Darogh* of Muscat to send pearl divers to Mangalore for this purpose.²⁷ Local traditions attribute to the genius of Tipu a plan for organising gold mines in Wynaad which was actually worked out in the first half of the 19th century under the English.²⁸ In his letter to Mohiyuddeen Ali Khan, Tipu after acknowledging the receipt of seven pieces of lead send by him, writes "it is usual for a silver mine or silver earth to be found under a lead mine..... shall send persons skilled in such earth from the presence to examine..."²⁹ Tipu's attention was drawn to the necessity of a strong fleet and for that purpose he established two dock-yards, one in Wajidabad and the other in Mangalore.³⁰ The teak-wood which was a state monopoly was collected in large quantities from Malabar and sent for this purpose, Tipu through his agents in Jiddah and Muscat procured

25. *Ibid*, Appendix E

26. *Ibid*

27. *Ibid*, No. CC, p. 231 and LLX, p. 187

28. Gazetteer of Nilgiri District, Vol. I, p. 94

29. Krik Patrick, No. CXCV, p. 227

30. Mohibbul Hasan Khan, *Op. cit.* p. 353

ship-wrights for his ship building industry.³¹ The models of ships were supplied by the Sultan himself.³² How far these schemes were worked out in Malabar and how far they were successful, we do not know. But one thing is certain that Malabar would have benefited much more than it actually did if it was destined to continue under Tipu Sultan.

Tipu was no doubt inspired by the Industrial enterprise and the subsequent development of the European countries through industrialisation and banking. In India, it was he who alone felt the pulse of the revolutionary development abroad. Therefore he wanted to cope with these commercial countries by establishing his own factories and industries and manufacturing essential industrial goods for the domestic use and for the purpose of export. The students of history will be very much interested to read the letters written by him to his *Daroghs* of different stations in one of which he writes "we are anxious to procure some seeds of saffaron plants, silk worms, date trees, almonds" etc.³³ Through some other letters he asks them: "having ascertained in what part of the country saffaron is cultivated .. engage persons to purchase one or two maunds of the seed. Procure silkworms and their eggs with five or six men acquainted with the proper mode of rearing them."³⁴ Finally silk industry was developed by obtaining silkworms from Bengal, and Muscat.³⁵ He had employed a number of European and Indian engineers and artisans in his various industrial concerns. Scissors, balances, hour-glasses, knives, paper, watches, cutlery and guns were manufactured by his men. The silk and cotton industries of Mysore became world famous during his time.

31. Kirk Patrick: pp. 234 and 282

32. Ibid, Appendix L, pp. XXVIII FF.

33. Ibid: CCL, XXII, p. 300.

34. Kirk Patrick: CLV, p. 187 and CLV, p. 186

35. Ibid, CCC LXXV, p. 418

The best quality of sugar in India was produced in Mysore. The ordnance factories of Tipu manufactured arms, guns and gun-powder that were in certain cases superior to those of European make. In his letter to Louis XVI of France, Tipu wrote, on August 6, 1786, among other things, thus: "a double barrell'd gun made in the arsenal of the Sarcar, together with an embroidered dress is sent for the noble rank and will arrive."³⁶

In fact the cause for Tipu's rupture with the English was the outcome of these activities to which the English could not reconcile. When all other rulers vied with one another to obtain favours of arms and ammunitions from the European traders, it was Mysorean rulers alone who had ever competed with them by manufacturing better quality of guns and gunpowder. The rapid industrialisation of the country, establishment of trade corporations, banking and trade monopoly accompanied by a prohibition of trade without licence etc. would never have been matters that could be over-looked by the English. It was Tipu alone that felt the necessity of developing our industries and technology to compete with the foreign merchants in India and also attempted to capture the foreign markets for Indian goods. "Tipu was the first Indian sovereign to seek to apply western methods to his administration,"³⁷ and it was again because of this that the English wanted to eliminate him from Indian politics. If he was destined to live, as long as his father, no doubt, the course of Indian history would have been a different one. But all ended with the Fourth Anglo-Mysore War.

36. Kirk Patrick: CCCXXXVI, p. 371

37. *The History of Tipu Sultan*, p. 354

SOCIAL REFORMS

We have seen the feudal structure of Malayalee society in which only the Namboodiris and the Nairs enjoyed power and prestige. This system, "what is called *Kanan Janma Maryada*—the totality of relations between the *Kanam* and *Jenmam* tenures—was so different from that in any other part of India," writes E. M. S. Namboodiripad, "that out-siders were dumb-founded when they were told about it."¹ It was this system that again determined the social relations and habits of different castes. They were so intermingled that the feudal system of Kerala cannot be studied separately without giving due consideration to its bearing and strong hold over the conduct and behaviour of the society. It was so framed that it would accommodate the unquestioned authority of landlords, and at the same time the unreserved servility of the subordinate classes in the society. The system of marriage and manner of dress required to be followed by all castes except the Namboodiris who were the landlords or *Jenmis* originated from this system.²

"The tradition fostered by the Brahmins," says the Author of *Cochin State Manual*, "ascribes to the mandate of Parasurama which ordained that 'sudra' woman should put off chastity and devote themselves to satisfy the desire of Brahmins."³ This is supported by all writers, prominent among whom is L. K. Anandakrishna Iyyer who, in his

1. E. M. S.: *Kerala: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow*, p. 3

2. A. C. Kannan Nambiar, District Munsiff, Badagara - Answers to the *Malabar Marriage Commission* 1891, p. 22

3. C. Achutha Menon: *Cochin State Manual*, p. 193

Cochin Castes and Tribes, observes that the Brahmins who are possessors of religious tenets pronounce *slokas* (hymns) to the effect that the Nair women should not observe chastity.⁴ Thus the regular and legal marriage for Nairs was prohibited by the Caste rules. This device, was imposed by the Namboodiri *Jenmis* on the 'gentry' of Malabar because their laws strictly ordained that only the eldest member of the house-hold should be left free to enter into law-ful wedlock with a woman of their own caste, the younger members being left to shift for themselves in this matter.⁵ The Author of *Malabar and its folk*, writes that the Brahmin ingenuity discovered a ready means of getting over the difficulty by a social prohibition of all valid marriages among the Nairs, which would otherwise have prejudicially interfered with their conjugal destinies. Thus it came about that the custom of concubinage so freely indulged in by the Brahmins with Nair women obtained such firm hold upon the country that it has only been strengthened by the lapse of time.⁶

As a result of the prohibition of marriage and the caste law that ordained that chastity was to be put off, there developed a system of what is called *Sambandham* or irregular marriage in which a Namboodiri can cohabit with any Nair lady he likes without incurring any kind of future obligation or liability. The theory justifying this system is that the Namboodiris being direct descendants of Gods, their *sambandham* with Nair women is considered to be sacred and divine. If the Namboodiri is pleased, God is pleased and the family which gets the opportunity to please him is blessed with eternal affluence and happiness. The Namboodiri's right to enjoy any Nair woman is, therefore, divine and denial of this to him is denial of God's right. Nairs if they have beautiful girls long for their *Sambandham* with

4. L. K. Anandakrishna Iyyer: *Cochin Castes and Tribes*, p. 85

5. Fgn. (Misc.), S. No. 56, Part II. para. 13, p. 13

6. *Malabar and its Folk*, p. 26

Namboodiris or at least prefer them for their deflowering.⁷ Writing in the year 1900, T. K. Gopala Panikkar observes: "at the present day there are families especially in the interior of the District (Malabar) who look upon it as an honour to be thus united by Brahmins."⁸ As some of the features of this mode of marriage prevalent among the Nairs in Kerala, have been discussed elsewhere it does not require much elaboration. But we have to point out the two important results of the regular practice of this system. They are polyandry and the system of matriliney. Both were universally recognised orders among the Nair community of Kerala and therefore an elucidation of these is required to appreciate the odds against which Tipu Sultan had to fight when he began his social reforms.

• The author of *the History of Hyder Shah and of his son Tippoo Sultan* writes that the Nairs are the nobility of the Malabar Coast and that they are the oldest nobility in the world for the ancient writers mention them and quote the law that permits the Nair ladies to have many husbands and each husband gives a sum of money or portion at the time of marriage and the wife only has the charge of children.⁹ Sheik Zainuddeen who was a native of Malabar says "Nair ladies will have two or four or more husbands. The date and time of each will be fixed previously and there is no quarrel on this issue."¹⁰ "If the Nair lady is beautiful", writes L. K. Anandakrishna Iyyer, closely following Buchanan¹¹, "many Nairs live with her. The ever increasing number of them, increases her respectability in the society."¹² We get abundance of descriptions of the system of polyandry prevalent in the Nair Community of Kerala from the writings of all the travellers and historians who visited the place

7. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 56, part II, p. 971

8. T. K. Gopala Panikkar: p. 36

9. *History of Hyder Shah* etc., p. 60

10. Zainuddeen: Op. Cit., pp. 72-3

11. Buchanan: Op. Cit., p. 39

12. L. K. Ananda Krishna Iyyer: Op. Cit., p. 39

and wrote about the Malabar society.¹³ Giving evidence before the Malabar Marriage Commission of 1891, the District Munsiff of Badagara said; "Polyandry seems to have been largely prevalent in its worst form in South Malabar in the earliest times. Instances in which a woman had as many as 27 and 12 husbands, who visited her by rotation are even now mentioned by some old men. Four to twelve men were in those days regarded as the ordinary compliment of a woman's *sambandakars*."¹⁴ It thus became a recognised practice for a Nair woman to engage as many husbands as possible at the same time.

As an inevitable consequence of polyandry, the system of matriliney came into existence among the Nairs. The reason assigned to this by all historians is that the Nairs being professional soldiers could not shoulder the burden of maintenance of families and, therefore, it was left to the responsibility of Nair ladies.¹⁵ Again by matriliney, a peculiar system of inheritance and a curious form of relations between sons and fathers evolved in the society. "The Nairs even the Zamorin and the other princes," writes the author of *History of Hyder Shah* etc. "have no other heirs than the children of their sisters".¹⁶ This law has established that the Nairs, having no family, might be always ready to march against the enemy. When the nephews are of age to bear arms, they follow their uncles.¹⁷ Sheik Zainuddeen, Barbosa and Buchanan corroborate the statement above.¹⁸ Since the children did not know their father, they remained with the mother.

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13. Vide .. Hamilton: *New Account of the East Indies*, Vol. I, p. 310
Buchanan: *A journey from Madras* etc., Vol. II, pp. 411-2, Abdul
Razaack: *Travels*, Vol. IX, p. 354; Nicolo Conti: *Travels*, p. 145;
A Description of the Coasts of South Africa and Malabar, pp. 122-25.
 14. *Malabar Marriage Commission Report*, p. 17
 15. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 56, Part II, Aara 12, p. 13
 16. *History of Hyder Shah* etc., p. 60
 17. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 56, Part II, Para 10, pp. 11. 12
 18. Sheik Zainuddeen, *Op. Cit.*, p. 84, Barbosa: *Op. Cit.*, p. 124
Buchanan: *Op. Cit.*, pp. 472-3

Since a mother had several husbands, her children did not have a common father and in many cases the paternity of the children could not be ascertained with definiteness. Barbosa made it very clear when he wrote "the children which she has, remain at her expense..... because they do not know their father."¹⁹ "The name of father is unknown to a Nair child. He speaks of the husbands of his mother and of his uncles, but never of his father."²⁰

To facilitate this wanton conjugal relations, another caste rule imposed on all, except the Namboothiris was that men and women should not cover the upper part of their body. Ibn Battuta who in the 14th century remained more than eight years in this part of the country gives interesting details of this mode of dress.²¹ "In Malabar all-Hindus whether male or female: rich or poor", observes Sheik Zainuddeen "are half-naked. Only a single loin cloth is girdled round the waist leaving the upper part exposed. In this respect, males and females, Rajas and nobles, rich and poor are equal."²² Even in the year 1908 when C. A. Innes wrote his *Malabar Gazetteer*, he found "them to wear nothing above the waist and it was considered immodest to cover the breast." These were strictly observed as caste rules and any deviation from these practices was tantamount to blasphemy.²⁴ Many an instance of cruelties was cited by K. P. Padmanabha Menon, in his monumental work. *The History of Kerala* to show the insistence on and strict adherence to this savage law. An Ezhava lady who happened to travel abroad and who returned well-dressed, was summoned by the Queen of Attingal and

19. Barbosa: Op. Cit., p. 124

20. *History of Hyder Shah* etc., p. 60

21. Ibn Battuta: *Travel* (Malayalam translation), p. 74

22. Zainuddeen: p. 63.

23. Innes: Op. Cit., p. 142

24. L. K. Anandakrishna Iyer: Op. Cit., pp. 100-1

her breasts were cut off for covering them.²⁵ The practice was in vogue till very recently. The Nair ladies with naked bosom parade in front of the *Aaraat procession* that starts from the Padmanabha swami temple of Trivandrum to the beach nearly 3½ miles away.²⁶ The Nair ladies of Travancore and Cochin have to remove their jackets even today when they go before the members of the royal family.²⁷ This was followed throughout Kerala. The reason assigned to it was that covering the bosom was tantamount to disrespect and immodesty. These were the prevailing systems observed in Kerala, the reforming of which was the avowed desire of Tipu Sultan.

All historians agree on one point about Tipu Sultan, that he was free from all prevailing vices of his time. His zeal to eradicate the savage practices among the subjects had become proverbial. Himself abstaining from all excesses and extravagance, he advised his people to follow suit and exhorted them to observe purity and chastity in life. Tipu might have been shocked to witness the abominable practices referred to above, prevalent in the Kerala society, because Kirmani says about him "in delicacy or modesty of feeling, he was the most particular man in the world, so much so that from days of his childhood to that of his death, no one ever saw any part of his person except his ankle and wrist and even in the bath he always covered himself from head to foot."²⁸ The social reforms of Tipu Sultan studied with this background of his personal habits, would make none feel that they were aimed at interfering with others' religious observances. As a strict moralist, he required the people to clothe themselves decently and prohibited the habit of women exposing their bosom. This

25. *Gross voyages*, quoted by K. P. Padmanabha Menon: *History of Kerala*, Vol. III, p. 192

26. *Ibid.*

27. *Ibid.*

28. Kirmani: *History of Tipu Sultan* (Miles-Trans.), p. 133

was not peculiar to Kerala alone. "In the whole of the territories of Balghaut" writes Kirmani, "most of the Hindu women go about with their breasts and their heads uncovered like animals. He, therefore, gave orders that no one of these women should go out of her house without a robe and a covering for the head. This immodest custom was, therefore, abolished in that country."²⁹ What Kirmani calls 'immodest custom' was modest and respectful a practice in Kerala. Therefore, these were irreconcilable. The caste rule was so rigidly followed that even the lowest castes did not deviate from the rules. When Tipu Sultan knew that there was a tribe called *Malai Kondigarus* in Malabar the men and women of which go about naked, he called the headman and required him to advise his fellow-men to clothe themselves decently. Tipu promised that if it were necessitated by poverty, he would provide them gratuitously with the clothes necessary for the purpose every year. But the savages made remonstrances and humbly begged to be allowed to dispense with the encumbrance of clothing. They finally told him that, if they were forced to wear clothes contrary to the rules of their caste, they would go and live in some other distant forests where they could follow their customs unmolested.³⁰ Tipu left them to their ways without further persuasion.

Again, he forbade, by a royal edict, the practice of polyandry prevalent in the country.³¹ At any cost he wanted to stop this evil system. An instance mentioned by Krimani is a clear manifestation of the concept of morality and the strict observance of it by Tipu Sultan. He says that when Tipu was sleeping "two ladies of the deceased Nawab's family both of them young and beautiful

29. Ibid.

30. Abbe J. A. Dubois: *Hindu Manners, Customs and Ceremonies*, p. 78

31. Kirk Patrick: No. XIV and Wilks: *History of Mysore*, Vol. II, p. 120

(God knows with what intention, good or bad) came forth from their apartments and began to rub his feet. While however, they were doing this, he awoke and when he saw them he became exceedingly angry at their presumption and trembling with rage" rebuked them.³² To such a God-fearing puritan the unchaste and loose life seen around him would be an eye-sore. Therefore, in strong words and severe terms, he condemned the practice of polyandry.

Another important reform of Tipu Sultan was the prohibition of intoxicants throughout his kingdom. "The Nairs are excessively addicted to intoxicating liquors" writes Buchanan.³³ The moral and social uplift of his subjects was the ideal of his kingship and throughout his life he strove untiringly to attain this goal. His letter to Ghulam Hyder, Amil of Bangalore, dated January 4, 1787, is an eloquent testimony to his ardent desire to see his prohibition policy implemented successfully throughout his domain. He wrote, "the account stating you had strictly prohibited the distilling and vending liquors, and had more over made over the whole of body of vinters enter into written engagements to desist from selling liquors is understood. You must also make the distillers execute the similar engagements and then oblige to take up some other occupation".³⁴ This letter also gives the means of implementation of the prohibition policy. He forbade the employment of female servants for domestic work as it would lead to immoral activities. He wanted his officers also to lead a life of morality and simplicity. When he heard about the illicit relation of his Feujdar at Calicut with a Nair woman, Tipu immediately insisted on his leaving the courtsean.³⁵ Professor Mohibbul Hasan Khan states that 'Makenzie manuscript' contains an endowment created by Tipu Sultan for

32. Kirmani: Op. Cit., p. 133

33. Buchanan: Vol. II, p. 412-13

34. Kirk Patrick: No. 423

35. Ibid: No. 464

the purpose of giving financial help to get poor unmarried girls married.³⁶ His revenue system and trade corporation etc. we have seen, were mostly meant for the amelioration of the poorer section of the community. But unluckily enough, all these reforms were resented by the Nair Community who believed that these were an outright encroachment upon their religious observances. The failure of Tipu was that he could not feel the pulse of the society and could not make his people understand that what he was doing was for their own good.

36. Mohibbul Hasan Khan: *History of Tipu Sultan*, p. 373

RELIGIOUS POLICY OF TIPU SULTAN

The role of a social and economic reformer assumed by Tipu Sultan was the major cause of all allegations of forcible conversion and religious bigotry brought against him. Therefore his religious policy should best be studied with reference to his social and economic reforms. The social order of Malabar with its strange customs of marriage and inheritance, dress and manners already alluded to in the preceding chapter was drastically affected by the measures that Tipu introduced for the amelioration of his people. Conservative by nature the people were reluctant to abandon their age-old habits and viewed these reforms as an encroachment upon their religious and social rights. They were unaware of the fact that these measures were a part of Tipu Sultan's reforms implemented throughout his domain. The privileged class of the Malabar society felt that they were singled out for ill-treatment. In reality the majority of the people reaped the benefits of these reforms. But the Nairs and Namboodiris who together comprised one-fifth of the total population of Malabar¹ were adversely affected by these administrative innovations. The rancour that raged within the breast of these men gave rise to a host of accusations against Tipu Sultan. It is in the interest of historical objectivity that a thorough examination and analysis of the origin, nature and credibility of the sources of these allegations should be attempted. It is a fact that a systematic recording of events and writings of history was seldom practised by the

1. Buchanan, Vol. II, p. 355.

rulers of Kerala.² It was only in the 19th century when Kerala came under the English rule that some sort of records began to be kept relating to political and administrative affairs. Therefore historians interested in the history of Mysore rule in Kerala had to rely on the writings of the English historians.

The pioneer work in Kerala history was done by the English scholars. Basing on their chronicles and Manuals, the Kerala historians made attempts to write the history of Kerala. Blindly following the English historians who twisted and mutilated facts to serve their own ignoble ends, Indian writers of Kerala history were unable to give an objective and genuine history of Kerala. To make matters worse they allowed their caste and communal prejudices and parochial bias to creep into their writings. Unfortunately no serious attempt has been made to rescue Kerala history from this labyrinth of myth and distortion of facts and to reconstruct it on scientific lines. Those who made earnest efforts to recreate the period have resorted to the available secondary sources which were all fabricated by the English. The source

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2. "It is clear" writes Puthczhath Raman Menon, "that the history of no other country in the world is so complicated, inconsistent and mixed up with legend as that of Kerala." (Puthczhathu Raman Menon, *History and Research* (Article), *History on the March*, p. 189). The Joint Commissioners of Malabar reported, "there is no date to the copy of Cochin Treaty furnished by Powney, so as to ascertain wherein was executed." (Fgn. Misc.) S. No. 56. Part II, p. 687). "I have received your letter", wrote John Hutchinson of Anjengo settlement on June 13, 1766 to the Raja of Cochin, "without date or signature, which I request in future may not be omitted in order to avoid confusion." (L. No. VIII, No. 188, p. 924. John Hutchinson to the Raja of Cochin). But the practice was continued in spite of repeated requests and that in the year 1800 the Governor of Bombay reprimanded the Raja for the same, (Ibid., No. 180. p. 274, John Duncan to the Raja of Cochin), "Neither the date nor your signature is affixed to these letters". observed Jonathan Duncan of the Bombay Government and required the Raja to discontinue this practice (Ibid., p. 271).

of information utilised by the writers of Kerala history is most unreliable. Thus no serious attempt has been made to reconstruct the history of Kerala on reliable evidence. Those who have made earnest efforts also failed to unearth original sources of history to counteract the English distortions.

When the land survey had been carried out by Tipu Sultan and land tax imposed in opposition to the usages of the country, the Namboodiri landlords felt it as a preliminary step to sabotage their caste rules in which they were held in divine esteem. Therefore, they cashed their lands with the Mappillas and others who eagerly agreed to the transaction and left for Travancore. The Raja of Travancore who was styled as *Dharma Raja* honoured them with shelter, as those *Jenmis* were only few in number and were loaded with the treasures of the country. This is evident from the *Report* of Malabar Joint Commissioners who assessed the position of the country under the Mysoreans by means of questions put to persons competent to enlighten them. One such question was "in what year did the *Jenmakar* run away"? Answer: In 964 M. E.* / 1788/89 A. D. all the *Jenmakars* ran away and as to their not attending on Arshed Beg Khan's time, the cause was that in this country the principal *Jenmakars* are Namboory Brahmins who do or did not come into the *cutcherry*,³ for fear of degradation of their caste. But the position of Nairs was pitiable. They were numerous and "were born soldiers"⁴ who did not know any other profession than soldiery. Naturally it was the soldier caste that would be worst hit whenever there was an invasion. In this process, they had to fight against the Mysoreans and met disastrous defeat at their hands. With the disappearance of feudatory

* M. E. Malayalam Era, which is supposed to have started with the last Cheraman Perumal who became a convert to Islam and left for Mecca in the year 825-26 A. D.

3. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 56, Part I, p. 150.

principalities to which they were attached Nairs lost their position of pre-eminence in the body politic of the State. They were deprived also of their unbridled right 'to kill and be killed' as professional soldiers. At the same time, they could not join the military service of the Mysoreans as it would be a desecration of their faith and disloyalty to their caste. The political integration of the country thus deprived them of their profession.

Hard on the heels of this came the devastating reforms of Tipu Sultan in social and economic spheres. Mention has already been made of the system of marriage and inheritance, dress and manners prevalent among the community. When Tipu Sultan decreed to the people in general and Nairs in particular to dress up decently so as to cover all parts of their body and to stop the shameful practice of polyandry, the Nair community as a whole felt that this was the preliminary step towards converting them. This fear is explained by the fact that covering the upper part of the body was exclusively a Muslim practice. "The woman of the noblest caste in India" writes Clarke in his *life of Willington* meaning the Nair women of Kerala, were required thus by Tipu Sultan⁵ "to adopt the Muhammadan Customs of covering their bosom." When the Nairs were panick-stricken at these suspicious move the English adroity exploited the situation by bringing forward a proclamation allegedly issued by Tipu Sultan to the Nairs of Kerala. This proclamation, used by Tipu Sultan's hostile critics as the most effective weapon to tarnish his image, runs as follows: "From the period of conquest until this day, during the twenty-four years, you have been a turbulent and refractory people and in the wars waged during your rainy season you have caused numbers of our warriors to taste the draught of martyrdom. Be it so. What is past is past. Hereafter you must proceed in an opposite manner, dwell quietly and pay your dues like good subjects; and since it is a practice with you for one woman to

4. Buchanan, Vol. II, p. 389.

5. Quoted in the *Travancore State Manual*, by Nagam Aiya.

associate with ten men and leave your mothers and sisters unconstrained in their obscene practices and are thence all born in adultery and are more shameless in your connexions than the beasts of the field; I hereby require you to forsake these sinful practices and live like the rest of mankind. And if you are disobedient to these commands, I have made repeated vows to honour the whole of you with Islam and to march all the chief persons to the seat of Government.”⁶

This proclamation was actually an invention of the English historian Col. Wilks Kirmani and other Muslim historians of Tipu Sultan who always try to portray him as ‘the Champion of Islam’ do not mention such an edict, which they would have gladly done if it had been really in existence. Van Angelbeck, the then Dutch Governor of Malabar did not hear of anything like it. The Tellicherry Factors neither record this in their Diary nor mention it in any of their correspondence. After the fall of Seringapatam, Tipu Sultan’s library and manuscripts were taken by the Officers of the Company. On the basis of the collection, Kirk Patrick and Beatson published their books. But this proclamation is found neither in *The Select letters of Tippoo Sultan* nor in the *Origin and Conduct of War with Tippoo Sultan*. It is interesting to note that the Malabar Commissioners who often baited their informants with questions of a vile nature have not recorded any question regarding this proclamation in their procedure Volumes. If such a decree was issued in the year 1786-90, certainly the Joint Commissioners who started their work immediately after the cession of Malabar by Tipu Sultan in the year 1792 would have enquired of it to assess its impact on the people. Buchanan who visited the place in 1800 did not report any such proclamation. Even the claim of Wilks that the ‘Proclamation’ is in the *Memoirs of Tippoo Sultan* is not correct.*

6. Wilks., *Historical Sketches etc.*, Vol. II, p. 120.

* Though the unknown author of this book speaks much about the religious atrocities, the edict he mentions is a different one. He

Even if we accept the proclamation of Tipu to the Nairs of Kerala as genuine there is nothing in it to prove that he was a religious bigot. His mere insistence on the abolition of polyandry and the adoption of a civilised mode of dress does not make him a religious bigot. If at all such a proclamation was made, it was only to introduce these reforms which were not even remotely connected with religious propaganda. It is quite legitimate to assume that the original proclamation was tampered with by later historians and deliberately altered to suit their purpose of picturing Tipu as a religious fanatic. We must remember that the proclamation, if it existed must have been issued in Malayalam in keeping with Tipu Sultan's practice to correspond only in

says "it is probably about this time, that he issued an edict for the destruction of all the Hindu temples in his dominions." (Memoirs of Tippoo Sultan (Miles), p. 270) Further it is alleged by Colonel Wilks and by other historians who follow him that Tipu had issued circular orders to all different detachment of his troops to employ every means for the conversion of the Hindus. It is again reported that a copy of such an order was discovered from Palghat Fort after its capture in 1790 which ran as follows: "It directed that every being in the District, without distinction, should be honoured with Islam, that the houses of such as fled to avoid the honour should be burnt, that they should be traced to their lurking places and that all means of truth and falsehood, fraud and force, should be employed to effect their universal conversion." (Wilks, *Historical Sketches etc.* Vol. II, p: 132, Logan, Vol. I, p; 451.) This should be read along with the other two edicts referred to above. Thus the picture of wholesale conversion and total destruction of all temples is complete. It is not surprising really that the originators of the above baseless charges should strive to buttress their position by forging any number of such documents. When we examine the allegation that instructions to destroy temples and to effect forced conversion were issued all detachments, consisting of Hindus and Christians and when we note that the Muslims formed only nine per cent of the entire population of Tipu's kingdom, we have to dismiss these allegations as patent falsehood. No ruler, however imprudent will ever think of issuing orders to his army to act contrary to their religious belief. If Tipu wanted to use the instrument of military force for conversions he should have first converted his troops.

Malabar language.⁷ The Malayalam phrase *Kuppayamiduka* is used to the present day as a synonym of conversion to Islam. So when Tipu Sultan threatened to make them 'put on' garments if on their own accord they did not do so, the mistaken notion that Tipu Sultan was bent on converting them to Islam took possession of the popular mind. This linguistic confusion was proved to be advantageous to the English historians who rendered the expression *Kuppayamiduka* into English as conversion to Islam at the point of the sword. Though technically the translation was blameless, it was a falsification of truth. We have seen how the historians had manipulated two edicts in the name of Haider Ali and how many historical literature of unknown origin including edicts have come out accusing Tipu Sultan of his religious fanaticism. Therefore, it is not out of place to presume that if at all a proclamation was made, it underwent certain adjustments to exploit the popular usage of the word *Kuppayamiduka*.

Another point that should be taken into account is that all these allegations came out only, after Tipu Sultan had imposed prohibition on trade in his kingdom. The Company was hard hit by this measure. With this began their war preparations against Tipu Sultan. Cornwallis wrote to the Political Department "we should have reason to apprehend that we were on the eve of a rupture with Tipoo."⁸ It was the part of Company's war preparations to play upon the communal feeling of Indian princes for their advantage. In his letter to Raghujee Bonslea, Cornwallis accuses Tipu Sultan of religious bigotry and asks the Maratta prince to rally round the English to fight against "a man who is the enemy of all mankind, and whose heart is bent on the destruction of every sect as well Hindoo as every other."⁹ This was continued to such a

7. Kirk Patrick, XXI, pp. 34-35.

8. Fgn. Pol. Proc. Jan. 6- Feb. 26, 1790, S. No. 2, p. 75

9. Ibid., Se. Cons. No. 5, March 10, 1790.

degree that the Marattas demanded a clause to be included in the Treaty of Seringapatam when John Kennaway was negotiating with the vakeels of Tipu on peace terms. "The Maratta vakeels acquainted me," writes Kennaway, "that an article should be inserted to prevent Tipoo from continuing the practice of circumseising Hindoos. I asked them what the contents were... they said that they did not know but would enquire and inform me"¹⁰ This shows that the news of forcible conversion was so cleverly instilled in the minds of Hindu rulers as to enlist their support though the English found it impossible to concede to this demand of Marattas as there was no concrete evidence. The same tactics were applied in Kerala also, where the Nairs were justified to a certain extent in believing that all of them were going to be converted to Islam. We can appreciate the position taken by them when all their usages and practices which had the sanction and sanctity of religion and caste were thrown off. The failure of the religious policy of Tipu Sultan was that he could not reconcile the people to his reforms as these were far ahead of the time.

Thus the Nair nobility of Kerala were affected very much by the political, social and economic reforms. Some of them left the country to take refuge in Travancore.¹¹ Some of them came under the protection of the English Company,¹² and "those who would not escape, took refuge in the forest"¹³ from "whence they began occasional depredations and predatory wars."¹⁴ The mental agony of such people who were forced by circumstances to such extremity and the nature of the stories of tyranny told

10. Fgn. (Misc.) Vol. 54, 1792, pp. 123-24

11. Buchanan, Vol II, p. 190

12. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 56, Part I, p. 88

13. Buchanan, Vol. II, p. 170

14. P. R. C. No. 103, p. 124

by them day in and out may well be imagined. Further it must be taken into account that by the Caste rules only Namboodiris and Nairs were allowed to acquire and propagate knowledge.¹⁵ Thus, as they were the only privileged custodians of language and learning what they said and wrote passed as the undisputed record of the affair in Kerala under Mysore rule. Those who had run away from the country were apt to magnify the stories at least to justify their flight. Thus, the Namboodiris whose pronouncements are 'divine commands' and 'whose person, holy' was not distrusted by others. Nor were his exaggerated and false versions of the cause of his flight ever questioned. Thus the very origin of the source of information makes it untrustworthy and open to dispute.

The nature of the source is equally untenable. Logan writes that a Brahmin who was required to convey a message refused to do so on the plea that there was a report prevailing that Tipu Sultan had issued orders for all the Brahmins on the Coast to be seized, and sent up to Seringapatam.¹⁶ This report was really circulated by the Tellicherry factors. The report from Tellicherry was to this effect "in July 1788, the circumcision of many Brahmins took place"¹⁷ and it was an exaggerated version of this that had appeared in the *Malabar Manual*. Again, Wilks wrote, "it was at Kuttipuram that 2000 Nairs with their families were converted."¹⁸ Logan completes the picture in the following way: "The unhappy captives gave a forced assent and on the next day the rite of circumcision was performed on all the males, every individual of both sexes being compelled to close the ceremony by eating beef."¹⁹ The source of this news also was the Chief of Tellicherry who

15. L. K. Anantha Krishna Iyyer, *Cochin Tribes and Castes*, pp. 339-49

16. Logan, *Malabar Manual*, Vol. I, pp. 448-49

17. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 56, Part I, p. 89

18. Wilks, *Historical Sketches*, Vol. II, p. 136

19. Logan, *Op. cit.*, p. 451

wrote, "it was now many of the Nairs were cut off, circumcised or obliged to fly to the jungle."²⁰ Though he does not mention the number of Nairs who were circumcised, Wilks and Logan after a century have not failed to remember their exact number! Here, we have to recall that it was to this Chief, Tipu Sultan had written "you are not a good man, but whether good or bad, what I can say. I have many lakhs of people like you in my service and do so have the Company.....From this time forward, you must not write to me for anything of business, for you write to me, I shall not send any answer. You must understand it."²¹ The Chief we must remember had for his informant a Brahmin who in turn was influenced by reports of rumours of a large scale conversion. To accept such sources and to be guided by them in important historical problems would be an affront to human reasoning.

Another grave charge of mass conversion was reported from the Coorg country where it was rumoured that nearly 70000 were circumcised and made Mussalmans. This story also originated from the Tellicherry Factors. On December 31, 1789, L. Avvon of Tellicherry factory wrote to C. W. Malet that Tipu Sultan was in the suburb of Tellicherry to "marry his son to the daughter of Bulla Bebbby, widow of the late Ally Raja, at the celebration of which marriage 40,000 captives unhappy families of the Coorg country and other parts of the Malabar Coast are to be circumcised."²² This was endorsed by Cornwallis in his letter to Malet who was the Resident of the Maratta Court.²³ It is clear that this news of religious atrocity of Tipu Sultan was for the consumption of Marattas and to stir them against the Mysore ruler. When these non-Muslim sources created such falsehood, the Muslim chroniclers also in their attempt to glorify their hero after their

20. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 56, Part I, p. 90

21. P. R. C., No. 37 A, p. 37

22. P. R. C., No. 51, p. 43

23. Fgn. Pol. Pro. February 5, 1790, Cons. No. 14, Cornwallis to Malet, December, 31, 1789, pp. 255-56

heart as the 'Champion of Islam' made similar utterances that have become trump cards in the hands of hostile historians. "When the Sultan arrived at Seringapatam", wrote kirmani "the prisoners taken in the country of Coorg had all been made Mussalmans and styled Ahmedis."²⁴

When the reforms of Tipu Sultan were introduced, the landed aristocracy and the privileged few raised the flag of disobedience but were silenced through suppression. The fact even the Muslim Kurukkal rose in revolt,²⁵ shows that the agrarian reforms affected the landed aristocracy very much, a fact to which Buchanan testifies, "they were all reduced to comparative poverty."²⁶ But these were taken as religious persecutions by the Namboodiris. This shows that the rich who were the oppressors of the poor were bridled and brought under the law of the country for the common weal. In this respect the rich irrespective of his caste and religion was held in check. But the majority of land lords were non-Muslims as 75 per cent of the population were non-Muslims. It was, therefore, the economic and social reforms that paved the way for the accusations of religious bigotry brought against Tipu Sultan.

If Tipu Sultan wanted the conversion of his prisoners and his subjects, he could have done it on many favourable occasions. In his letter to Ghulam Ali Khan and Ali Reza, who were in the camp of Cornwallis, Tipu Sultan wrote, "several people belonging to the Rajah of Travancore were made prisoners. I gave each of them a Rupee and a

24. The absurdity of several such instances was brought out by Prof. Mohibbul Hasan Khan in his work on Tipu Sultan (pp. 359-61) The students of history who are very familiar with the oriental diction and style of writing will not be surprised when we dismiss Kirmani's hyperbolic utterances as an attempt to create a halo of divinity around his hero. Those who know the writings of the historians of Ghazanvide and Ghorian Dynasties of India and in a later period of Barani, Isami, and Badaoni will not take the statement of Kirmani, in its literal sense.

25. Kirk Patrick, CCXC, III, p. 316

26. Buchanan, Vol. II, p. 65

reveal the falsehood of the story. Another instance is cited by Bartolomeu, who was in the Verapoly Seminary during the time of the attack of Tipu on Travancore Lines. He wrote, "naked Christians and Hindus were dragged to pieces and tied to the feet of elephants. All churches and temples were destroyed. Christians and Pagan women were forcibly married to Muhammedans."³³ This information he obtained was from those who had run away from the suburbs of Travancore Lines when it fell into the hands of Mysorean army. Thus it is also hearsay. But he had his personal knowledge of what had happened at Verapoly where he was stationed. With a sigh of relief he writes, "but by the favour of God and by the grace of our patron apostle Ouseph, our church and monasteries were not burnt down. They were neither desecrated nor became victims of sultan's wrath."³⁴ Thus his own personal experience is quite contrary to what he heard from others. In fact, this is the nature of all stories of forced conversions and desecrations of centres of worship.

Not a specific instance can be pointed out to show that any person was persecuted just because he was not a Muslim. Nor can any particular temple or church be pointed out as having been demolished by the Mysoreans. In spite of the unending allegations of religious bigotry and destruction of temples and churches that had been publicised by all, every writer has unequivocally admitted that matters that were personally noticed or known to him tell a different tale. After describing the devastation made by Tipu Sultan elsewhere of which he had no concrete evidence, the author of *Sakthan Tampuran* writes on the strength of temple records, "it is evident that Tipu did not commit any harm or destruction in the Cochin territory when he entered in the country and afterwards encamped at Trichur."³⁵ The observation of the author of *Cochin*

33. *Voyages to East Indies* (Froster's translation), pp. 141-42

34. *Ibid.*,

35. Puthethazhathu Raman Menon, *Sakthan Tampuran*, p. 136

State Manual basing his authority on the Temple records of Trichur also throws a flood of light on this issue. He says that when the Mysore army was on its march to Trichur, the priest of the great temple and the *Swamiyars* of the Mutts in that town locked up the sacred building and fled to Chennamangalam for refuge and that when the priests and *Swamiyars* returned after Sardar Khan's departure, they found everything intact. The temple Chronicler notes with considerable surprise that not only were the places of the worship not pillaged or defiled as was anticipated, but not a single door was found unlocked by the enemy.³⁶ Thus the rumour that was afloat and the actual things witnessed were contradictory. In the personal experience of any one, no atrocity was committed. But stories of cruelties and persecutions were let loose by Tipu Sultan's enemies with a view to enlisting the support of the local Rajas and also creating a feeling of terror about the ruler of Mysore.

It is a well known fact that a number of Tipu Sultan's officers not only in Mysore but also in Malabar were Hindus. Ananda Rao was the envoy sent by Haidar Ali to appraise the political conditions of Malabar before its conquest.³⁷ Madanna and afterwards Sreenivas Rao were the Civil Governors of Malabar. Ram Linga Pilla was one of the important Sirestadars of Tipu Sultan who helped Mir Ibrahim to carry out his revenue reforms. Most of his revenue collectors and writers were Hindus.³⁸ Jamea, whom Malabar Commissioners describe as "a Brahmin of a very respectable character", was employed as an officer under Tipu Sultan.³⁹ Noanji Pillai and Oudhoot Rao were important revenue officers.⁴⁰ This was his general policy. We

36. C. Achutha Menon, *Cochin State Manual*, p. 122

37. Tellicherry Factory Diary - Chief to the Governor of Bombay, Nov. 14, 1764, Cons. No. 2, Nov. 8, 1764

38. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 56, p. 155

39. Ibid., S. No. 59, para 39, p. 43

40. Ibid., para 47, p. 47

know that apart from his Diwan and Peshkar, a large number of Hindus held high posts both in the army and the civil service.⁴¹ His relation with Sringeri Mutt is celebrated. In the Central Record Office, Ernakulam, there is a curious document - an eye-witness' report - of the Fourth Anglo-Mysore War. Tipu Sultan knowing that he was passing through the last days of his life went to the Mutt, barefooted and received blessings from the *Jagathguru* as he addressed the Chief Priest. It is reported that the *Guru* gave a letter to the Maratta Chief requiring him to help Tipu Sultan instead of forming an alliance with the English.⁴² Even at the risk of displeasing Tipu Sultan's enemies, the divine priesthood of Sringeri showered on him blessings and offered him help. This shows the cordial relation of Tipu Sultan with the divine priesthood. If Tipu Sultan was a religious fanatic as made out by historians, the time was appropriate for the Chief Priest to show his discontent.

As we are concerned only with Kerala, it will be superfluous to enumerate all that Tipu Sultan did in other parts of his kingdom. One thing is certain. What Tipu Sultan did elsewhere in his kingdom was carried out in Malabar also. A number of religious heads and scholars of Kerala were recipients of Tipu Sultan's gift of land and cash. The *Satrams* where religious learning was imparted and Brahmins were fed, received his financial help. All the known temples of Malabar obtained from him lavish presents in money and rent-free lands. Guruvayoor Temple, the most esteemed of all temples in Kerala, was to benefit most. Apart from the rent-free lands, this temple received 8000 pagodas in cash annually for the expense of ceremonies.⁴³ The money was regularly paid every year by Tipu Sultan's agent Nalakathu Chandipurathu Aurasooty (Hydorse Kutty) Mooppan of

41. For details refer to *the History of Tipu Sultan*, p. 354-63

42. L. No. VII, 1st series, pp. 481-83

43. Kozhikode Archives - Inam Registers (Guruvayur Taluk)

Manathala. Even now the Hindus of this locality frequent the tomb of Aurasooty Mooppan for thanksgiving. This amount was reduced to 5000 pagodas by the English. Afterwards, that was also stopped in lieu of an assignment of some property to the temple. The important document which will help us in judging his religious policy in Malabar and which gives the lie to the allegations of forced conversions and temple destructions in Kerala has been traced out from the Inam Registers of Kozhikode Collectorate which is now preserved in the Archives there. A list of rent-free lands given by Tipu Sultan to various temples, mosques, *satrams* and divine heads of Kerala as entered in this Register⁴⁴ is appended at the end of this Chapter.

In spite of all these, allegations of religious excesses by Tipu Sultan are still current in Kerala for which the following reasons may be advanced. In the first instance, there was an organised propaganda of English to exploit the religious susceptibilities of the people. Next the genuine feeling of the aggrieved Namboodiris and Nairs who were affected by the reforms referred to above. Another point is that the authors who wrote Kerala history so far are the descendants of that community which had suffered most under Tipu Sultan and whose caste prejudices have not diminished to any appreciable degree. Yet another reason that precipitated local apprehension was that the Mappillas who were suppressed by the local Rajas, asserted their rights with the advent of the Mysoreans.⁴⁵ They might have harassed the Nair rebels and helped the Mysoreans to trace out their hiding places. Even before the advent of the Mysoreans on the scene the relation between the Nairs and the Mappillas was strained to such a degree that an organised massacre of Muslims was conducted by the local Rajas and Chieftains.⁴⁶ This antagonism is clearly brought

44. Kozhikode Collectorate Inam Registers, five folio volumes.

45. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 56, Part II, p. 824

46. M. M. D. L. T. *History of Hyder Shah* etc., pp. 61-63

out by the Joint Commissioners of Malabar in their *Report* in 1793.⁴⁷ They wrote, "the state of the above native society can be admitted considering the extreme rancour and enmity that a series of wars and mutual persecutions have kindled between them."⁴⁸ Under the Mysoreans, the Nair rebels were harassed by the Mappillas who were loyal subjects. This might have certainly aggravated the grievance of Nair rebels who to the best of their belief considered it as religious bigotry. Buchanan says that at Ponnani some cultured Mappillas expressed to him that they hate the Nair ascendancy as it was detrimental to their interest.⁴⁹ He continues to say "left to their own strength, the Mappillas would, very soon force them (Nairs) to retire into the woods and mountains to which they were confined when the English arrived."⁵⁰ This is corroborated again in the Proceedings of the Joint Commissioners meeting of January 31, 1793. Disapproving the use of the Company's force against the Mappillas by the Zamorin they remarked "this will again soon make them feel their own weakness and inability to collect from the Mopilahs without our aid and lead more naturally than perhaps any other mode to transferring the collections of Mopilah countries wholly to the Company which from all hands we learn is the only effectual way to reconcile those people to our Government to which they appear at present rather indisposed by the grievances they suffered from the delegation of our authority to their ancient enemies - the Nairs."⁵¹

Thus the Mappillas might have taken revenge on the Nairs utilising their position as loyal subjects of Mysoreans. There is every reason to believe that the Nairs might have been saved from the wrath of the Mappillas by the vigilance

47. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 56, Part I, p. Voucher No. 34, p. 831

48. Ibid., pp. 763-64

49. Buchanan, Vol. II, p. 564

50. Ibid., p. 565

51. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 56, Part II, p. 845

of the officers of Tipu. No doubt the grievances of the vanquished princes and Nair nobles increased with the regaining of the lost freedom of Mappillas under the Mysoreans. This was not any fault of Mysorean policy. The policy failed not because of any religious intolerance but because of the local bickerings and politics.

RENT FREE LAND DONATED BY TIPU SULTAN TO THE TEMPLES MOSQUES AND RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS OF MALABAR AND COCHIN

<i>Sl.No.</i>	<i>Name of Donees</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Purpose</i>	<i>Extent of land in acres</i>
1	2	3	4	5
1	Kadarancakarumakan temple	Tiruvambadi Amsom, Calicut Taluk	Devadayam for the purpose of attending the usual ceremonies of the temple	2.69 wet land
2	Tavanur Devaswom	-do-	-do-	1.48 wet land
3	Anayamkunnat Devaswom	-do-	-do-	1.57 wet land
4	Kumaranallur Devaswom	-do-	-do-	0.89 Garden land
5	Puthiyangadi mosque	Ernad Taluk, Nilambur Amsom	Religious institutions for the maintenance of the mosque	1.36 wet land
6	Kaipilkarinkali temple	-do-	Devadayam for attending religious ceremonies	13.91 wet land
				1.37 wet land

<i>Sl.No.</i>	<i>Name of Donees</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Purpose</i>	<i>Extent of Land in acres</i>
1	2	3	4	5
7	Chementhala Bhagavathy temple	Ernadu Taluk, Nilambur Amsom	Religious institutions for the maintenance of the mosque	15.07 wet land
8	Wandur Siva temple	Wandur Amsom	-do-	6.16 wet land
9	Punapelei temple	-do-	-do-	3.02 wet land
10	Chathengulengara Siva temple	-do-	-do-	15.40 wet land
11	Pottiyattu Siva temple	Kilmuri Amsom	-do-	1.89 wet land
12	Naduvatha temple	Pandikad Amsom	-do-	3.77 wet land
13	Kurumangotta Iyyapen temple	Pandikad Amsom	Devadayam Attending the usual ceremonies of the temple	98. wet land
14	Nechiparambatha Tripurandakan temple	Kilmuri Amsom	Devadayam Attending the usual ceremonies of the temple	7.29 wet land

<i>Sl.No.</i>	<i>Name of Donees</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Purpose</i>	<i>Extent of Land in acres</i>
1	2	3	4	5
15	Ulamam temple	Neduva Amsom	-do-	12.73 wet land
16	Chiramangalath Vetekkorumagan temple	-do-	-do-	2.60 Garden land
17	Nerunkaithakotta temple	Kadutharapalli Amsom, Palghat	-do-	2.75 wet land
18	Trikkolam temple	Kasba Amsom, Calicut Taluk	-do-	10.55 wet land
19	Thirumanathankunnu Bhagavathy temple	Nilambur Amsom Ernad Taluk	-do-	2.12 wet land
20	Meladeth temple	Kasba Amsom, Calicut Taluk	-do-	6.62 wet land
21	Palaparambath temple	Ernad Taluk, Koduvayur Amsom	-do-	23 wet land

<i>Sl.No.</i>	<i>Name of Donees</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Purpose</i>	<i>Extent of Land in acres</i>
1	2	3	4	5
22	Kondotti Thangal	Kulathur Amsom	personal	135.9 wet land 267.09 garden land 146.03 dry land
23	Muthakunnath Durgha Bhagavathy temple	Manjeri Amsom	Devadayam Attending the usual ceremonies of the temple	42.25 wet land
24	Apiraya Siva temple	Manjeri Amsom	Devadayam Attending the usual ceremonies of the temple	2.25 wet land
25	Pandalur Bhagavathy temple	Kasba Amsom Calicut Taluk	-do-	7.20 wet land
26	Vakatodi Karinkali temple	Manjeri Amsom	-do-	4.25 wet land
27	Tiruvidai temple	-do-	-do-	1.10 wet land
28	Orinedatha Siva temple	-do-	-do-	2.10 wet land

<i>Sl.No.</i>	<i>Name of Donees</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Purpose</i>	<i>Extent of Land in acres</i>
1	2	3	4	5
29	Quilandy Mosque	Viyur Amsom Kurumbranad	Religious institutions Attending religious ceremonies and maintenance of the mosque	197 wet land 56 g. land 23.5 dry land
30	Mannur Siva temple	Vallikunnu Amsom, Ernad Taluk	Devadayam for attending the usual ceremonies of the temple.	70.42 wet land 3.29 g. land 73.71 dry land
31	Nerankaithakottayil temple	-do-	-do-	53.13 wet land 13.00 g. land 124.0 dry land
32	Kunnikulangara temple	Kasba Amsom, Calicut Taluk	Devadayam For attending religious ceremonies of the temple	3.25 wet land 23.33 g. land
33	Tirunavaya Vishnu temple	Kasba Amsom, Calicut Taluk	Devadayam -do-	188.0 wet land 16.31 g. land

<i>Sl.No.</i>	<i>Name of Donees</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Purpose</i>	<i>Extent of land in acres</i>
1	2	3	4	5
34	Trikandiyoor Samootham Satram	Trikandiyur Amsom, Ponnani Taluk	Dharmadayam for feeding Brahmins and divines	48.03 wet land 14.40 g. land
35	Trikandiyur Siva temple	Trikandiyoor Amsom, Ponnani Taluk	Devadayam for attending the usual religious ceremonies	366.34 wet land 308.80 g. land
36	Triprangot Siva temple	Triprangot Amsom	-do-	274.85 wet land 65.07 g. land 50.00 dry land
37	Naduvil Madathil Thirumumbu	Trichur, Cochin	Personal use	40.26 wet land 22.13 g. land 4.17 dry land
38	Trikaikkad Madapuram Sree Ramaswami temple	Pariyampuram Amsom, Ponnani Taluk	Devadayam for attend- ing the usual ceremonies of the temple	1.98 g. land
39	Triprangot Samootham	Pallippuram Amsom, Ponnani	Dharmadayam for feed- ing the Brahmins and divines	6.31 wet land

<i>Sl.No.</i>	<i>Name of Donees</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Purposes</i>	<i>Extent of land in acres</i>
1	2	3	4	5
40	Ponnani Jaram mosque	Ponnani Nagaram Ponnani Taluk	Religious institution for maintenance of the Jaram	2.90 wet land
41	Triprangot Samootham Chanvattom Varam ceremony	Pallipuram Amsom, Ponnani Taluk	Devadayam - for attending the expense of the Festival	24.26 wet land
42	Vettathukoil Bhagavathy temple	Kasba Amsom, Calicut Taluk	Devadayam - for attending the expenses connected with the usual ceremonies of the temple	52.31 wet land 6.12 g. land
43	Thorakkavil temple	Kasba Amsom Calicut Taluk	-do-	4.71 wet land
44	Keraladeeswarapuram temple	Kasba Amsom Calicut Taluk	-do-	335.72 wet land 576.09 g. land 200.62 dry land
45	Trikandiyur Vettakkorumakankavu temple	Kasba Amsom Calicut Taluk	-do-	278.19 wet land 147.67 g. land 35.92 dry land

<i>Sl No.</i>	<i>Name of Donees</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Purpose</i>	<i>Extent of land in acres</i>
1	2	3	4	5
46	Pemana Vishnu temple	Vettom Amsom Ponnani Taluk	-do-	10.94 wet land
47	Perintrakovil Siva temple	Kasba Amsom Calicut Taluk	-do-	66.49 wet land 14.09 g. land
48	Dharaka mosque	Rairimangalam Amsom, Ponnani Taluk	Religious institutions for the maintenance of the mosque	11.45 wet land 16.87 g. land
49	Kumbikulangara Siva temple	Kasba Amsom Calicut Taluk	Devadayam - for attending the expenses connected with the ceremonies of the temple	11.29 wet land 7.43 g. land
50	Chembalengod Samootham Sathram	Paruthur Amsom Ponnani Taluk	Dharmadayam for feeding the Brahmins and imparting religious instructions to the students	16.49 wet land

ECONOMIC CONDITION

The various measures taken by Tipu Sultan for the economic prosperity of his country and well-being of his people are admitted even by his bitterest enemies. Sir Thomas Moore, on the basis of personal experience wrote, "when a person travelling through a strange country finds it well cultivated, populous with industrious inhabitants; cities newly founded, commerce extending, towns increasing and everything flourishing so as to indicate happiness, he will naturally conclude it to be under a form of Government congenial to the minds of the people. This is a picture of Tippoo's country and this is our conclusion respecting its Government"¹ Another observation worth quoting is of Sir John Shore who became Governor-General in India succeeding Lord Cornwallis. "The peasantry of his dominion", wrote he, "are protected and their labours encouraged and rewarded."² James Mill who had no reason to exonerate Tipu Sultan concluded that his kingdom was the best cultivated and its population the most flourishing in India."³ But Dodwell is of opinion that though the English found signs of prosperity within its domains, these were certainly due to no inspiration of his own.⁴ Yet he also agrees that there was all-round prosperity and progress in the domain of Tipu Sultan.

1. Moor's *Narrative etc.* p. 201

2. Sir John Shore: quoted by R. C. Mahjumdard and others in *The Advanced History of India*, p. 715

3. J. Mill and Wilson: *History of British India*, Vol. VI, p. 10

4. H. H. Dodwell: *Cambridge History of British India*, Vol. VI, p. 105

But historians of Kerala say that the country was absolutely destroyed, the gold and treasure accumulated from time immemorial were looted⁵ that the trade and commerce experienced a set back⁶ and that, in short the economy of the country was so impoverished that it took many years to repair the loss.⁷ Innes writing in the year 1908, accused: "Tipu did his best to ruin the trade of South Malabar by destroying the pepper vines."⁸ W. Logan⁹, and Buchanan¹⁰ held more or less the same opinion. But they do not go to the extent of our indigenous writers who blacken the period with incredible and even ridiculous scandals. These historians refuse even to recognise *fait accompli* of Mysorean rule as a historical fact. Whenever they are forced to refer to it, they begin with "when the Mysoreans were pillaging the country"¹¹ or at the time of Tipu's tyranny"¹² etc. Thus it has become an accepted and established opinion that during the Mysorean occupation of Kerala, the economic condition of the country was at its lowest ebb.

In this Chapter an attempt has been made to show that the prevalent opinion about the economic condition of the country under the Mysoreans is a distorted and fabricated one. As a matter of fact the period witnessed all-round prosperity and economic stability, industrial development and commercial growth. The peasantry with whom direct dealings were made, rose in social status by the change of the agrarian relations. The oppression of landlords and the rapaciousness of the Nair gentry were removed; the cultivators received encouragement and assistance from the State for the promotion of

5. K. M. Panikkar, Op, Cit. p. 530

6. Buchanan, Vol. II, p. 360

7. K. M. Panikkar, Op. Cit. p. 530

8. Innes, *Malabar Gazetteer*, Vol. I, p. 268

9. Logan: *Malabar Manual*, Vol. I, p. 486

10. Buchanan, Vol. II, p. 360

11. *History of Kerala*, p. 431

12. Logan, Op. cit, p. 610

agriculture In short, the peasants enjoyed plenty and happiness which were quite unprecedented in the history of Kerala. No doubt, the economic structure of the society was totally changed. Any change in the economic pattern will surely affect a section of the society adversely while others will get great benefits. Which of these weighs more is the question to be looked into.

We have discussed in detail the ownership of the property in Kerala and the relation of *Jenmis* with the *Kanam-dars*. We know, before the Mysorean occupation, land of any category was not taxed. Absolute enjoyment of the right of ownership of the property with all its social and economic implications, vested with a small section of the population. The bulk of the society was totally ignored. Only the privileged Namboodiri and Nair castes were counted practically for all purposes. The rest of the society was condemned as slaves and untouchables¹³ who had even

13. *Low Caste Hindus* — In this category comes a number of castes and sub-castes. Mukkuvans, a caste of fishermen, ranked below the Thiyyans. Next to them comes the artisan caste known as 'Kammalans'. They are divided into five sub-castes each with its appropriate craft, namely '*Thatans*' or gold smiths, '*Kollan*' or black-smith, '*Musaris*' or braziers, '*Asaris*' or carpenters and '*Chempottis*' or Coppersmiths. The '*Kaniyans*' or village astronomers, the '*Vannans*' or the washermen caste and the *Kavaras* or the basket makers are some other castes who are below the above caste. In the lowest cadre of the caste heirarchy lay the '*Cherumans*' '*Pulayas*' '*Panians*' and other aboriginal castes. Buchanan and others call them slaves. "The Cherumar, parayar and other low castes" write the joint Commissioners of Malabar in the year 1792, "are attached to the lands and were sold like slaves" (Fgn. Misc. - S. No. 55, p. 24, para 14.)

Since no other community except Brahmins and Nairs did get a tolerably good description of their ancient and medieval past no wonder these slave people found no place in the history of this part of the country. Their condition was deplorable. Buchanan appeals to the Company for ways and means to ameliorate them from their pitiable plight (Buchanan Vol. II, pp. 370-72). The rest of the society condemned them and exploited them cruelly.

'atmospheric pollution' and could not, therefore approach the caste Hindus beyond the limit prescribed for each caste like *Thiyyapad* and *Cherumapad*.¹⁴ In such a society where human beings were looked down upon, the Mysoreans began their revenue settlement with the cultivators directly. Even the bitter critics of Tipu Sultan admits that the tenants obtained a high social status owing to the land reforms of Mysore administrators. If this was the case, it would have been highly beneficial to the interests of the larger section of the community. But even in the changed circumstances, the writers do not change their feudal and caste prejudices. These are the reasons why the accusations still stand.

When the state demanded land tax and made a comprehensive survey of the lands which were hitherto unknown to the 'Land of Perumals' there was a hue and cry. We have seen that the burden of tax did not fall on the shoulders of the peasants and it was taken out of the *pattom* or rent paid to the *Jenmi*. But the *Jenmies* on whose share the land tax was imposed had to give away a part of it to the Government. Answering a question of the Joint Commissioners of Malabar, the Zamorin had to admit, "I know Tippoo's *Jumma* to be a just one all over the country and a burthen neither upon me nor upon the Districts."¹⁵ After the cession of Malabar to the English, they had collected 10 per cent more of the *Jema* (demand) in order to defray collection charges. "The Mysoreans never, however, included this 10 per cent", writes Logan, "in the permanent *Jama* as the Commissioners did."¹⁶ Further "they made the land revenue first imposed by Tipu Sultan, a permanent situation, every square inch of land being subjected to it."¹⁷ We know that under the Mysoreans,

14. 'Thiyyapad' means the limit a 'Thiyya' or Ezhava could approach a caste Hindu. The limit was 24 ft. for them. For 'Cheramapad' it was 64 ft. (C. Achutha Menon, *Cochin State Manual*, p. 495).

15. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 56, part II: p. 897, Question No. 3

16. Logan: Vol. I, pp. 644-45

17. E. M. S. Namboodiripad, *Op. Cit.* p. 100

the dry lands were exempted from taxation. The following observation of Buchanan will bring home the fact that the accusation that heavy burden of tax made the people flee from the country, is absurd and false. "The cultivation of the arable part of the highlands" writes Buchanan, "is by far the most neglected. Yet no land tax has been imposed on it, which in my opinion, clearly shows that the clamours raised against the land tax as injurious to cultivation are groundless."¹⁸ The only change effected was that the gentry lost the right to kill the peasantry at their pleasure or deprive them of all their belongings. Buchanan testifies to this fact in these words. "This confirms my opinion that it is owing to these disturbances chiefly and not to the taxes, that the plantation in many parts of Malabar are on the decrease."¹⁹ At the same time, instructions were issued to deal with all severity in such marauding depredations on the peasants by the jobless 'gentry' of Kerala. "It was therefore, necessary," writes Kirmani, "they (officers) should in future to the utmost of their ability prevent those pagans from doing any injury to the peasantry or poor inhabitants."²⁰ The conditions of the poorer section of the society before and after the Mysorean occupation, were never taken into account by any historian to make a comparative study of their economic position. If this is fairly done the clamour raised against the Mysorean system will surely die out. When Malabar was ceded to the English, the *Jenmis* were re-instated in their respective lands. "As for the Namboodiris and other ruling families" writes E. M. S. Namboodiripad "they were given back all the lands they once owned and what is more, were made full owners of these lands with no restrictions whatsoever in their relations with their tenants."²¹ The net result of the change is described by one of the English Collectors of Malabar thus: "The grant of freedom to a community thus

18. Buchanan; Vol, II, p. 380

19. Ibid, p. 359

20. Kirmani: Op. Cit. p. 459

21. E. M. S. Namboodiripad, Kerala etc. p. 208

organised meant a freedom for the strong to oppress the weak; freedom for the newly created proprietor to take an ever-increasing portion of the share of the net produce left over after paying the Government dues. What wonder, that the drones in the hive have prospered and grown fat or the working bees have become famished and lean.”²² But K.M. Panikkar with a sigh of relief remarks about this change; “it was only after the Malabar settlement of ‘The Commissioners’ and the introduction of the new agrarian relations that prosperity began to reign in Malabar.”²³ This spells out the sectarian outlook of the Historian and the reasons for his down-right condemnation of Mysorean administration. He goes on to say, “in the period that followed (the period when the caste Hindus were made *Jenmis* by the English), they (Nairs) regained in some measure their social importance.”²⁴ This social importance thus gained became a cause of misery and oppression to the poor peasants. “If a tenant failed to comply with the *Jenmi*’s demand”, writes Nagam Ayia, “he was promptly turned out of his holding. This led to serious discontentment among the agriculturists.”²⁵ It is a pity that these writers totally ignore the other sections of the society who had gained social status and economic prosperity under the Mysoreans and who under the changed conditions became sad victims of oppression from this feudal tyrants. One important point is that the *Jenmis* lost their right to deprive the peasants of their lives and properties during the Mysorean rule. People as a whole except this privileged class were happy and prosperous. But when the pattern was reversed by the English the table was turned against those who had benefited by the economic reforms. The feudal minority who gained importance gave fabricated stories of oppression and tyranny about the Mysorean rule because

22. Logan: p. 683

23. Panikkar K. M., Op. cit, p. 531

24. Ibid, p. 529

25. Nagam Ayia: Travancore State Manual, Vol. III, p. 161

they had suffered under the Mysoreans. Therefore, what they said and wrote were the clear expression of their ill-feeling towards the Mysorean administrators who brought about these drastic changes by which they felt aggrieved. Still no one can justify the statements of modern writers who can very well understand the benefit of the system.

Malabar was only one of the districts of Tipu's kingdom. It is admitted by all writers except the historians of Kerala that the well-being of the peasantry was the corner-stone of Tipu's agrarian policy not only in Malabar but throughout his kingdom. This was inherited as a glorious legacy from his father about whom Mirza Iqbal, the author of '*Ahwaly Hyder Naik*' speaks, "If any of his revenue agents extracted more money than stipulated, he would say, "if the amount contracted for with Government had been short, I should have exacted the deficiency and therefore if the farmer gets more I have no right to interfere between him and his good fortune."²⁶ Tipu's time was such that in addition to this, he gave all kinds of encouragements to the peasants. He gave away lands to the cultivators on attractive terms.²⁷ Rent-free concessions and other incentives were offered generously for the promotion of cultivation. Many acres of land were brought under the plough due to his persuasion and encouragement. In his letter to Cornwallis, A. Reid, the Collector of Baramahal District, made a representation to the effect that he might be allowed to adopt some of the reforms of Tipu as "they tended to the increase of cultivation and the good of the ryots and as they were drawn up by people of the greatest ability and experience in his kingdom."²⁸ J. Mill. observes that when the English advanced into the dominions of Tipu, they discovered such indications of good Government as altogether surprised them; a country highly cultivated, and abounding

26. Mirza Iqbal: *Ahwaly Hyder Naik (Miles)* p. 502

27. Mohibbul Hasan Khan, *Op. Cit.* p. 340

28. Baramahal Records, Vol, I (Management) pp. 8 and 22

in population; in short, a prosperity far surpassing that which any other part of India exhibited, not excepting the British dominions themselves.²⁹

Tipu undertook a number of irrigation works for the advancement of agriculture. "The existence of so many ancient works" (irrigation), writes H. H. Dodwell, "was recognised as a challenge inviting honourable emulation."³⁰ The tanks and wells caused to be dug by Tipu throughout his kingdom are outward manifestations of his zeal to foster cultivation. His tank at Bellary even now irrigate 1170 acres of land besides fetching an annual fishery income of Rs. 6000.³¹ An inscription spotted out in 1797 on a tank at Anandpur speaks that it was constructed by Tipu for the purpose of irrigation.³² There is an inscription at the entrance of Kannambadi Dam, eleven miles away from the modern Mysore City, showing that the foundation stone was laid by Tipu Sultan for the construction of a major dam. A number of wells were dug throughout Malabar. The wells of Feroke and Palghat are well-known. Since Malabar was an integral part of Mysore, all administrative reforms and economic measures undertaken in other parts of his kingdom also found their way to Malabar. When a fresh investigation of revenue and survey was ordered by Tipu in 1786, Malabar too experienced the second land survey in her history. This was done village by village and all the unauthorised *inam* lands were resumed by the State.³³ In Malabar also, all illegal possessions were confiscated and brought under the purview of taxation which created a commotion among the affected parties. Therefore, there is no reason to believe that Malabar did not experience economic development, when prosperity and progress were certified by all writers in other parts of his kingdom.

29. J. Mill: *History of British India*, Vol. V. p. 389

30. H. H. Dodwell; *Cambridge History of India*, Vol. V, p. 482

31. *Bellary District Gazetteer*: pp. 268-99

32. Robert Sewell: *Historical Inscriptions of Southern India*, p. 310

33. Baramahal Records, Section I, p. 153

In short, a minority who enjoyed unlimited authority before the advent of Haidar Ali was controlled and stripped of their rights which were found to be most dangerous to the rest of the community.

As regards trade and industry, we have seen that it was this prince alone in India who understood the trends of the European countries and strove hard to be on a par with the commercial countries of Europe. We have taken note of the various measures adopted by Tipu Sultan in this respect. He imposed trade monopoly on essential export commodities and collected tax in kind. These were taken for the advancement of trade and industry. But the impression created by the Kerala historians is that Tipu destroyed the trade and industry of the place by cutting down the pepper vines and imposing monopoly trade etc. as if he burnt down the gradens and fields.³⁴ Buchanan writes that about fifty years ago, the Mappillas of this place were very rich and possessed vessels that sailed to Surat, Mecca, Madras and Bengal and that the oppression of Tipu has reduced them to great poverty.³⁵ Buchanan visited the country in the year 1800. Malabar was under Tipu only for a period of eight years from 1782. It is clear then that the Mappillas lost their riches even before Malabar came under Tipu or for that matter under Haidar Ali himself, because Buchanan himself says that they were rich about fifty years ago.

The trade that existed in the Coast of Malabar, no doubt, was mostly carried on by the Muslim merchants. But with the advent of Europeans this monopoly over trade was lost and the Rajas began bargaining with the foreign traders. What actually the *Desavazhis* and *Naduvazhis* did was to give the trade monopoly to the foreign merchants in lieu of arms and ammunitions. The commodities

34 Jones: Op. cit. p. 268, K. M. Panikkar, Op. cit. p. 530

35. Buchannan, Vol. II, p. 420

enumerated and required by the foreign powers were collected from the cultivators by the Rajas at a low price and were delivered to the European merchants. In this they vied with each other. The country or cultivator never obtained any benefit from such transactions. In all treaties, pepper and spices found top rank and the provisions to supply monopoly articles at as low a rate as possible were inserted.³⁶ That the rates which Tipu paid were reasonable will be evident from the list of Galletti, regarding the price of pepper during the period from 1742 to 1793.³⁷ Buchanan writes, "in the year 1757, Travancore produced 11752 candies of pepper according to the calculation of Mr. Spencer. These were the Government monopoly. Government paid only Rs. 30 per candy to the cultivators."³⁸ By an agreement entered into between the Raja of Chirakkal and the Dutch in the year 1737, the Raja agreed to supply 1000 candies of pepper to the Dutch Company at a rate of Rs. 56.³⁹ In the year 1753, when the Treaty of Mavelikkara was signed by the Raja of Travancore with the Dutch, the former agreed to supply "a quantity of 15000000 lbs. of pepper at Rs 65, from his hereditary possession⁴⁰ and out of his conquests 2000 candies at Rs. 55.⁴¹ About this transaction, Moens suggested in the year 1781 to the Supreme Council at Batvia, "it is true that he had occasionally supplied something of those 2000 candies at Cranganore at Rs. 55 a candy ... it would be better (to prevent irregularity) to pay him Rs. 65 provided he supplies the full 3000 candies in the South and those 2000 candies nett in the North."⁴² After the war with the French, the English agreed in 1749 to make peace with them on the pledge of bringing down the price of pepper

36. M. R. O., *Tellicherry Cons.* pp. 60-61

37. D. R. No. 13, p. 24

38. Buchanan Vol. II, p. 457

39. Logan, *Op. cit.*, p. 367

40. Article IV of the Treaty: D. R. No. 13, p. 24

41. Article VI: Moens, pp. 112 and 214

42. Moens: *Administration of Malabar Coast*, p. 114

and other spices for the interests of both parties. "Accordingly the French and the English factors had meanwhile likewise combined and had succeeded in reducing the price of pepper to Rs. 50."⁴³ A number of such instances can be pointed out to establish that the monopoly price paid by all European traders was much lower than what Tipu imposed.⁴⁴ This brings out the fact that the monopoly price of Rs. 100 per candy given by Tipu was highly advantageous and beneficial to the interest of the cultivators in more than one respect. At the first instance they received Rs. 100 per candy as against the prevalent practice of the Rajas who paid only much lower price than the monopoly price of Rs 55 or Rs. 65. It is certain that when they had to supply pepper at the rate quoted above, the procurement price would be much less. As intermediaries between the cultivators and the European Companies the Rajas made lucrative business. It is true that this business that was carried on at the expense of vast hordes of poor cultivators was destroyed by the Mysoreans. If making the rich richer and the poor poorer is the yardstick to measure the economic development of a country, everyone has to agree that there was prosperity before the Mysorean occupation. On the other hand if paying the market value directly to the cultivator and removing the intermediaries and their exploitation are not compatible with affluence, there was economic depression under the Mysoreans. Buchanan who in no way favourably disposed to Tipu Sultan heard the brokers say that during the reign of Tipu, "they had a more extensive trade than at present."⁴⁵ He finally declares "the abolition laws (ie. monopoly price) in consequence of the overthrow of Tipu had evidently a great effect in reducing the price of pepper."⁴⁶ The monopoly price of Tipu

43. Day: *The Land of Perumals*, p. 133

44. C. R. E., Grandham No. 64 and 65 and also Logan's *Treaties* supply a number of examples. See *Tellicherry Cons.* Vols XI to XVII

45. Buchanan: Vol. II, p. 360

46. *Ibid*, p. 538

evidently was of a high rate and what is more the cultivators received the full amount to their commodities without its falling into the pockets of intermediaries. As a result of this, cultivation obtained a great impetus and the impoverished agriculturists began to experience for the first time economic happiness.

The elaborate roads that were projected and made by Tipu Sultan in Malabar have already been discussed at length. But it requires a little more elucidation as it will throw some more light on the economic condition of the country. Within a period of six years from 1784 to 1790, thousands of miles of roads were made throughout Malabar. We know it requires men, money and materials. No doubt Tipu would not impoverish the other parts of his kingdom for expending this large amount for the construction of roads in Malabar. Moreover, it was only a continuation of the work already undertaken throughout his kingdom. Therefore the money spent for this purpose might have come surely from the income of the country. It shows the advancement of trade and agriculture. Another point that would be reckoned with is the human labour utilised for the purpose of this major scheme. The labourers and peasants of Kerala were employed in large numbers. Thus perhaps for the first time in the history of Kerala, labourers on a massive scale were employed by the State for the public undertakings. As no one accuses Tipu of administering forced labour we can safely presume that the employed were paid for their labour which was again an unknown usage in the Kerala society, where the slaves and tenants were forced to undertake the work allotted to them. Buchanan gives an account of the ways in which the slaves were brought and forced to do the work required.⁴⁷ Barbosa describes graphically the condition of trade in Kerala in the 16th century. He testifies that each caste had its own profession and trade.⁴⁸ William Theckray

47. Buchanan, Vol. II, p. 370

48. Barbosa, *A Description of etc.* pp. 124-28

in his *Report* mentions six species of Cherumans or slaves who were bought and sold as slaves in Malabar.⁴⁹ In such a traditional society organised labour was perhaps first introduced by Tipu in this major work of magnitude that required thousands of labourers. Again, an inevitable outcome of the facilities of travel was the prosperity of trade and thereby economic development. To say to the contrary that the trade and commerce were destroyed in Malabar will be a strange logic.

Writers on Kerala history say that the gold and silver which Kerala had acquired as a result of centuries' trade contacts with the west practically disappeared from the land and that the country was impoverished.⁴⁹ It is really strange that these writers go to the extent of propagating the most incredible stories that carry not even an iota of truth in them. We know that Haidar Ali built the strongest fort in Kerala at Palghat and garrisoned it with his army. It served as one of the nerve centres of communication. Around this fort, a large town developed with flourishing merchants and industrious inhabitants. The importance of the town of Palghat with its "neatest and cleanest villages", was testified to by Buchanan in his 'journey'.⁵¹ This prospering state of Palghat was no doubt due to the Mysorean fort and their activities. In the *Malabar Gazetteer*, C. A. Innes, one of the bitterest critics of Tipu Sultan, has to admit "the Rajas (of Palghat) played little part in the history of Malabar till the middle of the 18th century, when the continued aggressions of the Zamorin drove them... to seek the aid of Haidar Ali, then Faujdar of Dindigal in 1756."⁵² When it was 1801, the town became one of the most important centres of trade with innumerable shops and industries as was attested to by

49. *Report on the Revenue Affairs in Malabar and Canara*, p. 2

50. K. M. Panikkar, *Op. Cit.* p. 532

51. Buchanan, Vol. II, p. pp. 368-69

52. C. A. Innes, *Malabar Gazetteer*, Vol. I, p. 469

Buchanan. No doubt, it was due to the Mysorean efforts that the place became so changed in the year 1801 since 1756 as to cause the admiration of Buchanan and others.

Another important town created by Tipu sultan was at Feroke intended to be his Malabar capital. Feroke, eight miles south of Calicut was never referred to by any writer nor did it play any part in politics till it was cleared of jungles and forests and made accessible for human habitation. Around the capital there arose a prosperous town with many industries and factories that remained thereafter as one of the important industrial towns of Kerala. The benefit that would accrue from the institution of a capital city in the economic life of the people can best be judged. Again, we know that a number of warehouses were established at important centres like Palghat, Mangara, Manjeri, Malappuram, Ponnani, Feroke, Calicut, Quilandy, Badagara, Mahe, Cannanore and Sultan's Battery, where the commodities were received.⁵³ In all these places, huzur cutcheries with sufficient staff were instituted. Around these, trade centres, markets and populous villages and flourishing towns sprang up. These were facilitated with roads that assured safety of travel and security of trade. The name 'Sultan's Battery' to the place used even today is an eloquent evidence of the emergence of the place as an important town under Tipu Sulan. Therefore any unbiased observer can see that the important towns of Malabar received great fillip from the Mysoreans in addition to the creation of such towns and trade centres as adverted to above.

K. M. Panikkar and others say that the ports of Kerala lost their importance and the ship-building industry of Malabar was destroyed. This is also not correct. Calicut, Cannanore and Mangalore became more active in their trade and maritime commerce. In all these places, large godowns and store houses were built by Tipu. All the imports and

53. Buchanan, Vol. II, p. 515

exports of Mysore had gone through these places. Any person who looks into the map of Tipu's kingdom can easily trace the fact that if Tipu did carry out his extensive commerce with foreign countries that would only have been done through these ports as the Mysore kingdom of Tipu had only a few other outlets to the sea that were not as important as Mangalore or Calicut. It was this large-scale trade that Crippled the business of Tellicherry factors, the complaints of which were made by the Chief to the Governor of Bombay in his letter dated August 26, 1789.⁵⁴ A number of letters that were quoted in the preceding topics show how much importance was given to Calicut and Mangalore and how far these served as Tipu's great centres of import and export trade. Again, we understand from his commercial regulations and other letters addressed to his *Deroghs* of foreign factories that Tipu wanted to develop Mangalore as a first-rate ship-building centre.⁵⁵ For the purpose of this ship-yard, he sought to bring down ship-wrights from Muscat and Jeddah. The monopoly on teakwood was imposed for the use of shipbuilding. Tipu directed his officers "the wood, iron, rope and other articles which may be required in the construction of the ships ordered to be built are to be bought from the countries adjacent to the docks and the workmen of every description (employed in the service) must be paid with the utmost regularity and the ships be completed with all possible despatch."⁵⁶

Kallai, only three miles South of Calicut, which has become the second important centre in the world for timber trade was the creation of Tipu Sultan. No one can deny the fact that the place retains even now the second rank in the timber market of the world.

Another equally strange and illogical statement is that the gold that was accumulated for centuries by foreign trade

54. Fgn. Dept, Sec. and Pol. Pro. S. No. 96, pp. 1849-56

55. For details, see the topic under *Trade and Industries*

56. Kirk Patrick: Appendix E, xxxvii

disappeared from this country. With the advent of Portuguese in the closing years of the 16th century, the monopoly of trade slipped away from the hands of Arabs and Muslims into the hands of foreign merchants. The economic condition of the Malabar Coast at the close of the Portuguese period is summed up by K. M. Panikkar himself in these words: "the direct commercial contact between India and European countries was shattered with their activities. In its stead, the trade monopoly of European Companies on Indian trade was imposed. It helped only to squeeze out of the treasure of India for the good of European countries."⁵⁷ The period that followed witnessed the feudal chieftains and petty princes of Kerala vying with each other to obtain the support of these foreign traders to fight against their own brother-rulers by conferring upon them the most attractive terms of trade monopoly in lieu of arms and ammunitions, not for gold or silver as has been made out by K. M. Panikkar and others. "A candy of pepper for every musket you let me have" was the demand made by Marthanda Varma to the Anjengo factors in 1744.⁵⁸ By the middle of the 18th century all the rulers of Kerala found themselves in pecuniary difficulties especially the Zamorin of Calicut, the most powerful Raja of Malabar. Attempts were made in the preceding Chapters to show how bankrupt was the Zamorin who sought shelter in committing suicide when he was compelled to fulfil his promise of paying war indemnity cash down. Many such instances of his pauperism were brought out by Moens, the then Dutch Governor in his '*Memorandum on the administration of the Malabar Coast*' and Gallette in his introduction to the *Malabar and the Dutch*.⁵⁹ No contemporary observer, not even the hostile English historians say that either Haidar Ali or Tipu Sultan returned to

57. K. M. Panikkar, Op. Cit., p. 244

58. Anjengo Manuscript Diary of 1754- M. R. O.

59. Moens: *Memorandum etc.* p. 133 and Gallette, p. 21

Mysore laden with treasures of gold and silver plundered or obtained from Malabar.

At the same time by the commercial activities and agrarian reforms, the economic conditions of the country and her people experienced a great progress. Writing about the economic condition of Malabar at the close of the 18th century K. M. Panikkar who wrote about the ruin of trade and towns, contradicts himself unconsciously thus, "Eighteenth century was a period in Kerala that scored conspicuous and definite improvement in many aspects of life. The trade and commerce of the country prospered very much and established a desirable status in Kerala in the 18th century."⁶⁰ In fact, this gives out the real state of affairs. The country as a whole benefitted under the Mysoreans. There was all round happiness and plenty in the country. The peasants and cultivators enjoyed unprecedented economic stability and security of life and property. The scope of employment enlarged. The system of paid labour registered a great impetus in the status of poorer classes in the society. The procurement of monopoly articles directly from the cultivators paying cash down improved their economy. In all transactions a certainty and definiteness were experienced by the people. The extensive trade activities and institution of markets and warehouses again helped economic advancement. These helped the growth of many towns and cities. In short, the Mysorean rule of Kerala was the most important period of her economic development and commercial activities.

60. K. M. Panikkar, *op. cit.*, p. 414

EFFECTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF TIPU'S REFORMS

The importance of the revolutionary reforms of Tipu Sultan and their impact on the life of the people can be appreciated only if we recall the medieval features of Kerala society. The great significance of the Mysorean occupation of Kerala for more than 25 years, lies in the fact that it marked an era of transition from the Medieval to the Modern. All the medieval institutions with their peculiar characteristics received a rude shock with the coming of the Mysoreans and were soon toppled down. Thus the medieval feudal system of Malabar by which the country was parcelled out into petty but sovereign principalities which through mutual jealousies and wars kept the country in a constant state of anarchy came to an end with the Mysorean occupation. "The whole of Malabar", writes Prof. P.K.K. Menon, "came to be organised under one political control, land revenue administration was thoroughly overhauled and modernised, a new variety of coinage appeared and the system of communications registered an improvement."¹ This was not all. The far deeper consequences are summed up by K. M. Panikkar who speaks about the effects of Mysorean rule on the society of Kerala in these words, "the social set up that existed from time immemorial² was destroyed by the Mysorean rule. From its ruins, sprang up

1. Prof. P. K. K. Menon: *Kerala and East India Company* (Article) *History on the March*, p. 222

2. See Appedix xi – Social Conditions.

a new middle class society.”³ Every aspect of the traditional life of Kerala underwent a radical change. Hence to say that this period marked the end of medievalism and opened an era of modern and progressive ideas is by no means an exaggeration.

But it had its own consequences of far reaching importance. The Namboodiris and Nairs who were deprived of their undue privileges felt aggrieved by the measures introduced by the Mysore rulers. When the revenue settlement was made Namboodiri *Jenmis* declined to attend the *Cutchery*. To do so they believed, was a degradation of their caste supremacy and would lower them in the esteem of other castes. Therefore, they sold the lands to the Mappillas and others, and left the country for Travancore. The Nairs who were attached to the *Naduvazhis* and *Desavazhis* as professional soldiers and who formed a large section of the population became unemployed when they were no longer required by their masters who had lost their political authority. Their income from the land as intermediaries between the *Jenmis* and cultivators was also lost with the revenue settlement which was made directly with the cultivators. Still greater was the shock sustained by them when they were asked to give up their age-old custom of polyandry and the practice of exposing the upper part of the body by the Nair women. The introduction of prohibition of intoxicants throughout the country was yet another unwelcome measure for the Nairs. As a result, “it was the Nairs”, concludes K. M. Panikkar, “who had suffered most. The state of society in which they were the executive arm and of which they were the centre, disappeared when Haidar Ali entered Kerala. Though in the period that followed (the Mysoreans) they regained in some measure their social importance, the great authority which was vested in them as a community responsible both for Government and for defence, ceased

3. K. M. Panikkar: Op. Cit., p. 415

with the Mysorean conquest.”⁴ No doubt, the Nairs fell in social and political importance. But the fall was an imminent historical necessity. The great authority they exercised prior to Mysorean occupation is graphically described by Buchanan in his *Travels*. He says “they are born soldiers⁵..... therefore had contempt for all other professions. Everyone carries with him a firelock and a sword. But those who are recognised as more courageous will bear a pair of swords. Since all of them go about with unsheathed naked swords, assassinations and murders are a common affair.”⁶ He continues to say that they were very much addicted to intoxicants.⁷ “When they go anywhere”, writes Barbosa in his *Description of the Coasts of South Africa and Malabar*, “they shout to the peasants that they may get out of the way where they have to pass and the peasants do so and if they do not do so, the Nairs might kill them without penalty.”⁸ We have seen that all the castes except the Namboodiris and Nairs carried with them even atmospheric pollution. “If a Nair apprehended of his body being polluted”, observes Buchanan, “by an Ezhava⁹ or Mukkuva, he must cut him down instantaneously as a matter

4. K. M. Panikkar: Op. Cit., p. 416

5. Buchanan, Vol. I, p. 366

6. Ibid, p. 389

7. Ibid, p. 411

8. Barbosa: *Description etc.*, p. 124

9. The Thiyyas or Ezhavas are numerically the largest single caste among the Hindu community today. According to the Census report of 1961, their population has been estimated to be over 35,83,000 which is 21.2% of the total population of the State and more than 38% of the Hindus taken as a whole. (*Kumara Pillai Report 1965*, p. 47). Till some thirty or forty years ago, this caste was totally barred from all social gatherings and was denied entry into the suburbs of temples and towns. (See *Cochin Tribes and Castes*, pp. 339-40, Nagam Aiyar, Vol. II, p. 414). Buchanan found them industrious labourers and today-tappers in the year 1800. (Buchanan, Vol. II, pp. 415-18). But as they were a polluting caste this community was strictly excluded from the political or religious affairs. They follow Makkathayam in

of right.”¹⁰ This unscrupulous and wanton suppression of the poorer section of the society was checked effectively by the Mysorean officers. The result was that the Nairs sank in social and political importance and the commoners gained status and recognition in the body politic of the country.

Naturally the affected parties could not reconcile themselves to these changes that had taken away their traditional rights. They, therefore, turned rebels and began “occasional depredations on the country.”¹¹ This turned out to be disastrous for cultivation in many parts of Malabar. When it was harvest time or when the pepper was ripe, the Nair rebels who were hidden in jungles and forests would surprise the poor peasants and pounce on the fruits of their labour. Though this was checked by the Mysoreans, the physical features of the country were favourable for the rebels to carry on such pillaging and ravaging at frequent intervals. When the political integration was first effected by Haidar Ali, we have seen that an organised rebellion of Nair nobles took place in the year 1766 which resulted in their complete rout. After this major revolt intended to bring back the old order, another serious threat was made in 1788-89 when the second land survey was effectively conducted and a number of illegal possessions were confiscated. In this outbreak, the Mappilla Chief like the Kurukkal of Manjeri also took part. Apart from these rebellions, no serious risings occurred during the period under review as an immediate consequence of the revolutionary reforms of Tipu Sultan.

the South and Marumakkathayam in the North. Their condition was comparatively better than that of the low castes.

Mukkuvas are fishmen caste. They inhabit in the coastal areas. They were below the Ezhavas in caste hierarchy. They lived in small huts which were not more than three feet in height. They had atmospheric pollution.

10. Buchanan: Vol. II. p. 410

11. P. R. R. No. 37A, p. 37

But as a result of the loss of power and profession, the Nair soldiers always allied themselves with the English Company. The English, in their turn, abetting rebellions of the discontented Nairs, created a perpetual problem of law and order in the country. As it is the duty of any civilised government to check lawlessness, the Mysoreans also kept a strict watch over the rebels and criminals who dared to defy the established system of Government. This led the rebels to seek protection under the English Factors of Tellicherry, and with their aid and connivance, they laid the country waste. When there were wars between Mysore and the Company, the Nair rebels helped the English with enthusiasm. Hence it may be asserted that one of the most serious consequences of the Mysore rulers' reforms was that the Nairs who were the soldier class of Kerala, were driven into the camps of the English Company.

Another far-reaching consequence was that the long-standing enmity between the Nair and Mappilla communities became more and more serious. The Mappillas as loyal subjects regained under the Mysoreans their lost freedom whereas the Nairs as rebels lost their ancient rights. This reversal was viewed as religious persecution by the Nair Community who later took revenge on the Mappillas when they (the Nairs) were re-equipped with authority under the English. "An extreme degree of rancour and enmity"¹² that had already existed between the Nairs and the Mappillas was aggravated when "they suffered the delegation of our (English) authority to their ancient enemies, the Nairs."¹³ When the English re-instated the landlords in their ancient possessions, "which for years past had been in undisturbed possession of Mappilla cultivators it widened the breadth still further."¹⁴ The revival of the suppression

12. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 56, Part II, p. 763

13. Ibid, p. 845

14. Innes: *Malabar Gazetteer*, Vol. I, p. 73

by the landlords of the poor Mappilla peasants sowed widespread discontentment amongst them. They began to organise themselves in armed gangs to protect their property and person from the Rajas and *Jenmis*. The plight of the Mappilla peasants who were exorbitantly exacted during the period following the cession of Malabar was sufficiently brought out by 'The Joint Commissioners' in 1793. One of the members of the Commission made it clear in the Committee that the Zamorin and his agents were collecting a number of unauthorised taxes employing even the English force to realise the amount.¹⁵ He goes on to say, "I could not therefore help asking (to the Mappillas he interviewed at Malappuram) why they could not pay to the Company the same rent they paid to Tipu. They said they could very well pay and very willingly, if nothing else also was demanded."¹⁶ Again a number of letters between the Commissioners and the Zamorin were exchanged relating to the collection of death tax which was termed as *Purushanteram*. "The demand of the Zamorin to take *Purushanteram*" (a share of the property of the deceased), observed the Joint Commissioners "is made a great instrument of oppression and particularly against the Mappillas, the pretence being taken not only of recent deaths but of the deaths of the relations even in the time of Tippoo Sultan."¹⁷ Accordingly they required the Zamorin to stop the collection of *Purushanteram*.¹⁸ But the Zamorin in his letters to the Commissioners, asserted "the levy of *Purushanteram* is an ancient custom"¹⁹ and "according to ancient usages I may receive the *Purushanteram* and fines from the inhabitants without it being considered a hardship."²⁰ The Commissioners again wrote to the Zamorin, "this is generally included in our prohibitions

15. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 56, Part II, p. 845

16. Ibid, p. 868

17. Ibid, p. 824

18. Ibid, Voucher No. 34, p. 831

19. Ibid, Ibid, p. 836

20. Ibid, Voucher No. 35, p. 837

as a demand founded in the ancient rights of the Rajas.”²¹ The Second Malabar Commissioners re-iterated in their *Report* that this tax was extracted only from the Mappillas and therefore was a religious tax.²²

But the English finally had to ignore the grievances of the Mappilla peasants and “set themselves to the task of making such adjustments in the State system as would satisfy the former rulers.”²³ This precipitated Mappilla rebellions in many parts of the country from the year 1792 onwards. In the same year “the Zamorin’s Nairs”, write the Joint Commissioners, “had already come into collision three times with the Moppillas of Ernad.....The assessment of the Rajas were unequal and Mappillas were rated more highly than Hindus. The general discontent deepened and in South Malabar, the military had to be employed”²⁴ against them. As ardent supporters of the Mysorean rule, they were suspected and condemned by the English from the very inception of their administration. The local Rajas and landlords who gained social and political importance as loyal supporters of the British Raj added insult to injury as far as the Mappilla peasants were concerned. They were thus harassed on all sides. But all these repressive measures only aggravated the situation. Ominous clouds of discontentment gathered and thickened fast in the horizon and threatened to topple the English regime in Malabar many a time. Serious rebellions continued intermittently throughout the 19th century and thousands of Mappillas laid down their lives fighting against the English. These outbreaks culminated in the final trial of strength in 1921-22 between the English and the Mappillas which is known in history as ‘Mappilla Rebellion of 1921’. This continuous struggle and uncompromising hostility towards the English deprived them of all new

21. Ibid, Voucher No 36 p. 843

22. Second Malabar Commissioners’ Report, Para 76

23. E. M. S, Namboodiripad: Op. Cit., p. 78

24. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 55, pp. 251-62, Para 290

vistas of life. They kept out of the schools and colleges established by the English and boycotted their military and civil services. As a result of this prolonged and protracted resistance against an established government for nearly a century and a half, the community fell into the abyss of misery and illiteracy from which they have not yet fully emerged. Undoubtedly this was a far-reaching consequence of Mysorean occupation of Kerala.

FAILURES OF HAIDAR ALI AND TIPU SULTAN

With the death of Aurengzeab, the Grand Mughals shrank into a provincial power and during the period under discussion they became only nominal title-holders of the 'Emperor of India'. When the central authority ceased to be supreme, the Mughal provinces one after another declared their independence under their ambitious viceroys. Thus Nizam-ul-Mulk who was the Governor of Deccan assumed the title of Nizam and established a dynasty of his own. The Marattas who tried to fill up the vacuum created by the decline of later Mughals, retreated with the defeat they suffered in the heroic battle of Panipat. Apart from these Indian powers, the French and the English were emerging as decisive factors in Indian politics.

The country was parcelled out into small kingdoms which began warring against each other in keeping with the hated legacy of Indian rulers. The European merchants who had novel weapons, disciplined and trained troops entered into this internecine conflicts siding one party or another. When a prince found his salvation in the support of the English, his opponent felt it unavoidable to bag the assistance of the French to maintain balance of power and thus ensure his success. Whether such wars were decisive or not, the European traders received the promised amount of land and money. People were quite prepared to join the European armies because of the confidence that they would obtain more booty. Plunder and loot were the main attractions that lured men to the army. Suppose a country was attacked and the

enemies repelled, both the victorious and the vanquished armies would vie with each other to pillage and plunder the same place. In this respect, no scruple was strong enough to check such an action. Therefore, people preferred to join that army which had greater chances of success and greater prospect of plunder. Any adventurous person having sufficient money could raise a force, and if he could succeed in humouring them with plunder and conquests, the strength of his military force would grow suddenly like a swollen river. On the other hand whatever might be the numerical strength of the force, it would fade away easily like the dew under the sun, if the leader met defeat in the first instance of an engagement. The creation and maintenance of an army by Haidar Ali should be viewed in this background of the then prevalent military set up in India. But his greatness lies in the fact that he could instill into his men confidence in the success of his arms by modelling them on the European fashion. When the Marattas, the Nizam and the Rajas of Kerala depended mostly on their traditional warfare, it was Mysore under Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan that changed for good and achieved great distinction. They were inspired by the European examples of scientific and industrial developments and tried to employ those novel devices in combination with Indian genius. It was this identity of purpose, aim and organisation of Mysore under Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan which created the irremediable enmity of the English towards these sovereigns. That the English felt alarmed at the growth of Mysore alone, was due to these salient features of their administrative set up and military organisation. The European supremacy in the quality of arms and ammunition, intrepidity and strategy of war and above all their lucrative trade and commerce were surpassed by the Mysore rulers who competed with them in all these aspects on an equal footing. Therefore, in the historic process of filling the political vacuum, it was an unavoidable necessity that they should either destroy that power or be destroyed by it. No compromise was possible in this respect nor would it have been natural.

Some blame Tipu Sultan for fighting against the English knowing well his incompatibility. Others consider him a poor victim of the expansionist and aggressive policy of Wellesley. Still others bestow on him the crown of martyrdom as one who stood to the last extremity by his avowed hatred of the English. Thus many scholars assign different causes to the fall of Tipu Sultan. A clear understanding of the entire story of the rise and fall of the Mysorean power will make us hesitate to pronounce Tipu guilty of bringing about that fall. If the fall of Tipu Sultan was precipitated by the hatred he had against the English, this torch of hatred was handed over to him by Haidar Ali. If the fall was due to the highly centralised despotism of a kind in which the whole fulcrum of the Government centred round the personality of a single person, the same was also constituted by Haidar Ali. If the so-called 'unprovoked attack', on Travancore lines was the cause for the beginning of the downfall of Tipu Sultan, the enmity between Mysore and Travancore was also bequeathed to him as a legacy. Therefore, it is not correct to separate Tipu's policy from that of his father. An attempt has been consciously made by the English Historians to extol Haidar Ali in all his deeds and villify his son in all his policies. This was done by Wilks, Bouring, Kirk Patrick and Beatson and they simply added more weight to their vituperations against Tipu Sultan. Thus they would claim "Haidar was seldom wrong and Tipu seldom right"¹ and that this was the cause for their attack. We have seen that in formulating the policies of his Government, in regulating the efficiency of administration and organising his army on European model, the pattern set up by Haidar Ali was scrupulously followed by Tipu Sultan. The fundamental principles of Haidar Ali's Government did not change under Tipu. Nor did he create any new problem that might threaten the existence of his Government. Therefore, if Tipu was wrong it was not his fault but that of his

I. Wilks: *Historical Sketches etc.*, Vol. II, p. 464

father from whom he had inherited a kingdom with all its assets and liabilities. But historians say that Haidar was seldom wrong. Then it should follow that Tipu who pursued the same policy as his father in matters of State and relations with Indian and foreign powers, was, also seldom wrong.

But in habits and tastes that were purely personal, Tipu differed very much from his father. Haidar like all other oriental monarchs of his time, was addicted to drink, enamoured of feminine beauty, and was heir to all human frailties.² But among the crowned heads that fill the columns of history, Tipu distinguished himself by his strictly moral way of life. He was free from all blemishes. His ethics of life was enriched by his learning and scholarship. His humane nature was further softened by the Sufistic philosophy to which he was favourably inclined. While Haidar Ali was an illiterate with no learning like Alaud-din-Khalji, Tipu was a scholar among scholars like Mohamed-Bin-Tughlak. No one can say that because of these qualities, 'Tipu was seldom right.'

But the important failure of Tipu Sultan lies in some other aspects of his dominant character. Thomas Munroe who summed up his career in the year 1799 said, a "restless spirit of innovation and a wish to have everything to originate from himself, was the predominant feature of his character."³ To a certain extent his innovations and reforms caused inconvenience and confusion to his officers who were not so learned and resourceful as their master. They could not fully understand the significance of his orders. The frequent changes of administrative units⁴, introduction of a new

2. M. M. D. L. L. T.: *History of Hyder Shah* etc., p. 267. Kirmani *Nishan-i-Hydari*, p. 489

3. Glieg: *Life of Mundro*, Vol. I, p. 232 quoted by H. H. Dodwell in *the Cambridge History of India*, Vol. V., p. 302

4. Kirmani: *History of Tipu Sultan*, (Miles), p. 66

calendar⁵, a variety of new coins and weights and measures⁶, might have created some degree of confusion at their inception. But we understand that these reforms did not cause any stagnation in the smooth running of administration. It is true that Tipu like all other oriental monarchs, was also a despot. Centralisation, not fragmentation of power, was the necessity of the time. Tipu's Government presents a very good example of an absolute monarch from whom even the minutest details of administration originated. In his letters we find Tipu instructing even his petty officers of things that are expected to be done by them. Sometimes he assumes the role of a physician prescribing medicines and pronouncing the causes for the diseases.⁷ A variety of letters dealing with innumerable subjects have come down to us amply illustrating his versatility and genius in different sciences and branches of knowledge. But it has its own defects also. As the practice was for Tipu to give his directions on all matters, the officers would always hesitate to take a decision on their own eventhough they could very well use their discretionary powers. This over centralisation of authority was one of the weaknesses of Tipu's empire.

Another dominant trait in him was his consistency and candour. His attachment towards his parents, friends, officers and children touches a high degree of sentimentalism. He was sincere in his dealings with others whether personal or public matters. These qualities which are certainly admirable in an individual were fatal to a ruler of the 18th century. Unmindful of evil consequences, Tipu followed these exemplary qualities throughout his life. In a world where deceit and treachery were commonly practised in personal and public life, where conspiracies intrigues, murders and assassinations tended to better possessions

5. Ibid, p. 133

6. Ibid., p. 136

7. Kirk Patrick: *Select letters of Tipoo Sultan*: Letter Nos. XXXVIII p. 53; CXV, p. 146; CCLXXXV, pp. 310-11

and prosperity and where the Machivellian perfidy was literally applied to achieve political goals, sincerity in diplomatic relations and frankness in politics were detrimental to one's own interest. Herein lies the most important cause of the failure of Tipu Sultan. When he knew that the Chief of Tellicherry was conspiring against him, abetting lawlessness among his subjects and that what he had written to him on that account was a fraud and a lie, Tipu admonished him saying, "you are not a good man" and ordered him not to write to him thereafter.⁸ He expected from others the same sincere disposition which he observed strictly in his dealings. Again, we have seen how he believed to be genuine, the favourable line of action said to have been taken by the Governor of Madras and Governor-General relating to the dispute between him and the Raja of Travancore which precipitated his movements towards the Travancore Lines and how great was his surprise when he knew of the declaration of war by the English on this issue. On the eve of the last war with the English, Tipu refused to surrender the Frenchmen and other Europeans in his kingdom though General Harris in his ultimatum to Tipu Sultan with preliminaries of a draft treaty demanded of him "to send them forthwith to the English camp."⁹ It is reported that when M. Chapiers offered himself to be delivered to the English, the sense of self-respect, honour and consistency of his character prevented him from stooping to such a shameful level.¹⁰

Another important failure of the Mysore rulers was that they did not make use of the hereditary Mappilla Navigators of Malabar to defend the Coast from the Europeans. With better equipments, provisions and leadership, the *Marikkars* of Malabar (as they were called) would

8. P. R. C., No. 37A, p. 37

9. Krik Patrick: Appendix No. XXI General Harris to Tipu Sultan, Preliminaries of a draft Treaty Articles 2 and 3. Also Kirmani: Op. Cit., pp. 120-21

10. Kirmani: Op. Cit., pp. 124-45

have been a great asset to the Mysore rulers in safeguarding the Coast against the European navy. It is a well-known fact that it was these *Marikkars* of Malabar that defended the Coast from the Portuguese by waging a number of famous naval wars with them under the colours of the Zamorin for more than a century.¹¹ From Gujarat to Ceylon, their naval supremacy was unchallenged till the Portuguese gained strength in the latter half of the 16th century.¹² This veritable source of naval power was not tapped either by Haidar Ali or by Tipu Sultan. It is true that Haidar Ali created a navy under the Aly Raja of Cannanore but it did not play any major role except to escort the cargo vessels. Tipu seriously turned his attention to the formation of an efficient navy only after Malabar was lost to him. It was this failure of Tipu that helped the English to overrun Malabar without much opposition as we have witnessed in the Second and Third Mysore Wars. If there was a strong navy under the farfamed *Marikkars* of Malabar, the English would have found it an almost impossible task to dislodge the Mysoreans from Kerala. The Mysoreans also failed to make the conquered people believe that more benefit would accrue if they showed willing obedience to their rule.

‘The evil that men do live after them
The good is oft interred with their bones’

It is quite easy to sit in judgement over the dead and make much of their failures. But posterity’s judgement on a particular event can seldom be fair as condition that necessitated the event will be altered considerably after the lapse of centuries. It is said of Tipu Sultan that people often heard him say, “that in the world he would rather live two days like a tiger than two hundred years like a

11. See ‘The Marikkars’ – *the Admirals of Calicut*, by Prof. O. K. Nambiar.

12. K. M. Panikkar: *Op. Cit.*, p. 59

sheep",¹³ and he was entirely true to his words. If these are failures, no doubt Tipu failed. But the fact remains that the great failures in the annals of history more often bequeath to posterity lessons of eternal value than do many brilliant victories.

13. Beatson: *Origin and Conduct of War with Tipu Sultan*, p. 217

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MYSOREAN PERIOD IN THE HISTORY OF INDIA

The history of India of the 18th century can be divided into two parts — the first beginning with the death of Aurengzeab in the year 1707 and extending to the ascendancy of Haidar Ali in the year 1761; and the second extending from this date to the death of Tipu Sultan in 1799. The death of Aurengzeab was the signal of the downfall of the Grand Mughals. The period from 1707 to 1761 was a period of turmoil and confusion in the history of India. It witnessed a number of native and foreign powers fighting against one another to establish their supremacy in India. The Sikhs, the Marattas, the Nizam, the French, the Dutch and the English emerged as independent sovereigns. They held sway in their respective territories which were carved out from the ruins of the Grand Monarchy of India. But no power whether Indian or foreign proved competent enough to fill the political vacuum created by the later Mughals. The Third Paniput war finally broke the Maratta ascendancy and with it the hope of an Indian power gaining supremacy over the whole of India, was lost. The foreign powers — the Dutch, the French and the English — exercised equal influence and commanded more or less the same strength in their political and commercial activities. The grand Monarchy under the Mughals had continued for an unusually long stretch of time and so when it fell, the fall was irreparable. The country became a sea of intrigues and conspiracy. No power could gain an upper hand in Indian Politics. Thus in the first part of the 18th century a number of powers equal in strength emerged on the political map of India.

When we turn to the second part of the 18th century the political horizon of India becomes clear and definite. It was in 1761 that Haidar Ali became the ruler of Mysore. He and his son Tipu Sultan unquestionably established their superiority over their Indian contemporaries. They proved beyond doubt that if there was to be a trial of strength between themselves and other Indian and foreign powers severally they would have quite easily regained the lost political unity of India. The history of India regains importance from this time onwards, for it was the only power that could dream of integrating India once more under a National Monarchy. The period from 1761 onwards was thus a period when an attempt was made for the revival of the glory that was India. The modern outlook of the Mysorean rulers and their eagerness to industrialise the country and introduce revolutionary reforms in the feudal and traditional society, lead us to the legitimate assumption that if the rulers of Mysore could triumph over the English, they would have modernised the country far better than the English had done. A serious study of the political, social and economic reforms innovated by them shows that radical changes would have been felt by the Indian society if the Mysore power were destined to predominate Indian politics.

But the course of Indian history took an unfortunate turn when the English emerged as the most decisive force among the European powers contending for supremacy in India. It was a strange coincidence that the year 1761 in which Haidar Ali became the virtual ruler of Mysore, witnessed the establishment of the English as the foremost power among the Europeans in India. The fall of Pondicherry in January 1761 and Haidar's success in May of the same year put a period to the war in the south making both the English and Haidar Ali major powers.¹ Thus the Anglo-French contest for supremacy in India ended in the victory of the

1. B. Sheik Ali — *British relations with Haidar Ali, 1760-82*, p. 31

English, a victory that carried great political significance and determined the subsequent history of India. It was in the same year that the Marattas retreated after their defeat from the last battle of Paniput. The significance of the year 1761 does not end there. It was important in yet another way, for, in this year, Rama Varma the Raja of Travancore became the most important power among the rulers of Kerala. The Raja of Cochin and the Zamorin of Kozhikode who were in constant enmity with each other accepted the Raja of Travancore as the arbitrator of future disputes between them. The close friendship and alliance of the Raja of Travancore with the English East India Company made the latter a formidable force in Kerala. Thus the political uncertainty of India was removed from 1761 onwards with the emergence of two important powers, the Mysore and the English — one Indian and the other foreign.

Another important feature of this period is that the centre of interest was shifted from the North to the South of India. The Marattas, the Nizam and the European powers all concentrated their activities in the places South of Vindhya and Satpura mountains. The contest of the European powers for trade monopoly and commercial supremacy in the Western and the Eastern coasts of South India presents an interesting study of powers coming into the scene with new techniques and devices so far unknown to Indian politics. The traditional form of warfare, the system of degenerated feudal tenure and the outmoded customs and usages of the country felt a rude shock at the modern and novel systems of European traders. But none of the Indian rulers was prepared to change the age-long practices either in administration or military, taking advantage of European contacts. Thus the first part of 18th century showed not only political uncertainty as there were a number of powers of equal strength warring with each other but also no sign of feeling the pulse of the time. The history of India from 1761 to the close of the 18th century is the period of the struggle for

supremacy between these two powers to decide the destinies of India and her people. The significance of the Four Anglo-Mysore wars has to be evaluated against this back-ground. But in the general history of India no special treatment is given to bring out its real importance. In fact the Four Anglo-Mysore Wars were thus a trial of strength between the Indian aspiration of regaining her political unity and the English ambition of establishing a colonial Empire. Studied from this point of view the period from 1761 to 1799 would certainly provide solutions for innumerable problems embedded in the history of India. Hence this attempt.

The First Anglo-Mysore War was started immediately after the conquest of Malabar by Haidar Ali. The English were supported by the Marattas and the Nizam of Hyderabad.² It was in accordance with the declared policy of the Governor General Clive who wanted the "Overthrow of Haidar Ali's usurped power".³

He believed that "his (Haidar Ali's) reduction is our most principal object, as the only sure method to give peace to the Carnatic and stability to our possessions. The sooner we extirpate him and restore the ancient family of Rajas, the better."⁴ But Haidar Ali bought off the Marattas and made peace with them. Then he sent his son Tipu Sultan on June 11, 1767 accompanied by Mahafuz Khan and Mir Ali Raja to the Nizam who received them with kindness.⁵ The Nizam was thus induced to throw over his allies and to join Mysore in fighting the English. In the first phase of the war the English won some brilliant victories. They captured Mangalore and invested the Cannanore fort. But the combined forces of the local Rajas and the English were repelled and made to sustain heavy loss by the

2. Moens - *Memorandum of administration on the Malabar Coast*, p. 154

3. Board's minutes cons. August 25, 1767

4. Madras to Bengal Cons. August 31, 1767

5. Kirmani, pp. 128, 129

Ali Raja of Cannanore.⁶ Finding it impossible the scheme of capturing the place was finally abandoned.⁷ The course of the First Anglo-Mysore war turned rapidly in favour of Haidar Ali. The recapture of Mangalore and the flight of the panic stricken English garrisons shattered the morale of the English in India and brought about their disgrace.⁸

In the next phase of the war the Nizam made peace with the Company. But Haidar pursued the war with varying fortunes. The English who felt eager for cessation of enmity with Haidar Ali opened negotiations for peace. But Haidar Ali wanted to dictate terms before the very gates of Madras. The Company's envoys charged with his mission received the following answer from Haidar. "I am coming to the gates of Madras and I will there listen to the propositions the Governor and Council will have to make."⁹ Haidar Ali's threats were not empty words, for "himself with 6000 cavalry made a forced march to the Mounts, where he virtually dictated the terms of peace."¹⁰ The author of the *History of Hyder Shah* says "while all the world was at a loss to determine where he was, he all at once showed himself at the gates of Madras, and despatched a flag of truce to demand, what propositions they had to make."¹¹ After reaching the neighbourhood of Madras, Haidar wrote to Josias M. Dupre who was at this time second of the Council of Madras: "I have been desirous of seeing you for this long time and being now arrived in your neighbourhood have written to the Governor to send you hither to carry on a negotiation of peace. By the blessing of God, you are a great Sardar, wise and experienced in all matters. You have more over lately carried on a correspondence of

6. Sec. Committee, 1768, Vol. 14, pp. 283-84, 15A, pp. 483-84

7. Logan, p. 415

8. Wilks, Vol. I, p. 608

9. *History of Hyder Shah etc*, p. 253

10. Indian Records Series Vol. II, *Vestiges of Old Madras*, 1640-1800, p. 397.

11. *The History of Hyder Shah, etc.*, p. 243

letters relating to peace which makes me still more earnest to see youwhatever tend to the establishing of a lasting peace between us, I shall inform you of the persons..... Let me therefore have the pleasure of seeing you as soon as possible..... when you set out from Madras you will despatch a camel Hircarah before with a letter that I may find a great Sardar to meet you near my army. May your happiness always increase.”¹² M. Dupre accordingly set out on the morning of March 30, to Haidar’s camp. He was escorted and taken to the presence of Haidar Ali by an army General. After discussing the peace terms Durpe returned in the evening to Madras and the Council after two day’s deliberation drew up the Treaty on April 2nd. On April 3rd the Treaty was signed and sealed by Haidar Ali.”¹³

It was proved beyond doubt that Mysore under Haidar Ali was a formidable force that would easily dispel any invading force whether Indian or foreign. Josias M. Dupre who negotiated peace terms expressed his views on the peace concluded with Haidar Ali in the following private letter to Robert Orme: “we have at length concluded peace with Haidar such as will do us no honour yet it was necessary and there was no alternative but that or worse. The reason it seems so disgraceful is that it (the war) was begun with ideas of conquest on one part and it is said to be the first time a country enemy has gained an advantage over us. An army of Maratta horse, we always dreaded because we always knew that it was not their business to fight, but to plunder, to burn and destroy. It was Haidar instead of Maratta and I think there can be no doubt but that whilst our force consists of infantry only any power with a large body of horse may plunder and ruin the country and if we have nothing to support our armies in the field or in garrison, but the current revenues of the country the failure of these must bring

12. *Indian Records Series*, Vol. II, p. 598, letter dated March 28

13. *Treaties etc.*, i, CXLI Vand LXXXVIII

ruin on us..... what thing must have been our condition had the war continued..... we had but provisions for 15 days in the Black town when the peace was concluded. Nothing could have prevented him in this path more than in the south from burning and destorying all the grain in the stock in the village and on the ground. A famine would have ensued and as it is grain is scarce and there certainly will be great distress before the next crop.

“Although I was clear that the peace, such was it, was better for the Company than the continuance of the war, yet my fortifications are not small and I cannot avoid thinking myself unfortunate in coming to India just in time to share the disgrace and to have from henceforth affairs to manage which are so encumbered and entangled that I can see no course we can take without being exposed to new embarrasments.....”¹⁴

The same sentiment was expressed by all English Generals who participated in the First Anglo-Mysore War. General Joseph Smith who commanded the English Army against Haidar Ali wrote to Robert Orme on March 28, 1769 thus “I believe it is the first instance known throughout history of Europeans pressing to surrender a town to blacks.”¹⁵

In the long history of European Colonisation in India, it was for the first time that an Indian power gained victory over the foreigners. This enthralling episode in the history of India which could arouse the national spirit and could inspire every Indian with glory and make him proud of the country's past has not been given due importance or the recognition that it deserves, in the annals of Indian wars.

The Treaty of Madras that put an end to the hostilities between Haidar Ali and the English contained a provision for

14. Orme Mss. Volume, 25, 10th June 1769, Indian Record Series p. 599.

15. Smith to Orme, March 28, 1769, Orme Mss. Vol. 22, p. 30

an offensive and defensive alliance between Haidar and the Company and for the mutual restitution of the conquest.¹⁶ The English did not carry out the provision of the treaty.¹⁷ Haidar Ali was too much indignant against the breach of the treaty provisions by the English who evaded helping him against the Marattas.¹⁸

When news reached him about the outbreak of war between England and France Haidar Ali foresaw that he would have to enter into an open hostility with the English. The French possession of Pandicherry fell into the hands of the English soon after the commencement of the war and the English wanted to capture Mahe, the French settlement in the Malabar Coast. This awakened Haidar Ali to the grave consequences that might accrue if Mahe came in the possession of the English. These French possessions were his supply centres and the capture of these places by the English would vitally affect his interests. Haidar Ali wrote to Rumbold that Mahe was situated in the territory of his tributary the Raja of Kadathanad and that he would consider this reduction as a hostile act.¹⁹ Instructions were issued to the Rajas of Chirakkal, and Kadathanad to help the French troops at Mahe. But suddenly Mahe fell on March 19, five days after Braithwaite's arrival before it, without firing a single shot. The fall was so sudden that it disappointed Haidar Ali whose troops were on their way to the French relief.²⁰ Mahe's reduction was an important cause of Mysore war.

On July 20, 1780, Haidar Ali declared war against the English and descended upon the Carnatic with nearly a lakh

16. *Indian Record Series - Vestiges of Old Madras, 1640-1800* Vol. II, p. 548

17. Sec. Committee. 1769, pp. 409, 10-Ibid., 1770, pp. 86, 87 and 388,

18. Ibid: 1771, pp. 72 and 245; Ibid, 1772, pp. 40-41

19. Haidar to Rumbold, March 19, 1779, Cons. April 7, 1779, Home (Misc.) Vol. 249, p. 96

20. Braithwaite to Madras, March 19, 1779 Consultations, April 5 1779, Vol. 60, pp. 46, 49

of soldiers. A major defeat that the English had from the hands of Mysoreans apart from that of Baille was the defeat of Braithwaite at Tanjore. "Col. Braithwaite, some time after the engagement began, sent a flag of truce to the enemy after which no person was killed, but the remainder of garrison were taken prisoners."²¹ In Malabar, the English successfully withstood the onslaught of the Mysoreans and were able to defeat two generals of Haidar, Sardar Khan and Makh-dum Ali. Hearing this disaster from Malabar, Tipu Sultan was ordered to move to the Coast. When Tipu Sultan reached Palghat he found that the enemy had retreated. The English army having been saved from a great disaster reached Ponnani town. Col. Macleod having arrived with a reinforcement from Bombay took up the command of the whole army. But having received the news of Haidar Ali's death Tipu Sultan suddenly broke up his camp and "proceeded with all possible haste to Seringapatam."²²

The English rejoiced over the death of Haidar Ali and determined to derive as much advantage out of this as possible. But Tipu Sultan succeeded his father without any contest and started his campaign against the English with renewed vigour. The recapture of Bednur and the besiege of Mangalore by Tipu Sultan made the English to open negotiation for cessation of hostilities. An armistice was signed on August 2, 1783.

In the course of the siege of Mangalore alone the number of English soldiers who were killed, wounded and missing was 1700 and between 30 and 40 officers were killed or wounded.²³ When Baillie surrendered, there were only 200 Europeans including 50 officers with him. These were the remnants of Baillie's total force of 3853 men.²⁴ Even in a

21. Sec. Pro., March 11, 1782, p. 983

22. Charles Stuart — *Catalogue and Memoirs of Tipoo Sultan*, p. 265

23. Sec. Pro., August 18, 1783.

24. Kirmani, Op. Cit. p. 198

fight where the English was successful it is significant that the loss on the part of Mysore was not much. Sir Iry Coote observed "I do not conceive it could have been considerable. We captured 30 or 40 horses of all kinds. The English casualties on the other hand were 79 men and 7 horses."²⁵

After the armistice was signed the English continued their efforts to strengthen their position by capturing Tipu Sultan's possessions in Malabar. Thus Fullerton captured Palghat Fort and Captain Macleod captured the Cannanore fort. These were gross violations of the armistice. These new acquisitions did not improve the English positions nor did they give any better bargain in the negotiations of peace. The Bibi of Cannanore and the Rajas and Zamindars of Malabar coast were included as friends and allies of Tipu Sultan in the first article of the Treaty of Mangalore which was signed on March 11, 1784.²⁶

The English thought that they were forced to conclude treaties with Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan on disadvantageous terms and therefore wanted to violate them. Grand Duff wrote to Shelburne "an English army much superior to one which under a Lawrence or a Clive five and twenty years ago made Hindustan tremble at the bare recital of its victories, now for the first time was retreating in the face of the Indian enemy."²⁷ We read from Dow's *History of India* "we were alarmed as if his horses had wings to fly over our walls."²⁸

"The resources of both Calcutta and Madras were strained to their maximum limit, peace was necessary for us" wrote Marcarteni, "for had war continued for a few months more we must have inevitably sunk under the accumulated

25. Sec. Pro., July 4, p. 2149

26. Sec. Pro., May 13, 1784

27. Grand Duff to Shelburne, Nov. 30, 1780

28. Dow, *History of Hindoostan*, Vol. II, p. 362

burdens of our expenses.”²⁹ Therefore when the Company was forced to sign a treaty which had failed to bring any territorial gains to the Company and which had prevented many officers from seeking revenge for the loss they or their compatriots had suffered at the hands of Tipu,³⁰ it was not surprising that the treaty of Mangalore “was considered merely a truce which would not last very long.”³¹ The general feeling of the Company’s officers was echoed in the remarks of Munroe when he wrote “it is to be hoped that the Treaty of peace which the company has lately concluded with Tipu is only meant to be temporary.”³²

The Third Anglo-Mysore war was the result of the English manoeuvres to retrieve from the humiliating treaties the English had to sign in the Two Anglo-Mysore wars. We have seen that the English did not consider the treaty of Mangalore as a permanent one, but a temporary truce. Therefore from the very beginning they began to violate the provisions of the Treaty of Mangalore. In violation of the Fourth Article of the Treaty,³³ that stipulated that Cannanore should be evacuated by the English it was adhered to only after strong complaints from Tipu Sultan. The Chief of Tellicherry had a letter from Tipu Sultan expressing his discomfort about the Cannanore fort, in which he wrote “the said fort was made empty as a jungle and then your troops went away. By this it is not certain that the heart is not clean.”³⁴ In his letter dated April 23, 1789 addressed to the Chief of Tellicherry in strong terms Tipu Sultan accused the English of violation of the Treaty. He wrote “the treaty formerly entered into between the Sircar and honourable Company has been always

29. Secret Pro. Nov. 23, 1784, Madras – Bengal Oct. 29

30. Prof. Mohibbul Hasan Khan *History of Tipu Sultan*, p. 80

31. Military Sundry Book, Vol. 61, pp. 1462-64

32. Gleig-Munroe p. 370

33. Logan: *Treaties etc.*, i, xc

34. Military Cons., May 29, 1784, Vol. 99 B, p. 2050

observed and kept without any difference until this time. But you have now lately broken the treaty made with the Company in the following instances.³⁵

The instances that Tipu Sultan cited were (1) The forcible acquisition of Dharmapattanam by the Company; (2) Sending the families of the Kottayam and Chirakkal Rajas to Travancore with an amount of about twenty lakhs of rupees; and (3) giving protection to about twenty thousand Nairs who fled from Tipu Sultan's territory and permitting them to indulge in depredations and pillages in the country. Tipu Sultan reminds the Chief of Tellicherry of the officers he sent to him some time back requiring the Chief to abide by the provision of the Treaty. But it was of no use.³⁶

In another letter Tipu Sultan required the Chief not to give any assistance or protection to the inhabitants or merchants belonging to his territory and requested him to seize such people if they were seen in the Company's territory and send them back to him. Dharmapattanam, a place belonging to Ravi Varma, the Raja of Chirakkal was forcibly taken by the Company to which Tipu Sultan expressed his indignation. He required the Chief to return the place immediately to the Raja.³⁷ This was again communicated to the Factors by the Raja of Chirakkal in his letter dated September 28, 1788, in which he reiterated his intention of taking back from the Company all territories which once belonged to him for which he received green signal from his suzerain.³⁸ These developments were reported by the Factors on June 26 with a request to send reinforcement to defend the place.

35. P R. C. Vol. III, No. 37 A, pp. 36-37

36. Fgn. Sec. Department, Proceeding, 1-22 Sept., 1788, S. No. 9, pp. 3803-4

37. Fgn Sec. Department, Pro. 1-22, Sept., 1788, S. No. 9, pp. 3803-4, Prince of Chirakkal to the Chief of Tellicherry, May 28, 1788

38. Sec. Proc. Sept. 25, 1789, S. No. 96, Cornwallis to Malet, August 29, 1784, p. 9:

Tipu Sultan's letter did not make any effect on the Company. Therefore he retaliated by imposing prohibition of trade in his territory. The merchandise of Malabar were enumerated as essential commodities and state monopoly was imposed on such goods. None was permitted to do business on these commodities. The Factors at Tellicherry wrote to the Bombay Government that if Tipu Sultan continued his policy of prohibition, their settlement at Tellicherry was to be closed down. Otherwise it would result in a great loss to the Company. At the same time they suggested that the Tellicherry settlement could easily be converted to a highly valuable possession to the Company, provided the local Rajas severed their connection with Tipu Sultan.³⁹ In fact it was from this time onwards that all kinds of rumours and vilifications had been released by the Company against Tipu Sultan. This was imperative for their bare existence. Concerted effort had been devised for destroying their formidable foe from then onwards.

Even when peace was prevailing, the English fomented rebellions in Tipu Sultan's kingdom and started negotiations with the Marattas, the Nizam, the Rajas of Cochin and Travancore and the dispossessed Malabar chieftains for making a grand alliance against Tipu Sultan.

But the English did not stop their efforts of forming an alliance with the Marattas and Nizam, as if they were on the brink of a war. Cornwallis directed Malet as early as 1787 to propose an alliance with Nana Fernavis in his letter dated August 29 of that year "you will point out to Nana how favourable his opportunities would be to regain their lost territory and that if he chooses to form a connection with us, the Marattas may expect the greatest advantages from our

39. Sec. Pro., Sept., 25, 1789, pp. 1855-56.

success.”⁴⁰ Similar letters were sent to Malet, their representative at Poona to conclude an alliance with the Marattas.⁴¹ Malet ceaselessly continued his effort of weaving the web of alliance with the Marattas, by dangling before them the sure prospects of territorial acquisition. Thus on February 7, 1790 Malet succeeded in securing the official declaration of the Maratta court of its “disposition to take part with your Lordship’s Government in hostility against Tipu Saheb.”⁴² At length after endless and vexatious delay, the Treaty was executed and exchanged on June 6, 1790.⁴³

Similarly Cornwallis through his representative John Kennaway showed friendly overtures to the Nizam of Hyderabad with a view of winning him for an ally. Kennaway succeeded in fanning the flame of Nizam’s fury against Tipu Sultan.⁴⁴

The English did not stop with the alliance of these big powers, but continued their efforts to form alliance with the deposed Rajas of Malabar and the Rajas of Cochin and Travancore. A paper of Protection was published inviting the rebels to come under the Company’s shelter and offering them support in their effort to oust Tipu Sultan from the Malabar Coast.⁴⁵ Thus all possible preparations were taken by the English to single out Tipu Sultan. The dread which Tipu Sultan’s power inspired in the English can easily be discerned from these military alliances.

The war started in April 1790 and ended on March 18, 1792 with the Treaty of Seringapatam. Tipu Sultan lost

40. Ibid: No. II, p. 9

41. Ibid: Letters Nos. 25 and 26, pp. 24-26

42. Sec. Pro. Vol. II, p. 202

43. Ibid: pp. 150-51

44. Dip’omatic Correspondence between Mir Nizam Ali Khan and the East India Company (1780-1798) A R. No. 7942, pp. 13-14

45. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 56, Part I, Voucher No. 10, pp. 455-56

the battle and had to give away half of his kingdom and three crores and 30 lakhs of rupees.⁴⁶ Thus the English machinations and manoeuvres were successful in crippling their inveterate enemy. Cornwallis wrote to Dundas "we have at length concluded our Indian war handsomely, and I think as advantageously, as any reasonable person can expect. We have crippled our enemy without making our friends too formidable."⁴⁷ It was considered by Munroe as a treaty of "moderation and conciliation."⁴⁸ The English aim was to repel Tipu Sultan from the Coast of Malabar and reduce his power.

In addition to bringing to the war, the best army and equipments the English had ever assembled in India,⁴⁹ Cornwallis himself took up the task of leading the army. The military intrepidity and rare talents of Tipu Sultan were admired even by his enemies.⁵⁰ All British Generals in India construed the time most favourable for their aggressive designs. Thus the Third Anglo-Mysore war was a political necessity for the English who were manoeuvring to do away with their formidable foe.⁵¹

The English expected that Tipu would come round to a friendly alliance with the English if he was stripped off half of his dominions and a good deal of money. But the prevailing spirit of Tipu Sultan was to oust the English from India for which he began his strenuous efforts to enlist the support of Indian and foreign powers. The reasons for the arrogant proclamation of the Fourth Anglo-Mysore war was the result of this uncompromising attitude of Tipu Sultan who preferred death to falling a prisoner into the hands

46. Fgn. (Misc.) Vol. 54, 1792, John Kennaway-Kirk-Patrick-*Select letters of Tippoo Sultan*, Appendix A(1), p. 77

47. Rose - *Cornwallis*, ii, p. 155

48. Gleig - *Munroe*, i, p. 131

49. Wilks - *Historical Sketches etc.*, Vol. II, p. 174

50. Ibid: p. 411

51. Beatson - *A view of the origin and conduct of War with Tippoo Sultan*- p. 44.

of the English.⁵² The English believed that "it was the ruler of Mysore alone who had shown himself at all equal to the English on the field of battle. It was Haidar who dictated peace to us under the walls of Madras Seringapatam under its late Hindu sovereigns had never been aggressive, but under its two Mohammedan rulers the English in Madras had learned to speak of it with respect whilst in Trichinapoly and in Mathura, in Trivandrum and in Cochin, its name was never mentioned without awe."⁵³ The avarice and greed of the English could not tolerate sovereign rulers who knew what sovereignty was. "The continuance of Tipu Sultan's power", writes Beatson, "upon so formidable a scale must have proved to the Company a perpetual source of solicitude, expense and hazard."⁵⁴ "In a crisis of world history, when no obstacle seemed able to bar the daring genius, that the one sovereign who hated those interests and who had himself seen what his troops led by his father could accomplish, should be rendered as far as possible harmless for evil was imperative."⁵⁵

Tipu Sultan fought and died in the battlefield. The struggle for supremacy between the indigenous and foreign powers ended in the failure of Indians. Thus it marked the close of a Chapter of Indian history, when India was ruled by her own men. The fall of Tipu Sultan not only gave territorial gains to the English but also made them "paramount in India."⁵⁶ A contemporary correspondence evaluated the fall of Tipu thus "the empire of the East is at our feet."⁵⁷ The Maratta statesman Nana Farnavis foresaw "the dim shadow of British power has increased; the whole of East India is already theirs; Poona will now be the

52. Beatson, Op. cit., p. 165

53. C. B. Melleson - *Seringapatam, the Capital of Tipu*, p. 146

54. Beatson, Op. Cit., p. 44

55. C. B. Melleson, Op. Cit., pp. 153-54

56. Wellesly's Despatches etc., p. X cii

57. Abur - Rise and progress of British India, Vol. II, p. 19

next victim. Evil days seem to be ahead. There seems to be no escape from destiny.”⁵⁸

The fall of Tipu in 1799 heralded a foreign and imperial Government with its colonial and merchantile policies the pinch of which was felt very acutely by the people of India for nearly a century and a half. The opinions of the English Generals and the private letters written by them have been extensively quoted in this chapter with the objective of giving a clear picture of the dread that the Mysore rulers put into the heart of the English. It was only Mysore under its Mussalman rulers that rose equal to the English in all spheres of activities. It is a known fact that no two kings can exist in the same realm and so it was impossible for the English and the Mysore rulers to co-exist. Both powers endeavoured ceaselessly to end the other. The international political situation and the lack of imagination among the indigenous rulers lent all possible aid to the English in annihilating their formidable Indian enemy. Thus the Four Anglo-Mysore wars were an inseparable part of a single chapter, of a fight between the English and the Indians. This period of Indian history, which witnessed the most uncompromising and the most relentless resistance offered to the English, has not unfortunately been given the importance that is its due. The saga of the Mysorean opposition of the British is one that can inspire all Indians, even as it can exalt the Mysore rulers to the ranks of some of the best statesmen and ablest warriors the world has produced. That these great men have not received their share of grateful acclaim from posterity is an evidence of the lack of objectivity with which Indian history has been written. The sooner an attempt is made to shed all bias, and to restore these great sons of India to their true stature, the better it is for our country as a whole.

58. Quoted in Sardesai, *New History of the Marattas*, Vol. III. p. 354

Appendix...i

The Zamorin of Kozhikode:

Between the two states of Cochin and Kolathunad lay the powerful kingdom of the Zamorin with his headquarters at Kozhikode. The *Keralolpathi* assigns their origin to the time of the partition of the country by the last of the Perumals who left for Mecca to embrace the religion of Islam. It is said that they were given only a small slice of land and a sword of the Perumal with the advice to extend their territories by waging wars. Joint Commissioners in 1792 and W. Logan in 1885 refer to this sword of the Perumal which they say was kept up sacrosanct by the then Zamorins. The latter gives in his *Manual* a photograph of the sword. In 1907, when Sir Arther Lawley, the then Governor of Madras made his tour, he recorded in his diary "to the Zamorin he (Cheraman Perumal) gave a small village and his sword with the advice, 'To die, kill and annex.' The sword is still preserved in the Zamorin's palace."¹ The Zamorins belong to *sambantha* caste which is below the Kshatriyas in the caste hierarchy. The Zamorins started a career of warfare successfully. The *Porlatri* of *Polnad*—the country round Kozhikode—was the first to be subdued by them. They waged perpetual warfare with the Rajas of Cochin and the Rajas of Chirakkal. The Arab merchant Sulaiman who visited the place in 852 A. D. found the Zamorin with all the powers of a sovereign Raja. Ibn Battuta and Abdul Razack give clear evidence of the stately power of the Zamorin.

1. *The Fifth Tour of H. E. The Hon. Sir Arther Lawley, Governor of Madras*, p. 18

The Zamorins within a century became the most powerful rulers of Malabar. The Arab settlements in their territory contributed not a little to their rise as a major power in Kerala. After subduing the petty chieftains and becoming the *Rakshapurusha* (protector) of *Mamanka*² the Zamorin assumed the title of *Kunnala Konatiri*, king of the hills and waves. It is from the Sanskrit equivalent of this word '*Samuri*' and *Samudri* or *Tamutiri*', that the Malayalam corruption of the same originated. In the European accounts he thus began to be designated as the Zamorin.

At the time when the Portuguese Captain Vasco da Gama reached the Coast of Malabar only eight miles north of the seat of the Zamorin, the Portuguese found the Zamorin as the most powerful ruler of Kerala. As the Portuguese realised that the Prince was under the influence of the Moors and so could not obtain any favourable trade agreements from him, Da Gama left for Cochin and Chirakkal. The subsequent history is crowded with the wars between the Zamorin and the Portuguese, the latter being helped by Cochin and Chirakkal. The naval captains who were designated as *Marrikkars* effectively checked the expansion of the Portuguese into the interior of Malabar by waging a number of naval wars and shedding much blood.

Just as the enmity between the Zamorin and the Raja of Cochin paved the way for foreign intervention, the mutual jealousies and wars between the Zamorin and the Kolathiri also served the interests of foreign powers who were eager to exploit these. Though the Zamorin claimed suzerainty over the whole of Kerala, the Rajas of Chirakkal and Travancore always questioned this. Anyhow the land

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2. A festive Assembly held once in twelve years at Tirunavai. The ruler who presided over the functions was hailed as the paramount power of Kerala. The Zamorin from 14th century onwards became the undisputed protector of this all Kerala assembly till his authority was overrun by the Mysoreans.

between Quilon and Cannanore accepted him as overlord and a number of chieftains who ruled over these areas paid him tribute in the 15th and 16th centuries. Barbosa saw him "dictating directions to the ministers who stood around him. They copied them in cadjan leaves and communicated them to the chieftains and concerned persons."³ When Stein Gollennesse wrote his "*Memorandum*" in the year 1743, Zamorin was the most important power in Kerala. His ambition of subduing the Raja of Cochin invited trouble from the Raja of Travancore, whom the Cochin Raja approached for help. Similarly in the year 1758 when Palghat was attacked by the Zamorin the Raja of Palghat sought help from Haidar Ali who was the Foudjar of Dindigal.

The relation between the Zamorin and Cochin was always hostile. "Between these two countries writes Moens, "there was always an irreconcilable hatred."⁴ The Raja of Cochin was a Kshatriya whereas the Zamorin was lower in rank in the caste hierarchy. Therefore the former felt humiliated to be a vassal of the Zamorin. The Raja of Cochin availed himself of all opportunities to ally with any rising power against the Zamorin. When the Zamorin had to wage wars continuously for more than a century against the Portuguese, the Raja of Cochin was a firm ally of the Portuguese and helped them with all his might. When the Raja of Cochin sought the assistance of the Dutch, the Zamorin hated them. This is clearly pointed out by Moens when he says "the Company too, has, as a rule had much trouble with the Zamorins, has had from time to time to wage expensive wars with them and has found them the most intrustworthy of all the Malabar kings."⁵ He continues to say that it was the friendship of the Company with the Raja of Cochin who was his enemy that conditioned his

3. Barbosa: Op. cit., p. 110

4. Moens: *Memorandum etc.*, pp. 134-135

5. Moens: Op. Cit., p. 132

relation with Dutch.⁶ At last in his miserable plight the Raja of Cochin who sought the help of Marthanta Varma of Travancore, regained the conquered territories from the Zamorin and defeated him in the year 1761. It was the beginning of his decline.

The Zamorin was also unfriendly with the Kolathiris of Chirakkal. Both rulers vied with each other to enlist the support of European powers in their wars. When Vasco da Gama could not obtain a favourable trade agreement from the Zamorin, the Kolathiri received him with honours and conferred on him all trade privileges.⁷ Their mutual jealousies prevented them from uniting against a common enemy. Moens, who was the then Dutch Governor of Malabar writes with extreme wonder "the indifference of the Zamorin to the Nabob's last invasion was surprising to me. He heard that the Nabob had taken possessions of the neighbouring kingdom of Cotteote (Kottayam), Coddagamale and other territories there about, one after the other and that his turn was to come next and yet he remained absorbed in trifles instead of thinking of defence of the kingdom. Not a month before he had to flee I received letter after letter from him dealing only with the appointment of a Namboodiri or priest in the Triporatty (Tripurayar) pagoda by the king of Cochin in regard of which he had not been consulted."⁸ Thus the political condition and internal dissension helped Haidar Ali in carrying out his design of conquest quite easily.

6. Ibid, pp. 132-33

7. *Malabar and Portuguese* p. 98 - Zainuddeen - *Thu-fat-ul-Mujahideen* p. 106

8. Ibid; p. 133

Appendix...ii

Kolathiris or Chirakkal dynasty.

Colastiris, Kolastry, Coolatri, Callistree, Collastry, etc. are the different terms used for Kolathiris in the European accounts and records. They are also known as the rulers of Chirakkal, the European equivalent of Chericca or Cherical. The kingdom over which they held sway was called Kolathunad.

Their kingdom extended from Kasaragod in the North to Korapuzha in the South. The eastern boundary was Kudakumala and the Western boundary the Arabian Sea. The house of *Kolaswarupuram* consisted in the beginning of two *Kovilagums* or palaces. These were *Pallikovilagam* and *Udayamangalam Kovilagam*. The two branches in later years became separate, always opposing each other. These again branched out into many houses, Pally *Kovilagam* having eight houses and Udayamangalam three houses.

The following are the eight houses of the Pally branch; (1) Pally *kovilagam* (2) Chirakkal *kovilagam* (3) Palaugat *Kovilagam* (4) Kannacherry *kovilagam* (5) Poodoovely *kovilagam* (6) Payavayali *kovilagam* (7) Chingoat *Kovilagam* and (8) Tenaood *Kovilagam*. Udayamangalam branch was divided into (1) Udayamangalam *kovilagam* (2) Melati *kovilagam* (3) Jaya *kovilagam*.

The oldest Raja of those two branches was to be crowned and designated Kolathiri Raja, the second in age *Thekkelankoor*, the third *Vadakkalankoor*, the fourth *Nalan-koor* and the fifth *Anjenkoor*. Thus there were five titular

Rajas, who were to follow one another in the title according to the seniority of age.¹

The Kolathiri Raja, first in age and dignity always took the Fort of Baliapatam for his residence. The second *Thekkalengkoor* and the third or *Vadakkalengkoor* chose the forts of Cotepoor in Kadathanad and Beela or Deela fort respectively. It was at Madai, seven miles northward of Baliapatnam river that the coronation ceremony was conducted. The ceremony of instalment of the *Vadakkalengkoor* as *Thekkalengkoor* had always been performed in the Cotepoor Fort and that a *Nalankoor* to the rank of *Vadakkalengkoor* in the Fort of Deela. The *Anjankoor* whose residence was in the Udayamangalam *kovilagum* supervised the property of the four elder Rajas. The family affairs of the two branches were looked after by the Anjankoor Raja.

The eldest female member of *Kolaswarupam* was called *Achimar*. Murukkancherry house, enjoyed the exclusive privilege of keeping for themselves the post of ministers of *Kolaswarupam*. The post of the Commander in chief of the army was held by the members of Chittotu Kurukkal and of finances by Mavila Nambiar by hereditary turns. The office of the *Purohit* went to the members of Areppan Namboodiri and of the chief priest of the temple to Kathimada Namboodiri.²

The early history of this northern dynasty of Kerala is unknown like the history of all other dynasties. The dynasty seems to have had the seat of their government near Mount Deli or *Elimalai*. The name assumed by this dynasty during this period was *Mooshaka Vamsam*. The earliest reference regarding this kingdom is made by Alberuni who mentions it as the kingdom of Hili. Following this we have the descriptions of Marcoppolo and Ibn Battuta. After

1. Board of Revenue, B. N. 64-69, V. 288, June 29, 1801, p. 7482

2. *Malabar Quarterly Review*, Vol. I, p. 266

Ibn Battutta we have only very scanty historical reference regarding this kingdom till the advent of the Portuguese.

It is presumed by all historians that the accounts given about the *Mooshaka* dynasty of Mount Eli can be considered as the description of the Kolathiris. This view is based on the conjecture that the *Mooshaka* dynasty might have changed its name in later years as Kolaswarupam. It is believed that the Kolaswarupam or *Mooshaka* dynasty also came into being with the dismemberment of the empire of Cheraman Perumal, when he partitioned his empire among his chieftains and relations and left for Mecca to embrace Islam.

The rulers of Chirakkal were hereditary enemies of the Zamorin of Kozhikode. When Vasco da Gama reached on the shores of Malabar and alighted at Kappad, eight miles north of modern Kozhikode, the Zamorin received him with pomp. But Da Gama had to return from Kozhikode without any advantageous trade prospects. The Kolathiri who was eager to wait upon this foreign merchants invited them and gave them ample provision for their trade. In 1502 Da Gama in his second voyage to Indies was successful in persuading the Raja to build a wall around their factory at Cannanore. It was in 1505 that Francisco Almeida succeeded in building a fort at Cannanore which was named as Fort St. Angelo. This fort remained in their possession till the year 1663 when their Malabar possessions were taken over by the Dutch.³

This fort at Cannanore remained with the Dutch until it was sold to the Aly Raja of Cannanore in 1771.⁴ The Aly Raja was the first ruler of this area who welcomed the Dutch and entered into a treaty with them.⁵ A treaty with the

3. D. R. No. 13, p. 14

4. Ibid. p. 19

5. Ibid. p. 143

Kolathiris was also concluded on March 20, 1663.⁶ The same was renewed in the years 1680 and 1681.⁷ The relation between the Raja of Chirakkal and the Dutch was cordial except in 1721-23 when the Kolathiri with the assistance of the English attacked the Aly Raja of Cannanore.⁸ The Dutch helped the Aly Raja.⁹

The Kolathiri kingdom was very much weakened due to the internal dissensions and the internecine wars. Alexander Hamilton who had been to this place more than once records an event when a number of princes of the royal family belonging to different houses were beheaded on altars built of stone.¹⁰ This is again entered into the proceedings of the Board of Revenue thus: "Many were the disputes and even in former times among the above stated 11 houses (of Pally and Udayamangalam branches) on account of the management of that country, at last they put to death several princes of the house of Udayamangalam *kovilagam* and utterly destroyed their authority in the country. Since that jealousy, ambition and intrigue took place amongst the other houses, but the house of Cherical had every advantage, both by the extensive power and support they always had from the *Mookistanmars* or Chief Nairs of the country and by the alliance that they have entered into with the neighbouring European powers."¹¹ These internecine wars and family quarrels converted the kingdom into congeries of small principalities.

At the period when Tellicherry factory of the English was established in 1695 the Kolathiri kingdom was divided

6. Logan; *Treaties etc.*, Vol. I, iii

7. D. R. No. 13: p. 143

8. Ibid. p. 143

9. Ibid. p. 144

10. *New Account of The East Indies 1739 edn.* Vol. I, p. 410

11. Board of Revenue B. F. 69-69, V. 288, June 29, 1801, pp. 2482-83

into the following small principalities. The Valunnavar¹² of Badagara was in semi-independent position, ruling the territory lying between Mahe and Kotta river.¹³ He was also called the Karthanad Raja; because the area under him was known as Karthanad. In the territory lying north of *Kavvayi* river ruled another scion of the family enjoying semi-independence. In the territory between the *Kavvayi* and Mahe rivers there were a few chieftains who held their sway but more or less owing allegiance to the Raja of Chirakkal. Randattara or Poyanad¹⁴ was under the control of four houses of the Nambiar caste. They were called the Achanmars. This territory lies to the east of Dharmapattanam. It was from them the English East India Company purchased this tract of land. Kottayam¹⁵ was under the

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12. *Valunnavar* means ruler. In the English records they are called Beyanore, or Baonor, a corruption of the Malayalam word *Valunnavar*.
 13. Karthanad Raja held sway over a territory comprising an area of about 30 miles. Under him there were 3,000 Nair soldiers. They were one of the scions of Kolathiri family. By 16th century they assumed sovereignty and entered into agreements with the Dutch, the French and later with the English. Hamilton also visited the place in January 1703 found him as an independent Raja.
 14. Tradition upholds that this was the *Nadu* from where Cheraman Perumal 'poyi' (went) to Mecca.
 15. **Kottayam:** This slice of territory lay between Tellicherry and Wynad. The Kottayam rajas were called *Puranad* rajas because it is believed that they originated from outside Kerala. But they held this territory as one the scions of the Kolathiri dynasty. In the English records they are referred to as Cotiote. This principality played a prominent role in the latter half of 18th century in the Malabar politics. They were divided into three branches or houses.

It was the Raja of Cotiote that first entered into an agreement with the English East India Company when they established their settlements at Tellicherry. The Raja remained a faithful ally of the English at the time of Haidar's conquest.

Puranad rajas (foreign) and Iruvalinad¹⁶ was ruled by six houses of the Nambiar caste. Korungoth¹⁷ was ruled by a chieftain of Nair caste. He was often referred to in the English records as Korungoth Nair. There were also some other local chieftains¹⁸ of Nambiar Caste who more or less enjoyed independence over the slices of the land that was their demesne. Another important power of the area was the Aly Raja of Cannanore who during this period was in enmity with the Kolathiris. Only the portions of Chirakkal, Taliparamba and the suburbs of Cannanore remained under the direct sway of the Kolathiris in the 18th century.

16. **Iruvalinad:** This was also a part of Kolathiri kingdom. When the English factory was established at Tellicherry this portion of territory was held by six families of Nambiar caste. They were (1) Kunnumal (2) Chandrott (3) Kilakkedatta (4) Kampuratta (5) Narangote Nambiar and (6) Kariyad Nambiar.

Due to the proximity of their territory with the French and the English settlements of Mahe and Tellicherry respectively they came into early contact with these settlements. They entered into trade contracts with these powers. In the latter half of 18th century they held almost independent authority over this territory.

17. **Korungoth Nair:** This was formely a part of Iruvalinad. But during the period of study they were also independent. This *Nadu* lay directly between the English and the French settlements. That is between Mahe and Tellicherry. As his territory also lay between these two European settlements he also came into early contact with these powers with a difference that it was he who first took up arms against the English in 1719. After his defeat in this attempt he remained loyal to the French at Mahe and entered into agreements with them. His alliance with the French protected him from the general overthrow of Malabar chieftains by Haidar Ali.
18. **Randattara Achanmar:** Randattara lies adjacent to Dharmapattanam. It is called Poyanad i.e., the country where Cheraman Perumal '*poyi*' (went) or set out on his journey to Arabia. This territory formed part of Kolathiris. But in the year 1741 the English Factors at Tellicherry took four ruling families of Achanmar and the 500 Nairs of the *Nadu* under their protection which paved the way for their independence. As they were under the special protection of the English Factors of Tellicherry Haidar Ali spread them in his general overthrow of Malayalee princes.

Appendix...iii

The Raja of Travancore:

Before the rise of Marthanta Varma, who is known as the 'Maker of Modern Travancore', this southern kingdom of Kerala was a small state lying between the south of Quilon and north of the Cape Comorin. In the year 1728 when this king came to the throne the whole of Kerala experienced great political change. He was an avowed enemy of feudal anarchy and was successful in quelling his feudal chieftains through by means of great bloodshed. He was a great king who had his schooling in modern thought and ideas. Moens considered him as a person who could converse with ease in English and Dutch in the diction of a European.¹ On the eve of his accession there were a number of small principalities all around his kingdom. As against the age-old convention he annexed all the conquered territories and mercilessly massacred a number of chieftains. Though he owed allegiance to the Nawab of Carnatic who in his turn was a close ally of the English, the reign of Marthanta Varma was remarkable in the history of Kerala.

He aimed at the unification of Kerala and heralded a system of centralised government. After conquering and annexing a number of small principalities he turned against Cochin. In the two important wars he waged against Cochin in the 18th century much of the territories of Cochin was annexed with his kingdom. But he came to the rescue of Cochin when the Zamorin conquered that state. By the treaty thus signed between him, the Raja of Cochin and the Zamorin on December 26, 1761 both the Zamorin and Cochin agreed to abide by his arbitration if there was any dispute in future.

1. Ibid: p. 133

Appendix...iv

The Raja of Palghat

Another ruler that deserves mention in connection with our present study is the Raja of Palghat. His dynasty was called Nedumpurayur which was later changed into Tarur or Taravur swarupam. In the English records it is called the Taruvayur swarupam. The family name of the Rajas was Shekkury. It is believed that this royal house also came into existence with the dismemberment of the Cheraman's empire. Buchanan collecting the information regarding their origin says "Palaghatcherry on the division of Malayala fell to the lot of Shekkury Raja of Kshatriya Caste."¹ It originally consisted of Eight *Edoms* or Houses equally divided into two branches distinguished from each other by the appellation of Northern and the Southern branches. *Thekke Thavazhi* (the Southern Branch) consisted of *Elayachan Edom*, *Peruvakal Edom*, *Naduvil Edom* and *Ponnil Edom*. The *Vadakkethavazhi* (the Northern Branch) included *Cherukotta Edom*, *Pulikal Edom*, *Mele Edom* and *Poojakal Edom*. The members of these *Edoms* were called Achanmars, five of whom the eldest in age, bear the title of Rajas under the denomination of First, Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Rajas ranked according to their age, the senior being the first. On the death of the first Raja, the second succeeded him and became the senior, the third became the second and so on to the fifth the rank of which was filled by the eldest of the Achans. By this mode of succession the eldest Raja would be very old in age in consequence of

1. Buchanan Francis Dr: *Journey from Madras through the Countries of Carnatic, Mysore and Malabar*, Vol. ii, p. 53

which it used to be customary to one of the Achans chosen by the Raja as his minister who performed the actual business of government.² In the year 1801 when Thomas Warden was Collector of this portion of Malabar he reported, "the eight *Edoms* of Achanmars multiplied so numerously in their members that they afterwards divided and formed themselves at pleasure into separate *Edoms* which they distinguished by their own names. The number now in existence is 27, twenty belonging to the Northern and seven to the Southern branch. The number of Achanmars they contain including minors is about 130."³

Their dynasty was called Tarur or Tharuvayur *swarupam*. Their family was also known as Shekkury family and the rajas were called Shekkury Rajas. Buchanan, writing on the family history of the Shekkury Rajas says "all the male members of this family are Achans, all the females are Neitars and all are of equal rank according to seniority but they are divided into two Houses descended from the two sisters of the first Shekkury Raja. The eldest male member is called the Shekkury or the first raja. The second is called *Ellea* Raja; the third Cavasseri Raja, the fourth Talanthampuran Raja and the fifth Tariputamuran Tampuran. On the death of Shekkury, the *Ellea* Raja succeeds to the house, each inferior raja gets a step and the eldest Achan becomes Tariputamuran."⁴

The rulers of Palghat played only very little part till 18th century. However there is a mention in the Nedumpuram Tali inscription of the 17th regnal year (934 A. D.) of the Chera emperor Goda Ravi Varma that a ruler of the Vempolinad (in the modern Kottayam District) by name

2. Thomas Warden - *Report on the Condition of Palghat, Congaad, Mannoor, Eddaterra, Kowlpara and Narnottam Divisions of the District of Malabar* - para 19, 1801, para 8

3. Ibid: para 9

4. Logan: Vol. III - deed No. 8

Kodai Ravi was appointed to rule over Nedumpurayurnad (Palghat) also. W. Logan brings out a deed of assignment given by one of the Rajas of Palghat to a temple in the year 1464.⁵

It is seen in the records of the Ernakulam Archives that during the 13th century the Palghat dynasty maintained its male succession through the marriage of two princesses of the family to the princes of Perumpadappu Swarupam (Cochin).⁶ It is stated that the Raja of Palghat always helped the Cochin Raja in his wars against the Zamorin. This friendly relation with the Raja of Cochin had its evil consequences also.⁷

The Portuguese who were the ally of Vijayanagar once requested the latter's military help against the Zamorin. Krishna Deva Raya, the renowned ruler of this dynasty sent his army under his generals Ramapayya and Devapayya.⁸ They were helped by the Tarur Swarupam. But the Zamorin could easily expel the Vijayanagar soldiers and destroy the palace of Palghat rulers.

After this event there are no records available to construct a political history of this dynasty till 1732 when the Mysore army entered in to Palghat on request of the Raja to repel the Zamorin's army from his territory. The Raja of Cochin also claimed in a letter to Jonathan Duncan, one of the Joint Commissioners of Malabar that the Cochin Raja always helped the Rajas of Palghat and therefore he enjoyed suzerainty over Palghat.⁹

In his ambitious campaigns the Zamorin conquered not only the territories of Valluvakonathiri (Walluvanad) but also of the Palghat Raja. There were many such con-

5. Ernakulam Archives - Series 1, Vol. XIII, No. 209

6. Tamilnad Archives-D. 266 - Story of the Rajas of Tarur Swarupam

7. Tamilnad Archives - D. 266, Op. cit.

8. Ernakulam Archives - Series I, No. 166/VIII dated 12-2-969 1794 A. D.

9. Tellicherry Cons. Vol. V, p. 42

quests in the first half of the 18th century. At all times the Zamorin was successful in obtaining war indemnity from the conquered. In his extremity the Palghat Raja requested help from Mysore to repel the attack of his enemy the Zamorin in the year 1732.¹⁰ This was repeated in 1735 also.¹¹ Another noteworthy instance was in 1737 when the Mysoreans appeared as aggressors.¹² They pillaged and plundered the country. This was continued in 1745 when both armies fought vigorously.¹³ The aim of the Mysoreans was to plunder the country and not to conquer it. The Dutch had no trade contact with the Raja of Palghat but as for the Dutch Moens writes: "we maintain friendship both with Mysore and Palghat."¹⁴

Palghat became the centre of all political activities of Kerala with the advent of the Mysoreans in the year 1757. The Zamorin as usual sent his army under his general Chencheri Namboodiri to Palghat. The Raja of Palghat requested Haidar Ali, then Foujdar of Dindigal for help which was readily extended to him.¹⁵ Thus the Raja of Palghat was one of the Rajas of Kerala who opened the doors of Kerala for the Mysoreans.

10. Ibid: Vol. VII, p. 81

11. Ibid: Vol. X, p. 52

12. Ibid: Vol. XV, p. 42

13. Ibid.

14. Moens Op. Cit., p. 16

15. A Report on the Administration of Malabar - J. Spencer, J. Smee and A. Walker (Second Commissioners of Malabar) 1801, p. 6

Appendix...v

Arakkal Swarupam of the Aly Rajas

This Muslim dynasty ruled over Cannanore. It is believed that one of the Rajas of Chirakkal gave in marriage his sister to one of his Muslim ministers who saved her from drowning in the river. Subsequent to this they established their independent dynasty. Another version is that a merchant prince who was a Muslim fell in love with a princess of the House and married her and became the ancestors of this kingdom. Still another section of historians believe that the Aly Raja established his principality at the dismemberment of the Perumal's empire like other *Swarupams* of Kerala. It is believed that the first ruler of this dynasty was Mohamed Ali and that the dynasty was named after him. This Mohamed Ali, it is further assumed was a convert to Islam whose original name was Mahabali. Still another version about the origin of this designation is that this only Muslim principality of Kerala might have accepted the title 'Ali' after the name of one of the four early Caliphs. As they enjoyed suzerainty over the high seas and remained masters of the Laccadives, and Maldives, islands of the Arabian Sea – they were called the '*Azhi*' rajas or the Lords of the sea, from which the designation the Aly Raja might have been derived.

Anyhow this principality enjoyed full support of the Muslims of Malabar. They played very prominent role in expelling the Portuguese from the Coast of Kerala. A number of naval battles were fought by them against the Portuguese. Thus they carried on continuous warfare with

the Portuguese. The local rajas either supported the Portuguese or made common cause with the Aly Rajas in their fight against the Portuguese. The relation of the Aly Raja with the other rulers of Kerala including the rulers of Chirakkal was conditioned by this factor.

Sometimes the Kolathiris helped the Aly Raja with men and money. But the surrender of Valia Hassan by the Kolathiris to Vasco da Gama and the brutal execution of this merchant of Cannanore brought about an estrangement. This merchant was a close relation of the Arakkal family. Following this a number of skirmishes and open wars occurred between the Kolathiris and the Arakkal swarupam.

The French, the Dutch, and the English sided with one party or other according to their self-interest. Moens points out that these quarrels ran so high about the year 1718 that the trade of the Dutch Company at Cannanore came to a standstill owing to an irreconcilable embitterment between the Nairs of Kolathiris and the people of the Aly Raja on account of the murder of a Muslim priest.¹ When war broke out between the Aly Raja and the Kolathiris in 1721 the English supported the latter and the Dutch supported the former. The contending parties, in spite of the efforts at conciliation made by the Zamorin, the Dutch and the English prolonged their enmity till 1732 when the king of Canara, the northern bordering state of the Kolathiris, invaded the Chirakkal territory. Though the English and the Zamorin indirectly helped the Raja of Chirakkal it was not possible for him to continue the war with the Canarese. Prince Udaya Varma Kolathiri met the Canarese General Ragaunatt and entered into a peace treaty with him. But the next step the Raja adopted was to embark on a joint effort of conquering the town of the Aly Raja. In the Tellicherry Consultations this event is recorded thus: "Imme-

1. D. R. No. 13, p. 143

diately (after signing the peace treaty) the prince gave order that the whole army should pass the Balliapattam and join his forces on the countryside in order to raise the bazaar of Cannanore which was immediately obeyed by Rangaunatt and put in execution."² The Dutch prevailed upon the Canarese to come to an amicable settlement. The English also in their own interest wanted peace. The Canarese withdrew on condition of war indemnity. For the services of the Dutch the Raja promised to supply thousand candies of pepper annually from the year of agreement viz., 1737.

The Canarese attacked the Raja again in the next year. The Dutch could not prevent this onslaught. It was the turn of the English to prevail upon the Canarese to come to an agreement. It was decided that the conquered part of the Kolathiri kingdom would remain with the Canarese. As a token of gratification the Raja gave a beautiful bit of land called Mattume to English. All these attempts to stop the aggression of the Canarese failed. They entered once again in 1739 and conquered the country. The English and the French vied with each other in rendering help to the Kolathiris in their war against the Canarese. This state of war condition prevailed till 1745 when an agreement was reached between the contending parties.

When war broke out between the Canarese and the Kolathiris in 1750-51 it was the turn of the French to be the active supporters of the latter. Acknowledging this service the Raja gave Ramantally to the French. The English on the contrary, exploiting the explosive situation of the Kolathiri kingdom, deposed two princes and attempted to instal another in their stead. The French reinstated the ruler of Badagara which was prejudicial to the English. The English now declared war on the Kolathiri. On this the Kolathiri broke all ties with them and entered into an agreement with

2. Tellicherry Cons. 1732-33, Vol. VI

the Dutch.³ The Aly Raja was also a party to this treaty. But after three years the Aly Raja broke with the Dutch and assisted by the English caused dissensions in the Kolathiri family. The Raja of Chirakkal who could not tolerate the insolence of the Aly Raja again came to friendly terms with the English. With the aid of the English, the Kolathiri attacked the Aly Raja, and besieged him near Cannanore. Finding that they were short of provisions and realising that they would not get timely help from the English and the Dutch, peace was restored to the country through the intermediary of the Raja of Travancore. This perpetual enmity of the Kolathiris against the Aly Raja drove him to seek assistance from elsewhere. Hence his deputation to Haidar Ali inviting him to conquer Kerala. After the war the English signed a treaty with the Raja of Chirakkal on April 21, 1757. By this treaty the Raja was promised help in case of external and internal troubles.⁴ Similar agreements were made with the other princes of the Kolathiri house, viz, Kadathnad, Kottayam (Cotiote), Neleswaram etc. But the English found it well nigh impossible to fulfil the treaty provisions of helping them when Haidar Ali marched against them.

3. Moens: *Memorandum etc.*, p. 145

4. T. F. R. August 24, 1763

FOREIGN POWERS AND THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE RAJAS OF KERALA

Foreign Interest in the Area

The interest of the European powers in this area was motivated by the desire of not only establishing their commercial and colonial supremacy but also carrying on religious propaganda of which no thorough assessment has so far been made. With the advent of the Portuguese began their missionary activities. Writing about the Portuguese possessions in India, A. Galletti in his introduction to *'The Dutch in Malabar'* says, "the towns were not only commercial factories, but Portuguese colonies and centres of Portuguese civilisations."¹ The Dutch secured protectorate over the Christians when they entered into a treaty with the Raja of Cochin after the fall of Portuguese in 1663.² When the English took over the possessions of the Dutch, the native Christians who were called the *'Markkakars'* came under the Company's protection as loyal subjects.³ In fact the English pursued a policy of proselytisation more tactfully. This was done through the agency of Christian missionaries who were liberally patronised by the Company's Government. By these activities they could create loyal supporters.

1. *The Dutch in Malabar* (Introduction) p. 15

2. Treaties — Grandham No. 65

3. I. IXV, S. I., includes a number of letters dealing with the native Christians

The Dutch

All Portuguese possessions on the Coast passed over to the Dutch when the former were defeated in the year 1663. The Portuguese forts of Cannanore, Cochin, Pallipuram and Cranganore came into the possession of the Dutch. In the opening years of the 17th century itself the Dutch entered into a treaty with the Zamorin. This treaty stipulated among many other things "a close alliance, eternal and unbreakable, for the oppressions of the Portuguese and for driving out all their associates out of all the lands of his majesty and also out of the whole of India."⁴ Treaties were also entered into between the King of Cochin and the Dutch.⁵ In the capture of Cochin and the war against the Portuguese, the Zamorin helped the Dutch.⁶ The Zamorin expected in return to make him King of Cochin.⁷ When the Dutch refused even to give the Vypeen island to him, the Zamorin turned against them. Thereafter the relation between the Dutch and the Zamorin was not cordial.⁸

In a summary note given by the Dutch in 1793, they narrate the illtreatment they had experienced at the hands of the Zamorin when he made a surprise attack on Chetwai in January 22, 1715.⁹ The Dutch recaptured the fort only in 1717. Alexander Hamilton asserts that the Zamorin was helped by the English in this war.¹⁰

The Dutch were in no better position so far as Travancore was concerned. Many were the battles in which they had sustained defeat at the hands of Marthanta Varma,

4. De Jonge, Vol. III, p. 150

5. Treaties Grandham No. 64 — Ernakulam Archives

6. Padapattu — p. 16, D. R. No. 13, p. 19

7. Batavia Diary 1663, p. 128

8. D. R. No. 13, p. 19

9. *Joint Commissioners' Report*, para 24

10. Hamilton — Vol I, p. 315

According to Stein Van Gollennesse he first reduced his vassals with the help of the English.¹¹ This is confirmed in a letter from the Chief of Anjengo in 1757 to the Select Committee of Madras.¹² The Dutch at first could not give any help to the local Chieftains as their policy since 1721 was of a strict neutrality, which is clearly depicted in a reply to the Raja of Cochin, when he requested help from them.¹³ But "it was the interest of the Dutch to maintain the position they had acquired of arbitrators in Malabar, to prevent any one prince, growing too powerful, to stop the encroachments on the principalities of Kayamkulam and Quilon where they had factories."¹⁴ Therefore, the Dutch were dragged into a war with the Raja of Travancore.

The war ended in the disastrous failure of the Dutch. The peace of Mavelikara signed in 1753 by them had a definite clause¹⁵ that Marthanta Varma might attack any ruler of Malabar as he choose. From the time of the Treaty they ceased to be a paramount power in Kerala history. They served as advisers to the Raja of Cochin in his political matters. But all his requests to get assistance were turned down by them. When in a letter the Raja expressed his apprehension of the entry of Travancore into his territory and sought Dutch assistance the Dutch Governor of Ceylon replied "in 1740 when the Dutch were at war with Travancore, I required the assistance of other Malabar Rajas, they in spite of the promise to assist the Company not only took a neutral part but secretly assisted the Travancore Raja by sending him shots etc."¹⁶

11. Gollennesse — *Memorandum etc.* p. 53

12. Fort St. George, Military Cons. No. 8

13. Ernakulam Archives — A Descriptive list of papers relating to Dutch period 1795 – 71 No. 9, list LXI/13 series I.

14. D. R. No. 13, p. 23

15. Article Nine of the Treaty

16. Ibid, No. 9, LXI/13, Series I, p. 2727

The Dutch therefore, resolved not to assist the Cochin Raja and other chiefs. Yet the relation with the Raja of Cochin continued till 1825 when their fort at Cochin fell to the English. Thus during the invasion of Haidar Ali, the Dutch were not a power to be reckoned with in the Malabar politics.

The French

The rulers of Cochin and Travancore did not have any kind of relation with the French. No relevant record is available in the State Archives to show any such relation. But passing reference is made by G.B. Melleeson to the effect that Caron, who led a French expedition to the east, "touched at Cochin on December 24, 1645 where he was well received. Thence he continued his voyage, reached Surat in the beginning of 1688 and established there the first French Factory in India."¹⁷ Their activities were mostly confined to North Malabar.

G. B. Melleeson says that a small squadron under the command of M-De. Pardiallen appeared in the year 1725, some four miles south of Tellicherry in a place called Mayyazhi and summoned the town to surrender. After a siege the place was occupied by Francisco Mahe La Bourdonnois. Then the settlement was named after him. This tract of land was taken from the territory of Vazhunnavar of Badagara.

The relations of the French with the Raja of Kadathanad and the Raja of Chirakkal enabled them to play their game by interfering in the local politics of Malabar principalities. The long struggle between the French and the English for the supremacy on the Western Coast began with the establishment of their power in Mahe. In 1728 the French agreed with the English to keep down the price of

17. G. B. Melleeson, *The History of French in India*, p. 50

pepper. But in 1740 desultory fighting between the French and the English was resumed and continued till 1749.¹⁸ In 1756 war broke out in Europe between France and English but neither Tellicherry nor Mahe assumed the offensive till the news was received in 1761 of the fall of Pondicherry. Mahe was then surrendered to the English but was restored to the French in 1765. When Haidar Ali invaded Malabar in 1766, the French supported him. In March 1779, however, in spite of the assistance from Haidar Ali Mahe was again taken by the English and their allies. This was a severe blow to Haidar Ali. He, therefore, sent a large force against the English and evacuated Mahe in 1779. In 1782 the English succeeded in destroying the Mysorean army and capturing Mahe. Mahe was finally restored in 1819.¹⁹ Thus in the latter half of the 18th century Mahe was thrice taken by the English and was subsequently restored. In 1793 it capitulated for the fourth time and was not finally restored to France till the peace of 1870. The English with the determination of extirpating the French from Kerala politics actively helped the native princes even at the time of peace. Thus the English were successful in instigating the Rajas of Neeleswaram, Chirakkal, Kottayam and Cannanore to expel the French from their territory. The Kolathiris dispossessed them of their factories in his territory and Aly Raja purchased their fort at Cannanore.²⁰ The Raja of Neeleswaram with the help of the English expelled them from their territory. Finally on the eve of Haidar Ali's conquest of Malabar they were confined to their only settlement of Kerala viz., Mahe. Koringottu Nair was the only ally of the French in Malabar during this time.

The English

The English had their first contact with the Zamorin when they entered into a treaty with him in 1615, when

18. Fifth Tour of Sir Arthur Lawley, p. 21

19. Ibid.

20. D. R. 13, p. 19

Captain Keeling with three ships touched Cranganore.²¹ The Zamorin expected assistance against the Portuguese but when the English ships sailed away leaving 10 men to build a factory, the Zamorin showed scant courtesy to the Factors. A few Englishmen settled in Cochin in 1635 but at the fall of Cochin in 1663 retired to Ponnani where they had established a factory. The English opened a factory at Calicut in 1664.²² As the Zamorin was not of much help they shifted their activities to Tellicherry which was obtained from one of the families of Kolathiri – the Vadakkellankur or Northern Regent in 1708.²³ In 1690 they purchased a plot from the Rani of Attingal and established a fortified factory. In their attempt to dislodge other foreign powers the English always gave support to the native princes and effected alliances with them. Dharmapattanam, an island near Tellicherry was obtained from the Prince Regent the Thekkellankur of the Kolathiri family in the year 1734.²⁴

In December 1756, Kottayam entered into a treaty with the English²⁵ and in April 1757 the Prince Regent of Kolathiri dynasty also followed suit. The Raja of Neeleswaram and even the Zamorin entered into their alliance. In 1717 when the Zamorin was at war with the Dutch he got support from the English. This is entered in the Tellicherry Diary. The Linguist is reported as observing “when this fort at Tellicherry was set about the building Mr. Adams got leave from the Zamorine to report what materials he should want from Calicut, customs free, which he believed the Zamorin readily granted as Mr. Adams was very serviceable to him by assisting him at his wars against the Dutch.”²⁶

21. Printed in Foster's letters received by the English East India Company

22. *Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 55, p. 8, para 9.* Fifth Tour of Sir Arthur Lawley, p. 22

23. *Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 55, p. 8, para 9*

24. *Tellicherry Cons. 1734-35, Vol. VII*

25. Logan — *Treaties etc.* i. cxxi

26. *Tellicherry Diary, 1743-44, p. 67*

The relation of the Raja of Travancore with the English was very close. Travancore before the accession of Marthanta Varma in 1728 was in a state of anarchy. The powerful chieftains and Brahmin priests shared the royal authority. These chieftains mercilessly killed the chief of Anjengo Factory and his retinue in 1721. The Company wanted a strong monarch who could check the anarchy of feudal chieftains and thereby facilitate the promotion of trade peacefully. They therefore made treaties with the Raja of Travancore. With the help of the English, Marthanta Varma easily crushed the Nair Chieftains and extended his kingdom to the borders of the Kingdoms of the Zamorin and Cochin. The active support of the English elevated him to the position of the most important power of Kerala. This friendship with the English was faithfully maintained by his successor, Rama Varma who was styled as the *Dharma Raja* of Travancore.

The subsequent history of Kerala should be viewed in the light of the above discussions. Travancore had emerged as the greatest power during this period. The English at the same time became the most important force among the foreign powers. The close friendship between the two and their concerted action prevented Haidar Ali and later Tipu Sultan from carrying out their schemes of conquest of the whole of Kerala.

Appendix . . . vii

Nairs

The term 'Nair' was originally a designation meaning literally commandant. Buchanan enumerates 12 sub-divisions of Nair caste and gives distinct functions enjoined on each.¹

Throughout the medieval period, they were the militia of the land. Jonathan Duncan gives a description of the Nair soldier "who, walks along holding up his naked sword, with the same kind of unconcern as travellers in other countries carry in their hands a cane or walking staff. I have observed others of them have it fastened to their back, the hilt being stuck in their waste band and the blade rising up and glittering between their shoulders."² They were the professional soldiers of the country. Duarte Barbosa wrote in detail about them. "The Nairs are the gentry", observes Barbosa, "and have no other duty than to carry on war..."³

They were organised under *Taras* which were autonomous bodies resembling independent principalities. The linguist of the East India Company wrote from Calicut in 1746, "there, Nayars being heads of the Calicut people, resemble the Parliament and do not obey the king's dictates in all things, but chastise his ministers when they do unwarrantable acts."⁴ No doubt the kingly power was very much limited by them, at a time when a strong monarchy

1. Buchanan, Vol. II. pp. 408-409
2. Asiatic Research, Vol. V, pp. 10 and 18
3. Duarte Barbosa: Op. Cit. p. 124
4. T. P. R. May 20, 1746

was a sheer necessity. It was the Nairs with the unquestioned right 'to kill and to be killed' that prevented the rise of monarchical despotism and paved the way for parceling out the country into congeries of independent principalities.

The Nairs follow the '*Marumakkathayam*' system of inheritance (Matriarchal system). According to the system the sons and daughters are excluded from inheriting the properties of their parents whereas the sons of sisters are the claimants to their uncle's estates.⁵ Another peculiarity of observance is that they live in undivided families which are called *Taravads*. The eldest male member through the maternal line is the manager of all *Taravad* properties. He is called *Karanavan* and enjoys absolute control over the *taravad*. The other members are maintained by the *taravad* property and succeed in order of seniority to the *Karanavanship*.

The most curious of all was their marriage system. The Nair ladies were at liberty to receive and divorce any number of men at their will and pleasure.⁶ There was no legal marriage among them. Barbosa observes, "Nairs are not married nor maintain women or children; their nephews, the sons of their sisters are their heirs, the Nair women are all accustomed to do with themselves what they please with Brahmins or Nairs but not other people of lower class under pain of death..."⁷ The Malabar Commissioners in 1792 remarked "their women mix freely with men and have conjugal relations with many of their caste and the high caste Namboodiris. The reason for the sons of sisters inheriting

5. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 55, pp. II-12. para 10

6. Ibid, p. 13

7. Barbosa, Op. cit. p. 124

property is therefore very clear.....”⁸ This observation is substantially supported by many other writers.⁹

Thus the form of conjugal relations then prevalent became polyandry in practice. Buchanan describing the system says that if a Nair woman tells that she has connection with a number of men, this will not diminish her status in the society. On the other hand, it was considered a matter of prestige if she could count some Brahmins and Chieftains among her many paramours.¹⁰ It was against these political privileges and caste practices, that Haidar Ali and later Tipu Sultan had to fight.

8. Fgn. Misc. S. No. 55. p. 14

9. See the following: Hamilton, *New Account of the East Indies*, Vol. I, p. 310; Buchanan Vol. II, pp. 410-12; Sheik Zainuddeen, *Op. cit.* p. 73, Abdul Razaak, *Travels* Vol. II, p. 354, Nicolo Conti *Travels* p. 145

10. Buchanan, Vol. II, p. 472

Appendix...viii

Mappillas

The religion of Islam spread rapidly in the Malabar coast through the agency of Arab merchants who poured into this country from an early date. Traditions claim that the last of the Malabar emperors, the famous Cheraman Perumal,¹ had so great a respect for Islam that he not merely

- 1, The strong tradition prevailing in Kerala is that the last of the Perumals (Emperor) — the Cheraman Perumal — met some Arab merchants who came to his capital at Cranganore on their way to Ceylon. Having come to know from them the teachings of the Prophet, the Perumal requested them for taking him to Mecca on their return voyage to which they agreed. Perumal it is said made all arrangements to set sail for Mecca and divided his Empire among his relatives and Chieftains. It is believed that he left for Mecca with the Arab merchants on August 825 A. D. It is significant to note that all royal dynasties in Kerala trace their origin from Cheraman Perumal. Moens (*Memorandum etc.* p. 196), Buchanan (*A Journey from Madras etc.* Vol. II, p. 361) Francis Day (*The land of the Perumals* p. 410), Sheik Zainuddeen (*Tuha-fat-ul-Mujahideen*, pp. 44-56) and others describe the story of this great event. Pointing out a tomb of a Hindu King who became a convert to Islam at Zaphar on the Arabian Coast with the inscription "Abdurahiman Zamori arrived A. H. 212 — died H. A. 216 (corresponding to 827-831 A. D.) W. Logan identifies Cheraman Perumal with Sthanu Ravi and suggested that the Kollam Era which began in August 825 and is still in general use in Kerala dates from his departure for Mecca". (Malabar Manual Vol. I, p. 288) The second Malabar Commissioners of 1801 were the first to bring out the traditions of Kollam Era started in commemoration of the Departure of Cheraman Perumal to Mecca (Second Malabar Commissioners letter, para 5). It was a regular practice with the Zamorin of Kozhikode and the Raja of Travancore to make a solemn declaration at their coronation ceremonies that they would rule only, 'until their uncle returns from Mecca' (*Madras Govt. Museum Bulletin* II p. 295; Logan Vol I, p. 231; Nagam Aiya, *Travancore State Manual* Vol. I, p. 225). But some modern scholars attempt to ignore this strong tradition on flimsy grounds. Here it will be out of place to enter into a detailed discussion on the subject.

embraced it² and tried to spread it among the subjects, but went in the 9th century to Mecca and from there sent letters to the Malabar rulers requiring them to favour the Muslim missionaries in everything.³ The low caste Hindus considered conversion to Islam as an emancipation from caste slavery and prejudices. Barbosa writing in the 16th century remarks: "If the King of Portugal had not discovered India, Malabar would already have been in the hands of the Moors, and would have had a Moorish King."⁴

The Muslims of Kerala are called Mappillas. This was a title conferred on their favourites by the ruling Rajas which was taken up as a matter of privilege by the posterity. The word Mappilla is a contraction of Maha (Great) and Pilla (child).⁵ The Nairs of Travancore even now use this honourary title of Pillai with their names.

All writers agree that till the advent of the Portuguese, Muslims were a privileged community and were highly esteemed by the rulers and the people alike. Moens says, "the greatest number of Moors are found in the kingdom of Zamorin, where they swam, and where they have generally had a finger in the Government..."⁶ The establishment of a Muslim kingdom at Cannanore and its important role in the latter half of 18th century are matters that require special treatment. The Aly Raja of Cannanore invited Haidar Ali to invade Malabar and helped him in his designs.⁷ Muslims as a whole supported the Mysoreans in their wars and administration. Since Muslims as a community fought against the English with Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan, they were penalised by them when the Company established their Government.

2. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 55. p. 4, para 4

3. Moens, *Memorandum etc.* p. 199

4. Barbosa, *op. cit.* p. 321

5. Hamid Ali, *Mopillas*, Chapter XXIII

6. Moens, *op. cit.* p. 199

7. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 55, p. 21, para 20

Appendix...ix

The Raja of Cochin :

The state was originally known as Perumpadappu and the ruling family was known Perumpadappu Swarupam. It is so called after the village of the same name in the Ponnani Taluk of Palghat District which is said to have been the original seat of the family. It was there that the coronation ceremony was performed till the middle of the 17th century. The Rajas of Cochin claim their descent from Cheraman Perumal.¹ They were Kshatriya rulers.² When Barbosa visited the country, the Cochin Raja was not as powerful a king as the Zamorin of Kozhikode.³ But in the first half of the 17th century Cochin became an important kingdom with extensive territories. She had under her a number of vassal principalities. The princes of Purakkad, Parur, Vadakkan, kur and Alangad were known as the pillars of Cochin. The Dutch Governor Gollennesse in the year 1743 referred to the above principalities as the four states of Cochin.⁴ But the rise of Marthanta Varma of Travancore upset the political balance. On the eve of the Mysore invasion of Malabar, Cochin was a small state.

The relation of the Raja of Cochin with the other rulers of Kerala was conditioned by the fear that he might

1. *Keralacharithram* — Grandham No. 18, p. 5

2. Translation of a Record Grandhavari in the State Archives (Ernakulam), p. 5. — Vide Manuscript Grandhavari in the Tripunithura Manuscript Library.

3. Barbosa: *Description of the Coasts of Africa and Malabar* p. 150

4. *Padappattu* — *Sree Moolam Malayala Bhasha Granthangam* No.5, p.51

lose his kingdom by the aggression of others. He had recognised the Zamorin of Kozhikode as the suzerain in the 15th century. But the Raja of Cochin took the earliest opportunity to throw away the paramountcy of the Zamorin. This caused a series of wars. He allied with the Portuguese and later with the Dutch as he could not maintain his authority without the help of any of these foreign powers and as his kingdom was threatened by the Zamorin from the north and Marthanta Varma from the south. Thus the Raja of Cochin relied on the help and protection of foreign powers. The mutual jealousy and enmity of the local powers had driven the Raja to take asylum under the foreigners.

This is clearly brought out in a letter dated September 15, 1705 from the Governor General of Batavia in reply to a letter of the Raja of Cochin. It contains the words: "the most important enemy of Cochin is the Zamorin and the Dutch officer at Cochin who will speak everything to the Highness. The Company would advocate all just cause."⁵ But they found themselves helpless when the Zamorin started his conquest in 1752. The Raja of Cochin now realised that the Dutch was of no use to repel the aggression of the Zamorin. Therefore he turned towards Travancore for help. Negotiations were ably conducted. Thus a treaty of perpetual friendship was signed between Cochin and Travancore on December 26, 1761.⁶ Immediately after the Treaty the Raja of Travancore proclaimed war on the Zamorin and regained from him Cranganore, Parur and Verapoly. The war that ensued was detrimental to the Zamorin. He was compelled to come to terms with Travancore and Cochin. It was settled that in case there was a dispute between Cochin and the Zamorin, the matter would be settled by Travancore. This Treaty which ended the age-long war between Nedi-yiruppu (Zamorin) and the Perumpadappu (Cochin) swarupams is of great significance in the history of Kerala.

5. Ernakulam Archives — List LXI iii Series I, p. 2721

6. Logan: Treaties, CXXIV and XXV

Though the Raja of Cochin in his plight had to seek assistance from Travancore, their relation was not harmonious in the beginning when Marthanta Varma came to power in Travancore. The country between Quilon and Cape Comorin was extended to further north after the Treaty of Mavelikkara between the Dutch and Travancore on August 15, 1753. The Rajas of Cochin fully understood the disastrous implications of these treaties but would do nothing more than complain bitterly to the supreme Government at Batavia. Taking advantage of a desension in the royal family of Cochin, the Raja of Travancore marched his army against the Cochin territory. In the war that followed the Raja of Cochin had to sign a treaty proposed by Travancore. The Raja of Cochin who was humiliated by this treaty took advantage of the revolt of some vanguished princes. A confederacy was formed against Travancore consisting of Kayamkulam, Ambalapuzha, Changanacherry and other principalities under the leadership of Cochin. This combined force also was defeated by Travancore. The Travancore force conquered all territories upto Aroor river and the Raja of Cochin had to sue for peace. These territories were not returned to him. After this loss of territories and defeat the Raja of Cochin found that the Zamorin was pressing him hard from the northern side.

He appealed to Travancore for help which was promptly given to him. Moens writes in 1781 "the King of Cochin is only the king of his territory in name and the king of Travancore, king of Cochin."⁷ Pressed from two sides Cochin remained as a buffer state between Travancore and Kozhikode during the period under review.

Appendix...X

NAMBOODIRIS

Of the highest caste in Kerala are the Namboodiris. They were respected by all. In approaching a Namboodiri, those male or female belonging to castes below them had to uncover their bosom as a token of respect.¹ "His person is holy, his directions are commands, his movements are processions, his meal is nectar, he is the holiest of the human beings, he is the representative of God on earth."²

Namboodiris are polluted by the touch of all castes below them and by the approach of all lower than Nairs. They follow the *Makkathayam* (Patriarchal) family system and the general rule is that only the eldest son is allowed to contract regular marriage with a Namboodiri woman, others being restricted to *Sambandhams*³ with Nair women. This is testified by all writers who have dealt with the subject. But the women of their caste were carefully guarded and used to seclusion.

The tradition current in Kerala is that after reclaiming the land from the sea, Parasurama made it a gift to the Namboodiris, hence they are the owners of all lands in Kerala. No other caste was allowed to learn and propagate knowledge so that all the learned professions also came to be monopolised by them.

1. Logan, Vol. I, pp. 127-28

2. *Travancore Census Report 1873-75*, p. 191

3. *Sambandham* was a peculiar kind of irregular marriage where the person cohabits with Nair ladies without having any responsibility to maintain her or the progeny.

Appendix...XI

ECONOMIC CONDITION

The arable land in Kerala is divided into highland or dry land, plain land or wet land, and coastal land or garden land for the purposes of agriculture. Paddy is the staple crop which grows luxuriantly in the deep valleys and wet lands. Paddy was cultivated too extensively that after the local consumption, surplus rice was exported, during the period under survey. In the garden lands, cocoa and areca palms, jack trees and pepper vines, betel vines, mango trees, plantains, pineapples and saffron are also grown in addition to many spices and vegetables. By far the most important cultivation in the garden lands is cocoanut. This tree provides the raw materials for many kinds of manufactured goods for export as well as for local consumption.

But the landed property was in the hands of a few. The condition of the ordinary peasant was deplorable. He was attached to the soil. The merits and evils of the feudal system were in full swing during this period. In the 18th century when there was no question of industrial employment almost the whole population depended upon agriculture. The changes in the agrarian relations and land tenures led to a number of bloody rebellions in Malabar. In fact all the so-called 'Mappilla Rebellions' of Malabar had a direct bearing on the agrarian question of Kerala.

The system of land tenure in Kerala was very different from that of any part of India. Here the ownership of the land was not with the rulers but with the landlords who were

called *Jenmis*. Major Walker in his *Report on the land Tenures of Malabar* made it very clear in 1801, when he said "in no country in the world is the nature of this species of property better understood than in Malabar, nor its right more tenaciously maintained... The Jenmakaran possesses entire right to the soil and no earthly authority can with justice deprive him of it."¹ In the years 1807 and 1815 when Thackerary and Major Warden submitted their Reports to the Board of Revenue, they declared, "the whole of the land in Malabar, cultivated and uncultivated, is private property and held by *Jenm* right."² .. the *Jenm* right of Malabar, vests in the holder an absolute right in the soil."³ Dr. Buchanan, a careful observer wrote in 1801, the peculiar tradition in the ownership of lands with the *Jenmis* and gave a detailed description of the system of land tenure in his invaluable work.⁴

The Joint Commissioners of Malabar in 1792 reported that the possession of land was of two descriptions. Firstly, *Jenm-kaars* or free holders who held their lands either by purchase or by hereditary descent and secondly *Kanom-kaars* or mortgagees to whom an actual delivery of the land appeared to be made although the money taken upon it was not at all proportionate to the value of the land.⁵ *Kanamdar* deposits an amount with the landlord which was called *Kanam*.⁶ An annual rent *pattam* is fixed according to the capacity of land and from it the tenant is entitled to deduct the interest due to him on the amount of the *Kanam*: the net balance payable to the *Jenmi* is called *purappad*.⁷ The properitor always reserved a right of resuming

1. Major Walker: *Report on the Land Tenure of Malabar*, p. 21 para 12

2. Thackeray's *Report to the Board of Revenue*, dated August 4, 1807

3. Warden's *Report* dated September 12, 1815

4. Buchanan, Vol. II, pp. 358-380

5. Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 56, p. 861

6. Ibid, pp. 862-63

7. Ibid, p. 860

the estates whenever he pleased by paying up the sum originally advanced and no allowance was made for improvements.⁸ In the *Kuzhikanom* lease the sum to be expended on improvements is considered as the advance. The *otti* differs from the *Kanom* in that the *Jenmi* gets no *purappad* and the *ottidar* has the right of pre-emption if the *jenmi* wishes to sell. *Panayam* is a simple mortgage with or without possession. *Andaruthipanayam* is a mortgage of which the amount given will be forfeited at the expiry of the stipulated period through the usufruct and the land then reverted free of encumbrance to the mortgagor. *Verumpatom* is a simple lease from year to year.

The peculiar characteristic of the system of land tenure was that the ruler had no right to tax the land nor was he competent to dictate terms on different tenures. The *Jenmis* were feudal overlords without any obligation whatsoever to the rulers. This peculiar nature of the agrarian relations and ownership of the property underwent great changes with the advent of the *Mysoreans*.

With the entry of *European* powers, trade and commerce received great impetus. Pepper was the important attraction of foreign merchants. Gollennesse, the Dutch Governor of *Malabar* wrote in 1743 "I put pepper in the first place because the Honourable *Company* maintains its expensive establishments on this Coast that belong to that branch of trade"⁹ Moens also details out the trade and commerce of the Dutch up to the year 1781 in his *Memorandum*.¹⁰ The list of the English trade contracts are given in 'The letters to Fort St. George 1765' published by the *Tamilnad Archives*.¹¹

8. Buchanan, Vol. II, p. 367

9. Gollennesse, *Memorandum etc.* p. 71

10. Moens, *Memorandum etc.* pp. 214-226

11. Letters to the Fort St. George, Vol. XIV. pp. 63-65

Though trade and commerce were centred on pepper and other spices, they traded in many other articles. War materials found an important place in the imports to this country. "A candy of pepper for every musket you let me have", was a proposal made by Marthanta Varma to the Anjengo Factors in 1744.¹²

By these trade activities, the importance of certain ancient ports like Cranganore, Porakkat, Kayamkulam and Colachel had declined very much and gave place to the rise of new towns and cities like Cochin, Alleppey, Cannanore and Quilon.

But the trade and commerce did not enrich the people in general nor did the local rulers benefit much from it. In all the trade contracts, the Rajas promised to supply goods on a lesser price than the market rate in exchange of fire arms. In the first instance because of the compulsory procurement of these commodities, the cultivator did not get his competitive price for his goods. Secondly the goods obtained by the rulers in exchange were war materials that might not have helped to ameliorate the lot of the subjects.

Social Conditions

The division of the society into Brahmins, Kshatriyas Vaisyas and Sudras elsewhere in India, cannot easily be traced in the caste compartments of Kerala. The absence of Vaisyas in the Hindu Society of Kerala is conspicuous and therefore Jews, Christians and Muslims occupy this position as they were traders and merchants of the country. In the caste heirarchy Namboodiri Brahmins come first. Next to them are Nairs. These were the two important castes who were the custodians of religious customs and political institutions respectively.

12. Anjengo Diary. 1744

All others were polluting castes. The Malayalees follow two kinds of pollutions, viz. atmospheric pollution and pollution by actual contact. Recognised scale of distance was prescribed for each polluting caste to keep away from higher castes. The distance a Nayadi has to keep between himself and a high caste was 72 feet, a Pulayan 64 feet, a Mukkuvan 24 feet, and an Ezhava 18 feet.¹³ "If a Chogan or Ezhava, dared to pollute a Nair by approaching nearer than the prescribed distance he was at liberty to cut him down."¹⁴ Buchanan testifies that the Nairs were free to kill any low caste Hindu who did not observe the rule of pollution.¹⁵

The system totally barred the bulk of the community from exercising their human rights. Jews, Christians and Muslims were not considered having atmospheric pollution. They came under the second category of polluting by touch.¹⁶ This is corroborated by Ibn Battutta and other writers.¹⁷ The society was thus separated into water-tight compartments of castes and thereby the Kerala Hindus lacked cohesion.

13. W, Logan, Vol. I, p. 118

14. Buchanan, Vol. II, p. 339, Also see L. A. Ananthakrishna Iyer, *Cochin, Caste and Tribes*, p. 339

15. Buchanan, Vol. I, p. 338

16. Sholk Zainuddeen: *Tuhfath-ul-Mujahideen*, p. 82

17. Ibn Battuta, p. 26

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